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This dissertation examines the relationship that exists between two distinct
and seemingly incompatible bodies of scholarship within the field of con-
temporary philosophy of technology. The first, as argued by postmodern
pragmatist Barry Allen, posits that our tools and what we make with them
are epistemically important; disputing the idea that knowledge is strictly
sentential or propositional, he claims instead that knowledge is the product
of a performance that is both superlative and artefactual, rendering technol-
ogy importantly world-constituting. The second, as argued by Heidegger
and his inheritors, is that technology is ontologically problematic; rather
than technology being evidence of performative knowledge, it is instead
existentially threatening by virtue of the fact that it changes the tenor of
our relationship with the world-as-given. Despite the fact that these claims
seem prima facie incompatible, I argue that they may be successfully rec-
onciled by introducing a third body of scholarship: the philosophy of pho-
tography. For it is the case, I argue, that although we, qua human beings,
occupy lifeworlds that are necessarily constituted by technology, technol-
ogy also induces a kind of phenomenological scepticism: a concern that
mediated action precludes us from the possibility of authentic experience.
Arguing in favour of the sentiment that photographs serve as a kind of phe-
nomenal anchor—a kind of machine for living—I claim that photographic
images provide a panacea to this existential concern: despite being epistem-
ically problematic, it is this selfsame epistemic “specialness” of photographs
that forces us to phenomenologically recommit, if only temporarily, to the
world in a serious way. Consequently, it is my belief that an analysis of
our artefacts and the way they function is fundamentally incomplete with-
out an analysis of the epistemic and ontological problems introduced of the
photographic image; as I will demonstrate, the photographic image casts an
extremely long shadow over the philosophy of technology.
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A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular
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1 PRE FACE : V I EW ING THE WORLD
A film is a ribbon of dreams. The camera is much
more than a recording apparatus; it is a medium via
which messages reach us from another world that is
not ours and that brings us to the heart of a great
secret. Here magic begins. (Orson Welles, quoted in
Cowie, 1973: i)
What you have in front of you is an analysis, and reconciliation, of two os-
tensibly incompatible bodies of work within the field of philosophy of tech-
nology: the former a pragmatic epistemology of artefactual performance
deeply entrenched within the analytic tradition; the latter a reading of tech-
nology as ontologically threatening that is equally indebted to the Conti-
nental tradition. The first, as argued by philosopher Barry Allen, posits that
our tools and what we make with them are epistemically important; disput-
ing the idea that knowledge is strictly sentential or propositional, he claims
instead that knowledge is the product of a performance that is both superla-
tive and artefactual, rendering technology importantly world-constituting.
The second, as argued by Heidegger and his inheritors, is that technology
is ontologically problematic; rather than technology being evidence of per-
formative knowledge, it is instead existentially threatening by virtue of the
fact that it changes the tenor of our relationship with the world-as-given.
Despite the fact that these claims seem prima facie incompatible, I argue
that they may be successfully reconciled by introducing a third body of
scholarship: the philosophy of photography. For it is the case, I contend,
that although we, qua human beings, occupy lifeworlds that are necessarily
constituted by technology, technology also induces a kind of phenomeno-
logical scepticism: a concern that mediated action precludes us from the
possibility of authentic experience. Arguing in favour of the sentiment that
photographs serve as a kind of phenomenal anchor—a kind of “machine for
living”—I claim that photographic images provide a panacea to this exis-
tential concern: despite being epistemically problematic, it is this selfsame
epistemic “specialness” of photographs that forces us to phenomenologi-
cally recommit, if only temporarily, to the world in a serious way. Conse-
quently, it is my belief that an analysis of our artefacts and the way they
function is fundamentally incomplete without an analysis of the epistemic
and ontological problems introduced of the photographic image; as I will
demonstrate, the photographic image casts an extremely long shadow over
the philosophy of technology.
Accordingly, I began this work with two things in mind. The first was a
concern for the technological: a deep, almost erotic fascination with the pro-
cesses by which things are made and our relationships with those things—
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both in the process of creation and afterwards. For technology has al-
ways had an uncertain—one might even say threatening—role in philosophy.
From Aristotle onwards, the character of technology assumes this oddly
contingent character; it exhibits a kind of shiftless casuistry, unmoored from
the realm of absolutes. Consider: in Physics, Aristotle makes the claim that
“Of things that exist, some exist by nature, some from other causes” (Aris-
totle, 1941, 192b8). The distinction that he renders between the two cate-
gories is the intuition that kicks off the classical story: animals, plants and
the “simple bodies” of the classical elements exist by nature, whereas the
relics of material culture (“a bed and a coat and anything else of that sort”)
are those things that are derived from some other source (192b18). Things
that exist by nature have within themselves “a principle of motion and of
stationariness” and are accordingly subject to certain natural rhythms ren-
dering them dynamical; when a seedling grows into a grand tree, or a fire
dances upwards, or tidal patterns align with the phases of the moon, they
are acting according to their inherent nature—something is natural when it
has a nature; i.e.: they are natural in the sense that their existence is not
premised upon human interference. Moreover, these non-intentioned enti-
ties and the natures that they obey are the good and proper object of what
Aristotle dubs episte¯me¯, commonly rendered as “scientific knowledge”. For
Aristotle, episte¯me¯ is a knowledge of first principles and natural things; of
inalienable qualities extrapolated from static base claims. It is a form of
purely deductive knowledge; the realm of propositions regarding discrete,
immutable natures:
We all conceive that a thing which we know scientifically can-
not vary; when a thing that can vary is beyond the range of our
observation, we do not know whether it exists or not. An ob-
ject of Scientific Knowledge, therefore, exists of necessity. It is
therefore eternal, for everything existing of absolute necessity
is eternal; and what is eternal does not come into existence or
perish. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1139b)
Conversely, those things that exist by other causes have no innate impulse
to change beyond what the nature of that which it is composed: “nature is a
source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs
primarily, in virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute”
(192b20-23). Because they are not the products of the objects of episte¯me¯,
Aristotle’s “artificial products” (that is, the products of artifice) do not have
the source of their own production. Rather, artificial products are the re-
sult of intentioned techne¯, techne¯ being the form of knowledge that deals
with things that change. Unlike episte¯me¯, there is a sort of dynamism to
techne¯, as it is the process of a kind of intelligible, directed action. Neither
doxa, the unfettered opinions and beliefs of the populace, nor mere experi-
ence (empeiria), techne¯ is something very much like the realm of craft, or
specialised knowledge—sculpture, ship-building, carpentry, statesmanship.
Instances of techne¯ cannot be reduced to nor entirely extrapolated from first
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principles or propositional claims, because the process itself is necessarily
adaptive. The making of something like a wooden table is one of dynam-
ical, bodily feedback; of a series of iterations wherein no individual act is
identical to any other simply by virtue of the changing shape of the timber
substrate. “Art [techne¯] does not deal with things that exist or come into
existence of necessity [. . . ]. [Art deals] with that which admits of variation”
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1140a).
The fact that “art”—that is to say, technology—is suspect because it “ad-
mits of variation” is a crucial point. As I demonstrate in the next section,
the assumption that technology and workmanship is somehow a shiftless or
debased form of knowledge when compared to propositional claims is one
that has had a profound influence on the Western philosophical canon. Al-
though I cannot provide a diagnosis for why this is the case—at least, beyond
the purest self interest on the part of Plato and his acolytes1—this marginali-
sation of technology in the philosophical literature has no doubt influenced
the suspicion with which it is often treated, particularly by philosophers of
an Heideggerian bent. For it is with Heidegger that phenomenology and
the study of technics become properly welded; although the objects of his
inquiry expands from analyses of tool-being in his earlier works (hammers,
tables, chairs) to analyses of the technological lifeworld in later publications
(power stations, cities, technological superstructures), Heidegger is one of
the first philosophers of the 20th century to take questions of technology
seriously, particularly with regards to how technology can present an ex-
istential threat to the tenor of our collective lived experience. We will be
examining some of these intuitions further in the piece.
The second thing that interested me came to my attention rather more
slowly, but in hindsight was equally inescapable. Thanks to my other aca-
demic interests, I’ve come into possession of a small but highly compelling
collection of glossy prints and slightly faded black-and-white photographs
from the 1940s, 50s and 60s—a vision of things to come as promulgated by
those writing (and sometimes dying) decades before I was born. Despite,
or even because, they were so deeply inaccurate, I found those doctored
photographs of our thwarted future—flying cars, robot servants, Jetsonian
spaceflight, post-scarcity economics—bizarrely compelling. Though I was
obviously in possession of the fact that these photographs were elaborate
fictions, there was and remains something about the photos of figures such
as the Lee Merlin, winner of the 1957 Miss Atomic Bomb beauty pageant
(figure 19) that made me take them seriously; a certain quality inherent to
those images had that made them feel something like the truth. Thus the sec-
ond question with which this work is concerned: what is the relationship
that holds between photographs and the world? Though this is perhaps the
question at the heart of the philosophies of the photographic image (that is,
analytic philosophy of film and philosophy of photography, both of which
find their genesis in Stanley Cavell’s The World Viewed), it is a question that
1 It seems natural to valorise the life of the mind when one has no particular talent for manual
labour.
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has attracted, in my view, a dearth of satisfying answers. For it is almost as
if the photographic image is somehow more convincing than other kinds of
image—as if there is something mysterious, almost mystical, about its very
nature that warrants our attention. For that matter, it is almost as if we
would like to say that the photographic image is true, that it has identity
with the world, but are unable. It is in this vein that Cavell notes that “[a]
photograph does not present us with “likenesses” of things; it presents us,
we want to say, with the things themselves. But wanting to say that may
well make us ontologically restless” (Cavell, 1979: 17). Even when produc-
ing a veridically minimal image—say, a David LaChapelle photograph—our
intuitions demand that we take serious the idea the photographic image re-
tains a presumption of objectivity that other forms of representation do not.
The image, far more than painting or literature, is parasitic upon the Real,
and so we react to it as if the image is reflecting Real things. Or even more
explicitly: “We might say: A painting is a world; a photograph is of the
world” (Cavell, 1979: 24).
This is a powerful intuition: we want to be able to say that a photograph
of something is evidence of an event or an object having been the case.
When we see events unfold on CCTV, we want to say that we know that
they occurred by virtue of the fact that they were captured; when a pri-
vate eye shows a cuckolded husband photographic evidence of his wife’s
infidelity with a local politician and a well-hung sex dwarf, it seems natu-
ral to say that we know know that infidelity to be the case. That is to say:
we believe that photographic apparatuses—and that which they produce,
photographic images—are, by virtue of their ostensive and automatic abil-
ity to represent veridically reliable representations, somehow truth-bearing
or world-bearing; they seem to capture knowable facts about the world in
the former case, or that they seem to explicitly capture the world in the
latter. However, this assumption seems prima facie incompatible with the
idea that technology is somehow disreputable, dangerous or otherwise sus-
pect; how is it that we can call photographs truth-bearing or world-bearing
if they are just as misleading (perhaps even more misleading) as any other
kind of technological apparatus? Are they, as our intuitions seem to suggest,
epistemically load-bearing? As I will explore in my concluding chapters, al-
though it is the ostensive automatism underpinning photographic processes
that forces us to take them seriously, this automatism also seems to prob-
lematise the idea that technology is innately existentially threatening.
So where to begin? Some breed of phenomenological analysis seems like
an obvious choice. Phenomenology is, after all, the study of appearances, of
things as they appear to consciousness; moreover, as the intellectual move-
ment to which Heidegger belonged, an analysis of phenomenological tech-
nics might seem appropriate. Nonetheless, I have decided against begin-
ning this thesis with Heidegger or any of his subsequent readers. Although
Heidegger and his inheritors are the subject of chapter 3, I begin chap-
ter 2 with a brief discussion of the intentional relationships we have with
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our artefacts when we produce them, arguing that propositional theories of
knowledge are insufficient to account for certain kinds of intelligible, knowl-
edgeable, intentional activities—the kinds of activities that David Pye refers
to as constituting “the workmanship of risk” (chapter 2.1).2 Given that ob-
servation, I move to a discussion of the pre-linguistic origins of material
culture, some 2.6 million years ago, wherein I claim, referring to the work
of philosopher Barry Allen and anthropologist Roy Rappaport, that propo-
sitional accounts of knowledge are also historically untenable in that recog-
nisably knowledgeable activity—the making of tools—predates language by
over two million years. Indeed, Allen and Rappaport both argue that tech-
nology in an important sense serves to necessarily constitute the human
being, with the idea of a pre-technological yet linguistic human a theoretic
impossibility. According to Allen, a pre-technological human would be no
human at all; it is an entity with which we would share none of the im-
portant conditions for humanhood. Rather, the qualities that we consider
to be intrinsically human, rather than being premised upon a linguistic or
propositional capacity, are instead premised upon participating in a certain
kind of intentioned, mutually complementary economy of artefactualised
action—an actual quite unlike the indexical instances of tool use in non-
human animals (chapter 2.2).3
Subsequently, I argue in favour of the epistemic account outlined by Allen
in his Knowledge and Civilization and Artifice and Design, wherein he claims
that technology, in addition to being human-constituting, is also knowledge-
and world-constituting. Our artefacts, whether physical, linguistic or cog-
nitive, are the product of a kind of intentional, superlative artefactual per-
formance that is itself knowledge-making. Under this rubric, both Rylean
knowledge-how claims and knowledge-that claims are collapsed into a sin-
gle kind of activity; a pragmatic activity where the knowledge-value of an
outcome is entirely subject to it passing or exceeding certain success crite-
ria in an interesting or remarkable way. Not only does this have profound
ramifications for a theory of knowledge, there is also an important phenom-
enal aspect to the affair; under this definition, not only do our artefacts
serve as physical instantiations of a knowledge-making process, they are
also world-constituting in that our artefacts constitute a great deal of our
lived experience (chapter 2.3). Finally, I conclude chapter 2with some com-
ments about the metaphysical ramifications about Allen’s epistemic project;
although Allen is brutally dismissive of metaphysics (as befits a pragmatist),
2 “Agency” and “intention” are recurring themes throughout this work, as will become ap-
parent. Borrowing the distinction from Donald Davidson, and as I note in chapter 2.1:
“attributions of intention are typically excuses and justifications; attributions of agency are
typically accusations of responsibility” (Davidson, 1980: 48).
3 “Indexicality” is also a concept that will recur many times over the course of this work, in
a number of different capacities: referring to language, artefacts and photographic images.
Despite the multiplicity of applications, the meaning remains identical: in each case, I am
invoking a broadly Peircean definition whereby indices are semiotic representations “whose
relation to their objects consists in a correspondence in fact” (Peirce, 1992: 7). The relation-
ship between the index and the object or event is necessary and exclusive; it cannot mean or
do anything other than what the index allows.
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we can nonetheless begin to make sense of metaphysical claims once we
appreciate the kind of supervenience and emergence relationships that oc-
cur between human beings, our artefacts and the things-in-themselves. Al-
though I will leave that analysis for chapter 2.4, it will suffice to say that I
argue that the nature of these relationships means that it is impossible for
us to ever access the Real in a significant and non-attenuated way.
However, if we are in fact constituted by technology—if the superlative
use of technology is what can be said to constitute knowledge—then why
do we have so many existential concerns regarding its proper applications?
It is with these questions in mind that I commence chapter 3 with a broad
(but necessarily incomplete) review of the extent to which Heidegger is sus-
picious of technology and its ramifications for our phenomenological status;
as I outline in chapter 3.1, Heidegger is concerned that technology serves
to denude the world of its essential Being, thus negatively impinging upon
the quality of our lived experience. chapter 3.2 is a continuation of this
discussion, though with an emphasis upon the possibility of agency and
intentional action with a technological system. Tracing a sequence of schol-
arship that moves from Herbert Marcuse, through to Jürgen Habermas, and
finally to Andrew Feenberg, I explore how the problem of agency has proved
to be an important and seemingly unescapable aspect of post-Heideggerian
philosophy of technology, particularly in theorists of a Marxian bent. Al-
though it sounds like a minor point, the question of whether or not science
and technology are to considered forms of speech or labour proves a key
aspect to the development of this debate.
Thereafter, having addressed the intersection of agency and politics, I in
chapter 3.3 move to a more finely-grained articulation of the way techno-
logical relations are understood to mediate or impinge upon our forms of
life. Drawing first upon the deeply pessimistic and deeply Catholic schol-
arship of Albert Borgmann, I provide account for Borgmann’s diagnosis
and subsequent method of treatment for the ills of the contemporary era:
although the world has become distanceless and the mechanisms of action
have become ever-more invisible to us as our world grows increasingly tech-
nologised, he argues that we should re-sacralise the world by introducing
certain kinds of phenomenologically significant focal practices. Conversely,
the second part of chapter 3.3 concerns the world of Don Ihde, who pro-
vides a far more optimistic account of our relationship with technology as
well as providing a helpful taxonomy for the kinds of relations we have
with our artefacts. Finally, in chapter 3.4, I provide an account for what is
otherwise an unintuitive result: that, in spite of the technical dimension of
epistemology per Allen—that is, that we should not be discomfited by tech-
nology because it is world-constituting—the discomfort exhibited by these
post-Heideggerian philosophers remains an intuitive and understandable re-
sponse to the encroachments of technology, as if technology can somehow
compromise or otherwise attenuate our capacities for authentic experience.
To that end I invoke the scholarship of Bernard Stiegler, who, while echoing
Allen’s point that technology is human-constituting, also argues that we
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are concerned by technology because it reminds of what we perceive as our
own ontological lack—the loss of Being, in a Heideggerian sense—and our
own impermanence and lack of agency in the face of the world.
Leaving broader technological questions behind, it is in chapter 4 that
we begin our analysis of the photographic image itself—particularly with
regards to the presumed indexicality of the relationship that photographic
images have with the real. To this end, I commence chapter 4.1 with an
historical discussion of the camera obscura and the awkward position that
questions of internationality and agency have traditionally had with regards
to the production of photographic images, particularly with respect to how
this has influenced the rise of visualism in the sciences. Subsequently, in
chapter 4.2, I provide an exegesis of a key concept in analytic philosophy
of photography—what is called the “transparency thesis”—particularly as it
is presented in the scholarship of Roger Scruton, Kendall Walton and Gre-
gory Currie. I then, in chapter 4.3 and chapter 4.4, cast doubt upon the
assumptions of the transparency thesis by committing to an extended and
sustained analysis of the constituent elements of a photographic image—
photographer, camera, world, photograph and viewer—as well as outlin-
ing the complex and deeply contingent intentional web that holds between
each element. I make clear, it is the automatism—the ostensive lack of
performativity—seemingly inherent to the photographic process that ren-
ders it epistemically problematic, as well as complicating accounts of pho-
tographic agency and intention. With particular reference to the works
of Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin, Joel Snyder & Neil Walsh Allen, and
Dominic McIver Lopes, I outline an intentional theory of photographic pro-
duction, as well as providing a deflationist account of the nature of pho-
tographic content. Moreover, it is whilst justifying for this deflationist ac-
count that I bring the argument back to Allen’s work in chapter 2 and the
post-Heideggerian material in chapter 3. Consequently, I argue that not
only can both the knowledgable production and reading of photographic
images be subsumed within Allen’s epistemic rubric, but also that the “epis-
temic specialness” of photographs (to borrow Cohen & Meskin’s phrase)
means that they have a certain ontological gravitas that serves to address
the existential concerns of Heideggerian thinkers.
I begin chapter 5 by invoking Paola Marrati’s reading of Deleuze as a
political thinker. Extrapolating from her account of the crisis of the action-
image as a symptom of a broader dismay at the collapse of teleological ac-
counts of human progress after the SecondWorldWar, I argue that the tenor
of this dismay is not actually political but technological; we are deeply scep-
tical of the power and truthfulness of our own political narratives and the
possibility for meaningful change because we are struck with the feeling
that we have been denuded of existential agency. The Deleuzian crisis of
the action-image is nothing less than a description of the Heideggerian cri-
sis of technology; in both cases, the abolition of narratives and a picture of
a world without being—a fundamentally Allenian world—leaves us feeling
ontologically anxious (chapter 5.1). Finally, it is in chapter 5.2 that I make
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it clear, via Stanley Cavell, Robert Sinnerbrink and Giorgio Agamben, that
photographic images, by virtue of their presumed indexicality (and thus pre-
sumed veridicality) serve as a panacea to the existential doubts expressed
by both Deleuze and post-Heideggerian philosophers of technology. Un-
like other kinds of image—indeed, entirely unlike other kinds of objects in
general—photographic images, whether moving or still, force us to recom-
mit to the world in a serious and substantive way. The truth or falsity of the
contents of these images is irrelevant, because the power of photographs is
not contingent upon us believing that the contents of the image are indeed
the case; rather, because they seem to capture a glimpse of the world, we are
forced to take the world seriously. Although we can no longer rely on a posi-
tivistic account of how to live, of some kind of eudaimonic satisfaction, the
myth-making capacity of photographic images enforces in us the conviction
that it is still possible to have lives worth living. Le Corbusier, in his Towards
an Architecture (Vers Une Architecture), describes a house as “a machine for
living in”. Although no doubt intended with a Gallic smirk, there is a lesson
here: contrary to our intuitions, photographs are properly understood as
machines for living: heuristic solutions to our existential scepticism, but no
less remarkable for the fact.
In short, the following text is my attempt to open a dialogue between
what has hitherto been two quite distinct avenues of inquiry: the philos-
ophy of technology and the philosophy of film. Customarily addressed
separately—by different theorists working in different fields, with very little
overlap—it is my belief that an analysis of our artefacts and the way they
function is fundamentally incomplete without an analysis of the problem
of the photographic image; as I will demonstrate, the photographic image
casts an extremely long shadow over the philosophy of technology.
2 PARL I AMENTS OF TH INGS
We all know a little about Greek geometry and the teachings
of the philosophers. Who knows anything about Greek metal-
lurgy? Yet perhaps the gods speak to us in their own way. Of
all the buildings that once graced the Athenian Agora, only one
stands as it always was, untouched by time or reconstruction.
That is the temple of the metallurgists. The Academy fell down
long ago. It has been rebuilt—partly by money earned in the
steel mills of Pittsburgh. (Hacking, 1983: 150)
2.1 On Intending & Creating
I have already mentioned that there is, in the Western philosophical canon,
an apparent bias towards arguing that knowledge is something sentential or
propositional. Although I shall not spend long on this point, it is nonethe-
less worth tracing the broad outlines of this idea in order to better identify
the broad ramifications of accepting this view.1 Per chapter 1, we can begin
our brief history with Aristotle:
For Aristotle, techne¯ was a very particular kind of knowledge.
It was not concerned with the necessary and eternal a priori
truths of the cosmos, nor with the a posteriori contingencies
and exigencies of ethics and politics. Rather, techne¯ was instru-
mental reason, concerned with actualising the potentialities of
beings that had no capacity to do so on their own, and which
could be otherwise. Moreover, this was a kind of knowledge
associated with people who were bound to necessity. That is,
techne¯ was chiefly operative in the domestic sphere, in farming
and slavery, and not in the free realm of the Greek polis. It
implied neither knowledge of the “divine” eternalities and ne-
cessities of the universe, nor the self-knowledge of those who
actualise themselves through lasting words and deeds. It was
simply a technical skill, a “know-how”. (Young, 2009: 190)
Moreover, this apparent bias against techne¯ in Aristotle—the fact that
it was a “technical skill” rather than being a kind of true knowledge—is
not of mere historical interest. Indeed, this intuition appears equally as
prevalent in contemporary philosophy, among both analytic and Continen-
tal thinkers; an emphasis upon propositionality and language that is known
1 For a sustained description and critique of strictly propositional or sentential epistemologies,
please refer to Allen, 2005: 11-59.
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among philosophers as the “linguistic turn”. First used by philosopher Gus-
tav Bergmann (Rorty, 1993: 337) and popularised by Richard Rorty’s influ-
ential anthology of the same name, the term “linguistic turn” describes a
development in Western philosophy that, in the face of the perceived exis-
tential threat of other disciplines encroaching on subject matters that were
once the sole domain of philosophical inquiry, sought to reduce the focus of
philosophy to the analysis of language and meaning (“Whereas physics and
history find conditions for the existence of actualities by discovering tempo-
rally prior actualities, philosophy can achieve autonomy only if it escapes
from time by escaping from actuality to possibility. [. . . ] The linguistic turn
was [an] attempt to find a domain which would overarch those of the other
professors” [Rorty, 1993: 340]), with the figures of Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege as the progenitors of the movement. For
his part, Michael Dummett in Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics argues that
the linguistic turn emerged as a direct product of the claims present in §62
of Frege’s The Foundations of Arithmetic, wherein Frege, having established
that numbers, being a kind of non-sensible class of objects, are only made
available via the context principle: “never [. . . ] ask for the meaning of a
word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition” (The Foundations
of Arithmetic via Crary and Read, 2000: 323). As Dummett writes:
Frege converts the problem into an enquiry how the senses of
sentences containing terms for numbers are to be fixed. There
is the linguistic turn. The context principle is stated as an ex-
plicitly linguistic one, a principle concerning the meanings of
words and their occurrence in sentences; and so an epistemo-
logical problem, with ontological overtones, is by its means con-
verted into one about the meanings of sentences. (Dummett,
1991: 111)
Furthermore, this philosophical disposition was characterised by an un-
derstanding that the philosopher was not concerned with the mere physi-
cal properties of things, with their real qualities. Rather, the philosopher
“is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them” (Ayer,
1936: 61). The propositions of philosophy “are not factual, but linguistic in
character—that is, they do not describe the behaviour of physical, or even
mental, objects; they express definitions, or the formal consequences of
definitions” (Ayer, 1936: 62). With philosophical problems collapsed into
problems of language, being either solved or dissolved in the means of ex-
pression, philosophical propositions become pieces in a game where players
pursue an accurate understanding of the relations between ideas, as Carnap
writes: “The aim of epistemology is the formation of a method for the justifi-
cation of cognitions. Epistemology must specify how an ostensible piece of
knowledge can be justified, that is how it can be shown that it is authentic
knowledge” (Carnap, 1967: 305). Philosophy thereby became rendered the
analysis of the structure of thought—the relationship between concepts that
can only be properly analysed via an analysis of language and the proposi-
tions that serve to constitute it (Dummett, 1978: 458).
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Consequently, it is this set of assumptions in favour of propositionality
and definitionality that makes episte¯me¯, rather than techne¯, the historical
locus of philosophical attention, engendering accounts of knowledge that
claim that the act of knowing means something like being in possession the
right kinds of propositions, even if those propositions are socially contin-
gent. As Rorty notes, “we see knowledge as a matter of conversation and
of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature” (Rorty, 2008:
171). Given these observations, it does not seem particularly contentious
to claim that this Aristotelian value distinction between immutable, propo-
sitional knowledge and contingent praxis is one that still has a degree of
currency within the academy. If episte¯me¯ is immutable and propositional,
then that seems to suggest that techne¯, even if it is knowledge, is knowledge
of a derivative or lesser kind; a mere craft, unsuited to the sober contempla-
tions of philosophers.
Although I am by no means in a position to threaten the validity of this
account as a whole, I must confess that I find propositional or sentential ac-
counts of knowledge insufficient in at least some respects. For this blinkered
emphasis upon propositionality has other, cascading effects that rub uncom-
fortably against scholarship in my chosen fields of study—particularly, in
this case with regards to how we think about the role intention, and thus
propositionality, plays in the creation and production of objects. Consider,
for instance, the orthodox account: there exist certain objects that have been
made to fulfil a given purpose, and those objects have agents responsible for
their creation. For example: were I a carpenter, a dining table might well be
the intended product of a sequence of directed, intentional actions. The act
ofmaking necessarily involves intentional agency on the part of amaker; an
intended object of this kind—a “tool”, if you like—is a kind of object that has
been intentionally made to fulfil a purpose (in this case, to provide a surface
upon which to eat), as distinct from any other kind of object. Accordingly
we can say:
1. An object o is a tool t iff o is the intended product of authorial action.2
However, tools alone do not entirely comprise the sum total of products
of artifice; as Hilpinen in “Authors and Artifacts” notes, objects that a per-
son may “bring about” can be either intentional or unintentional (Hilpinen,
1993: 156). Returning again to the hypothetical table that we mentioned
above, it would be inaccurate to say that, in the transition from raw mate-
rials into intended object, there is no detritus remaining from that process
of transformation. Even if one plans the construction of such an item ex-
ceptionally well, such that there are no off-cuts left behind, the act of cre-
ation will invariably have unintended by-products in the form of sawdust,
bent nails, etcetera. These products are plainly not naturally occurring, ac-
cording to the Aristotelian schematic: although they are undeniably the
2 A note on nomenclature: I will be articulating type/token distinctions by rendering types in
capitals and tokens in lower case. That is to say: there is an individual object o that belongs
to the general category of O.
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product of intentional action, they are not the intended products of said ac-
tion. Rather, they are a different kind of object entirely—a kind of material
residue from the process of making. Per Donald Davidson’s philosophy of
action, wherein he draws a crucial distinction between intention and agency;
although an intention is the desired goal of an action, all products of that
action are the result of the agent: “attributions of intention are typically
excuses and justifications; attributions of agency are typically accusations
of responsibility” (Davidson, 1980: 48). Accordingly, we now have two dis-
tinct categories of artificial object, both of which are the products of human
agency, but only one of which is an intentional product. Finally, both tools
and material residue comprise the category of artefacts—those objects that
are unlike all other objects in that they are the product of intentional action.
To wit:
1. An object o is a tool t iff o is the intended product of authorial action.
2. An object o is residual r iff it is the product of the intentional action
of an author but is not itself the intended product t.
3. T-objects and R-objects together comprise the sum total of human
artefacts A.
Finally, our rather modest list of definitions requires something in the way
of a success criterion; it is not clear that all intentional products of intended
action deserve to be considered T-objects.
[An] agent produces a genuine artifact only if his activity is
successful in some respect and to some degree; in other words,
proper authorship requires that the character of the object pro-
duced should fit the author’s intentions (to some degree) and
not merely depend on them. If an author fails in every respect,
he does not produce a genuine artifact, but only ‘scrap’; he is
not an author of anything in the ‘intentional’ sense of the word.
(Hilpinen, 1993: 160-161)
For instance: one could certainly imagine a case wherein a prospective
author may attempt to create an object of a certain kind and fail in do-
ing so; i.e.: Monroe Beardsley’s hypothetical sculptor who intends to make
something smooth and blue, but instead makes something rough and pink
(Beardsley, 1958: 20). That is to say: whether or not something is considered
a T-object is not solely contingent upon whether or not it is the intended
product of authorial action; rather, the potential T-object must be assessed
against a given set of conditions K, the nature of which are specific to the ob-
ject that was intended (KT)—i.e.: an object intended to be a smooth and blue
is judged against K-conditions of “smoothness” and “blueness”. Although
our sculptor may have intended to produce an object of a certain kind, they
have failed to do so due to not meeting the K-conditions. We can call this
category of artefacts “scrap”.3 Accordingly, as per figure 1:
3 Accounting for the exact nature of K-conditions is far more complex than I have presented
here, but this characterisation will suffice for our purposes. However, if readers wish to

















Figure 1: A taxonomy of artefacts.
1. An object o is an intended artefact i iff o is the intended product of
authorial action.
2. Intended artefacts I are tools T iff they satisfy conditions K for T (KT).
3. Intended artefacts I are scrap S iff they fail to satisfy KT.
4. An object o is residual r iff it is the product of the intentional action
of an author but is not itself an intended artefact I.
5. T-objects, S-objects and R-objects together comprise the sum total of
human artefacts A.4
Furthermore, this kind of classical organisational structure can be co-
opted to pull additional weight, as the introduction of intention places each
of the component parts of the taxonomy into some kind of causal order.
Given that intention is the phenomenon that catalyses the sorting of A-
objects into their respective taxa, we can speak of intention as a kind of first
cause when articulating the orthodox position; intention prefaces produc-
tion, which itself prefaces intentional and unintentional products, etcetera.
With intention as the primum movens, a kind of organisational flowchart
makes itself available to us, as per figure 2. As we can see, a causal char-
acterisation of artefact production—in addition to adhering broadly to or-
thodox positions within the philosophy of technology and philosophy of
action—also serves to illuminate the means by which by-products can be re-
purposed into products. For instance: imagine for a moment that, in a fit of
gastronomic zealotry, you have decided to make a poppy seed cake slathered
in an orange glaze. In the making of said cake, you inevitably also produce
an amount of organic detritus—excess poppy seeds, egg shells, unused or-
ange peel. Were you to throw out this detritus, this material would be mere
residue; an R-object by the above taxonomy. However, if I were to place
this organic matter within a compost bin for later use upon my garden, I
will have re-intentioned the object, starting the cycle anew; I will have com-
menced production of a new product (compost) with its own by-products
consult a more sophisticated schema (though utilising a distinct nomenclature and organisa-
tional structure), please see Hilpinen, 1993.
4 Of course, one could very easily further speciate these taxa—in the instance, for example,
that someone wished to differentiate art objects from design objects. However, at this point
in our analysis this rendering of the taxonomy of artefacts will suffice.














Figure 2: A flowchart of artefact creation.
(heat and carbon dioxide), and so on, ad infinitum. Moreover, the same is
true if I were to reuse a prior failure—say, by serving the half-cooked batter
of my poppy seed cake as an exotic mousse—that would also constitute an
instance of re-intention. A real-life example: in 1968, Spencer Silver, whilst
trying to create a super-strong adhesive, accidentally developed a glue that
was pressure-sensitive, reusable and had low adhesion. Although initially
seen as useless, the glue was eventually repurposed for stationary—and thus
the Post-it note was born.
The crucial idea appears to be purpose. As artifacts, artworks
are things largely made on purpose by agents. Understanding
them that way, we take them in terms of purposes. Thus a
first intentional result: since artworks are artifacts, they are
perceived and comprehended in terms of agency, and their rel-
evant features are taken under intention, in the sense of being
there on purpose, normally for purposes. (Maynard, 2012: 738)
However, despite the fact that this kind of account has a kind of undeni-
able totalising elegance, there is at least one observation that one can make
as to why we might want to reject this analysis. Consider that in figure 2,
intention prefaces production in all cases, as intention becomes the marker
by which we can categories and speciate our artefacts. Although conve-
nient, I would dispute the validity of this kind of causal story, for it casts
all intention as a kind of propositional attitude: “I intend to create tool-t”,
where tool-t is a specifically intended product of authorial action itself com-
prised of a series of propositional claims. Although many instances of pro-
duction do follow this general schema—say, for instance, in the case where
I successfully produce my orange poppy seed cake (t) after having intended
to make said cake (“I intend to create t”). The t that I intended to make has
identity with the t I made; I made the kind of cake that I intended, for I did
not intend to make any other kind of cake. However, is this the case in all
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instances of artefactual production? I would argue that this is plainly not
the case. Consider the following: imagine that you are a poet, and you feel
the urge to write a long and beauteous poem: it would be a rare poet indeed
who knows what the end of a poem is before she reaches it, and it would
be a rarer poet still who is in full possession of the poem inside her head
before she puts pen to paper.5 In cases such as these, it seems clear that
although it might be accurate to say that “you intended to make an object
of type-T” (“you intended to make a work of art”), it would be inaccurate
to claim that “you intended to make t” (“you intended to make that work of
art”), because you had no such explicit intention. To conflate the two seems
to make some kind of error by confusing the type of thing that a object is
with specific instances or tokens of that type.
David Pye’s tragically under-utilised work The Nature and Art of Work-
manship is in many respects a response to this problem, and in doing so
helpfully distinguishes between what he calls the workmanship of certainty
and the workmanship of risk. Pye argues that the workmanship of certainty
describes something very similar to the orthodox case we described above,
with intention as a kind of propositional attitude: “I intend to create t”. He
characterises the workmanship of certainty as being the kind of workman-
ship presenting in quantity production, with its “pure state in full automa-
tion”; the craftsman has in his or her possession the full knowledge of the
artefact’s final form. Pye continues: “In workmanship of this sort the qual-
ity of the result is exactly predetermined before a single saleable thing is
made” (Pye, 1968: 4-5, emphasis mine). We could say that instances of work-
manship of certainty would constitute most of the things that one would
encounter in a big city in the 21st century. The computer on which I am
writing—a mid-2011 MacBook Air—is fundamentally similar to any other
mid-2011 MacBook Air, for it is a product of a highly automated process
that has explicit and precise ends. “I intend to create t” is possible, because
there is some kind of indexical relationship between the object that is in-
tended and the object that is produced, which has the corollary effect that
all ts produced in the mode of the workmanship of certainty are identical.
Andy Warhol makes a typically ironic comment in this vein:
What’s great about this country is that America started the tra-
dition where the richest consumers buy essentially the same
things as the poorest. You can be watching TV and see Coca-
Cola, and you know that the President drinks Coke, Liz Taylor
drinks Coke, and just think, you can drink Coke, too. A Coke is
a Coke and no amount of money can get you a better Coke than
the one the bum on the corner is drinking. All the Cokes are the
same and all the Cokes are good. Liz Taylor knows it, the Pres-
ident knows it, the bum knows it, and you know it. (Warhol,
1977: 100-101)
5 Paul Valéry is said to have once remarked “A poem is never finished; it is only abandoned”.
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The workmanship of risk, however, is a rather different beast. Unlike
the “exactly predetermined” results of the workmanship of certainty, the
workmanship of risk describes the process of craftsmanship, wherein “the
quality of the result is not predetermined, but depends on the judgement,
dexterity and care with the maker exercises as he works” (Pye, 1968: 4). If
one is making a chair by hand, or assembling a sculpture out of refuse, or
writing a poem, one is engaging in a kind of dynamical practice described
by the workmanship of risk. Although we can say “I intend to create a
T” (say, a chair) and subsequently produce examples of t (kinds of chairs),
there is no implication that each t is identical to the other. Rather, there
are multiple possible outputs: t1, t2, t3, etcetera—items which might share
nothing beyond the necessary common properties that make something a
chair. Accordingly, these results might also be of vastly different quality
or worth: t1 might barely qualify as a T at all, satisfying few K-conditions
for T (KT) and is thus borderline S; t2 a mundane, if serviceable example that
satisfies some KT, deserving of neither vitriol nor merit; and t3, a superlative
example that either seems something like an ideal instantiation of T in that
it satisfies all KT, forces us to reconsider the boundary conditions of what
it means to be an item of type-T (such as Marc Newson’s Lockheed Lounge,
see figure 3), or perhaps even presents such a t as to open up the possibility
for hitherto unanticipated species of T.
By example, the development of the motorcycle provides evidence of this
latter process in action: in 1885, Gottlieb Daimler and Wilhelm Maybach,
after having developed a high-speed, compact, single cylinder internal com-
bustion engine, constructed a two-wheeled testbed known as the Daimler
Reitwagen in order to test the capacity and viability of this engine. Now,
testbeds—what we could describe as T1 objects—have only a certain number
of necessary features, most of which revolve around providing a platform
upon which development projects can be experimented. Any other features
of this particular testbed t1 are what we call accidental features: features
such as, for instance, the fact that the Reitwagen took the form of an en-
gine set into a two-wheeled chassis (Walker, 2006: 16-18). However, this
novel form catalysed the development of a new kind of item: the motor-
cycle. Despite being designed as an experimentation platform for a new
kind of engine, the motorcycle was a new type of object (T2) with vastly
different necessary features—necessary features that, moreover, were mere
accidental or contingent features when on the testbed.
For these reasons, it would seem then that a strictly linguistic or proposi-
tional account is insufficient to adequately explain the both the qualities of
artefacts and the kinds of knowledge that artisans have in their possession
when both are working in the spirit of the workmanship of risk. It seems
clear that although one can speak meaningfully of artefacts that are not
themselves the instantiation of a previously-held propositional attitude (“I
intend to make something of type-T”), orthodox accounts of propositional
knowledge and the corollaries they have for questions of intention seem
prima facie incapable of parsing cases of this kind without committing some
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Figure 3: Lockheed Lounge, Marc Newson, 1988-1989
kind of serious damage to our intuitions about tool creation and the kinds
of performative knowledge held by artisans; it appears strange to argue that
the bodily, performative knowledge of how to create things of a certain type
is not “knowledge” simply by virtue of the fact that it has no concomitant
propositional content. Although certain instances of t are the clearly artic-
ulated products of a propositional attitude, it seems quite perverse to think
that all tool creation is the product of a clearly defined intention lest we end
up excluding those cases where no such clearly defined intention is present;
that is, the very quality that defines the workmanship of risk. Indeed, in
cases like this, propositionality itself starts looking problematic: whereas
one could potentially, in the case of “I intend to make t”, argue that “t” ex-
ists as a series of propositional claims which is then instantiated by virtue
of the process of production, there is no clear means by which the dynami-
cally rendered products of the workmanship of risk are able to be similarly
described. Clearly this is something of an issue.
2.2 The Premodern Prometheus
It is widely known amongst palaeoanthropologists—just as it is widely ig-
nored by philosophers—that there is a substantial differential between the
emergence of hominin tools and the development of language. According
to current scholarship, language use in humans developed somewhere be-
tween 50,000 to 200,000 years ago, and certainly not before that time (Dia-
mond, 2006: 141-167). Furthermore, by “language” we do not mean some-
thing like animal communication, for they lack the requisite sophistication
and grammatical structures; even animals with quite sophisticated forms of
communication such as prairie dogs cannot compare.6 However, animals
like prairie dogs differ from us in one crucial aspect: unlike human beings,
6 And prairie dogs are truly remarkable—recent studies by animal behaviourist Constantine
Slobodchikoff, among others, suggest that prairie dogs are not only capable of identifying
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prairie dog communication is inextricably indexical to the world. When a
prairie dog cries “Coyote!”, there is no possibility that the prairie dog could
be indicating anything other than that fact that a coyote has entered its
field of vision. Conversely, human beings find ourselves with the ability to
transcribe objects with respect to one another (“There is a leopard behind
that tree”), with respect to spatio-temporality (“I encountered a leopard last
year whilst on safari in Tanzania”) or even with respect to our own mental
structures (“Imagine that you are facing a hungry leopard”).
The reason we can perform these feats that prairie dogs cannot is that we
have developed the heady joys of grammar and syntax—that lexical syncat-
egoremata that facilitates the development of formal structures in natural
language.7 It must be made clear: what prairie dogs do is not speech in any
recognisable sense. Unlike natural language, animal communication is com-
prised of strings of lexical items that operate without inflection, casing, con-
jugation or grammatical particles. Accordingly, it lacks syntax: grammatical
rules are not hard-coded into animal communication as they are in natural
languages. For example, whereas casing dictates the grammatical function
of a noun in the sentences of natural languages (viz.: when a noun is in the
nominative case, it operates as the subject of a verb, as opposed to being the
object of the verb, i.e.: “I kicked Donald” rather than “Donald kicked me”),
there is no such formal structure present in animal communication. That
is to say: within animal communication, indexical items exist discretely of
one another, unable to interact in any meaningful sense. Although the sum
total of those indexical items may be enormous, they do not comprise a
system by virtue of their number. Inert, they cannot speak to one another
without the presence of a linguistic aether. However, with the introduction
of grammar, the systemic quality of natural languages erupts: no longer
need we suffer the indignity of referring only to a specific spatiotemporal
co-ordinate. The qualitative difference between natural languages and ani-
mal communication is nothing less than the fact that language is an open
system, whereas animal communication is no system at all: thanks to the
syncategoremata, we have potentially unlimited capacity to juggle and or-
der signs as they refer to objects. It is this capacity, unique to humans, that
developed somewhere between 50,000 and 200,000 years ago.8
Of course, this fact alone tells us nothing. However, it is a curious fact
that recent scholarship suggests that material culture has origins far ear-
lier than those of language. Consider: once upon a time, palaeontologists
potential predators at distance, but also capable of identifying and reporting the species, size
and speed of those predators (Slobodchikoff, 1991).
7 A syncategorematic term is a word that cannot serve as the subject nor the predicate of a
proposition, but can be used with other terms to form a proposition.
8 “The screaming vervet performs no speech act. The calls are isolated signals, fixed sequences
without the syntax of a sentence. There is no recursion, that is, no units recurring in combi-
nation; no grammatical or ungrammatical combinations; no marks of plural or tense. Vervet
calls apparently operate as Darwin thought—the caller’s spontaneous emotional expression
has become an adaptive signal for everybody else. All a monkey can do with this system
is involuntarily express a discriminating fear of predators and, being monkeys, raise a false
alarm to manipulate others” (Allen, 2008a: 29).
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decided to differentiate stone tool-using species from non-stone tool-using
species by including the former within the clade Homo, with the earliest
species within the genus being Homo habilis, or “skilful man”. However, ev-
idence discovered in certain African Oldowan sites in 1996 cast doubt upon
this narrative, resulting in the surprise discovery of Australopithecus garhi
(“garhi” means “surprise” in the local Afar language)—a seeming missing
link between Australopithecine forms and more modern Homo forms (Sus-
man, 1987). With the earliest of these Australopithecine stone tools dated at
approximately 2.6 million years old (Plummer, 2004: 118), it seems fair to as-
sumes that purposive non-stone tool-use was prevalent within earlier Aus-
tralopithecine genera (Australopithecus and Paranthropus, though some also
allow for the inclusion of Kenyanthropus) somewhere in excess of three mil-
lion years ago. This of course would seem to suggest that material culture
pre-dates language—even according to the most conservative estimate—by
some 2.4 million years.
These two dates mean nothing on their own without additional explana-
tion, but they do pose a question: is the right kind of complex, intentioned
tool use a precondition for the development of language, or are the facts
unrelated? This is a rather difficult problem, and one clearly impossible
to test, but is language without tools even available to us as a conceptual
possibility? Certainly some philosophers think so, though they may apply
strict caveats. Don Ihde writes: “it might be possible for humans to live non-
technologically as a kind of abstract possibility—but only on the condition
that the environment be that of a garden, isolated, protected, and stable.
The price for such a non-technological existence is to be enclosed. Here
would be the “milieu of nature” in purer form” (Ihde, 1990: 13). Although
we will return to Ihde as some length later in the piece, the assumption that
humans qua linguistic beings could conceivably evolve without developing
a kind of substantive material culture is an interesting one. Are these two
dates—200,000 years ago, 2.6 million years ago—accidental and unrelated, or
do they bespeak a deeper process?
In this section I will be arguing for the latter option: specifically, that tool
use in hominins serves as a precondition for language, and that it is an error
to believe that the latter can develop in the absence of the former. To this
end I refer to the work of Barry Allen in his book Knowledge and Civilization
and its sequel, Artifice and Design (Allen, 2005, Allen, 2008b). According to
Allen, it is the case that the kind of tool-use conducted by human beings
is categorically distinct from tool use in other animals: although it is true
that chimpanzees hunt termites with twigs and sea otters crack abalone on
rocks, what human beings do is qualitatively different from the way ani-
mals use tools. Unlike animals, human beings have the capacity to make
tools with other tools: rather than just using what is on-hand as a chim-
panzee would, we will consciously, and with intent, craft a tool in order to
realise a given outcome. Moreover, this appears to have been no less true
in the prelinguistic Palaeolithic: we have an abundance of evidence that the
tools of Palaeolithic man, even prior to the development of language, were
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carved with explicit uses in mind—hand axes were carved for bludgeoning,
cutting, skinning, chopping and a host of other uses, and their intended use
is evident from their form. This, according to Allen, raises an interesting
possibility: that the utility of any given artefact relies upon it belonging to
a larger ecosystem of mutually contingent artefacts.
Allen contends, when he speaks of an ecosystem of “mutually contingent”
artefacts, that words are relevantly similar to our tools and devices in that
they have a kind of grammar or organisational syncategoremata. In much
the same way that Noam Chomsky, along with Marc Hauser and W. Fitch,
claimed that recursion is the property that distinguishes animal communi-
cation and natural language (Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch, 2002), so too is
Allen claiming that the mutually contingent relationships that hold between
our artefacts differentiates human and animal tool use; they are artefactual
examples of what Chomsky, quoting William Humboldt, described in lan-
guage as “the infinite use of finite means” (Chomsky, 1996: 8).9 That is to
say: by smashing two rocks together I can make a sharper rock; with that
sharper rock I can kill a deer; with that deer I can make clothes to keep me
warm and delicious food to eat. Like orphaned words, most of our tools
do not make sense unless embedded within a matrix of other, complemen-
tary tools, with the exception of certain baseline examples (for instance, a
shovel): a needle cannot be used as a needle without a thread; a mobile
phone cannot be used as a mobile phone without a satellite; a microwave
dinner is going to taste even more like cardboard without a microwave. To
quote Allen, it is not “to make something facilitate (as chimpanzees do); it
is to take up a facilitating artifact that has already been made and made
available in an economy of socially complementary action and technically
complementary tools” (Allen, 2008a: 73). Just as our words require syn-
tactical arrangement in order to make sense, so too do our tools require a
syncategoremata of their own.
Moreover, Allen argues, human beings are alone in possessing an arte-
factual syncategoremata, just as we are alone in possessing a true language.
Although there are plenty of species of animal that engage in what looks like
purposive, recursive tool-using behaviour, they are not actually being capa-
ble of tool-use in the way of which Allen speaks. Borrowing a rather whim-
sical term from Douglas Hofstadter’s column in Scientific American, Allen
describes these ostensibly intelligent behaviours as exhibiting the property
9 According to Chomsky, it is linguistic recursiveness that guarantees the modularity and
infinitude of language That is to say: Chomsky argues that it is recursion in language that
allows me to substitute pronouns for nouns, or allows me to embed simple sentences—say,
“Ryan has had a long week” or “Ryan would very much like a beer”—into a third sentence,
“Ryan is an ugly bag of mostly-water”, thereby enabling me to render a recursive sentence:
“Ryan, who is an ugly bag of mostly-water, has had a long week and would very much like a
beer”. However, in order to render these statements adequately, we are in need of a grammar
or a syncategoremata; unless one is articulating a purely indexical correlation between token
and world (“Arrgh! Leopard!”), words are unmoored from use unless they are embedded in
some kind of complementary semiotic system. Although there are things to which words
may refer, beyond these indexical base cases a word requires some kind of context in which
to be understood.
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of sphexishness: that is, the degree by which behaviour is simply determined
(Hofstadter, 1982: 20-29). The name itself draws its inspiration from the be-
haviour of the wasp Sphex ichneumoneus, its oddly mechanistic hunting and
burrowing behaviour having been described by Dean Woodridge in 1963:
When the time comes for egg laying, the wasp Sphex builds a
burrow for the purpose and seeks out a cricket which she stings
in such a way as to paralyse but not kill it. She drags the cricket
into the burrow, lays her eggs alongside, closes the burrow, then
flies away, never to return. In due course, the eggs hatch and
the wasp grubs feed off the paralysed cricket, which has not de-
cayed, having been kept in the wasp equivalent of deep freeze.
To the human mind, such an elaborately organised and seem-
ingly purposeful routine conveys a convincing flavour of logic
and thoughtfulness—until more details are examined. For exam-
ple, the Wasp’s routine is to bring the paralysed cricket to the
burrow, leave it on the threshold, go inside to see that all is well,
emerge, and then drag the cricket in. If the cricket is moved a
few inches away while the wasp is inside making her prelimi-
nary inspection, the wasp, on emerging from the burrow, will
bring the cricket back to the threshold, but not inside, and will
then repeat the preparatory procedure of entering the burrow
to see that everything is all right. If again the cricket is removed
a few inches while the wasp is inside, once again she will move
the cricket up to the threshold and re-enter the burrow for a fi-
nal check. The wasp never thinks of pulling the cricket straight
in. On one occasion this procedure was repeated forty times,
always with the same result. (Woodridge, 1963: 82)
This is the definitively sphexish act: despite a level of complexity that
appears to presuppose a premeditated method, the behaviour of the wasp
makes it apparent that the wasp is in the grips of a series of inflexible
stimulus-response events. Although we are faced with a black box schema
with regards to the wasp’s mental states, the fact that varying inputs do
not result in varying outputs strongly suggests that the wasp is incapable
of anything that we could justifiably consider an instance of tool-use: there
is no capacity for improvisation, no deference to circumstance and no ev-
idence of a system of mutually contingent devices.10 Insofar as Allen is
concerned, most examples of “tool use” in the animal kingdom qualify as
examples of sphexishness for this fact. Although animals can and do act
upon their environment, they do so in a way that is inflexibly instinctual,
rather than being the product of learning (whether by trial and error or by
pedagogy), investigative manipulation or higher cognitive processes. More-
over, most instances of animal instrumentalisation, like examples of animal
10 A note on nomenclature: a black box is a system or object where it is only possible to see
inputs and outputs; the contents of the black box are opaque to us. Although we might
be able to extrapolate the contents of the black box by virtue of assessing those inputs and
outputs, doing so is very much an exercise in abductive reasoning.
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communication, are entirely indexical structures: although they operate as
a form of “artifactual denotation”, these instruments have no capacity to mu-
tually interact, as they are not embedded within a socio-cultural economy of
artefacts (Allen, 2008a: 73). This socio-cultural economy is the artefactual
syncategoremata in which instances of animal instrumentation use must
be embedded in order to be considered instances of tool use, the first step
of which simply being an indicator of the degree of improvisation readily
apparent in the use of a tool. Unlike human behaviours, highly sphexish
behaviours have no such apparent improvisational capacity. These are the
behaviours that are “instinctual” in the most pure sense of the term: al-
though these behaviours may be ostensibly indicate some degree of plastic-
ity (the mating ritual of the bowerbird, the maternal habits of the gastric
breeding frog, the predation methods of Portia spiders), they are actually so-
phisticated products of a simple behavioural algorithm that is brutally and
inexorably mechanistic.
If you may excuse me an analogy: at the beginning of 2001: A Space
Odyssey, humanity’s simian ancestors were preoccupied with inoffensively
sphexish behaviours. Eating, sleeping, mating and avoiding predation com-
prised the sum total of their activity. However, upon discovering and touch-
ing the obsidian monolith, these early apes developed a new and deeply
potent quality: with the swelling chords of Strauss’ Also Sprach Zarathustra
providing appropriate auditory context, an ape picks up a bone and pro-
ceeds to bludgeon one of his colleagues to death. This symbolic instance
provides us with an example of the proto-tool: an instance of improvisa-
tional, inferential reasoning, a “learned, individual, relatively unsphexish
use of a peripheral effector” (Allen, 2008a: 73). Behaviour of this nature is
found throughout the animal kingdom: octopuses are capable of removing
the lids from screw-top jars, New Caledonian crows will improvise hooks
out of pieces of wire, your dog learns how to open your back door by jump-
ing onto the door-handle. Because it is learned, whether by virtue of learn-
ing by observation or their own mental prowess, this behaviour is no longer
purely sphexish. If we transmit multiple inputs into our black box schema,
we find multiple outputs: moreover, the quality of these outputs indicates
the both a capacity for improvisation that is missing in animal instrumenta-
tion and evidence (by virtue of observing a deference to circumstance and
available resources) an understanding of an ecology of mutually contingent
artefacts. Moreover, we are the only genus within Animalia that has gradu-
ated to full tool-use (though I would allow for the inclusion of Australopithe-
cus garhi); it is only in Homo that we find evidence of truly complementary
tool-using behaviours.
Just as there is a qualitative difference between the cries of a gibbon and
a doctoral thesis by virtue of the presence or not of syncategoremata, the
distinction between animal tool-use and human tool-use is indicative of a
similar relationship. In each case—animal cry and animal tool—the object
of our analysis is purely indexical: each item is tied inextricably to a given
functional arrangement. As in the case when a gibbon shrieks “Leopard!”,
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Figure 4: Biface illustration of Oldowan tools
when a chimpanzee wields an insect lure, the only function of the insect
lure is as an insect lure. The animal tool, unlike our own, lacks “instrumen-
tal potential”; it has a function rather than a “range of functionality” (Allen,
2008a: 73)—it is has finite uses for finite means. This range of functionality
is made evident in what Allen calls a tool’s “functionless functionality”, a
concept denoting that objects are only awarded utility in being used in an
intelligent and broadly intentional manner. The human hand is an exam-
ple of such an entity, as are the human speech organs. Both objects have
a wide range of application and utility, but neither is defined by this range
of application and utility. A tool—any tool—is merely an extension of this
quality: for something to be a tool, it must facilitate or augment the func-
tionless functionality of our own organs. A tool has no intrinsic purpose,
and it can only be considered such when it is exercised or utilised in some
respect. Without the present of a human agent, tools are mere detritus: the
truncated evidence of an absent human wielder, without positive content of
their own.
All implements tend to include in their appearance the invisible
presence of what is needed to fulfil their function. A bridge is
perceived as something to be walked over, a hammer as some-
thing to be gripped and swung. This extension is so much more
tangible than would a mere association between an object and
its use, or the mere understanding of what the object can serve
to do. It is the direct perception completion of an object that
looks incomplete as long as it is unemployed. (Arnheim, 1969:
89-90)
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So, by Allen’s account a tool is an artefact composed by and of other arte-
facts. Both animal tools and human tools are characterised by the fact that
they are manipulated. However, whereas animal tool is a manipulation in-
formed by sphexish behaviour—or perhaps in marginal cases, a relatively
unsphexish behaviour informed by cognition and circumstance—for some-
thing to be considered a “true” tool it must be an “economic artifact that
has already passed through other hands using other tools, and was purpose-
made to amplify and extend the hand’s functionless functionality” (Allen,
2008a: 73). This is an important observation: whereas animal tools exist
as isolated instances, true tool use is predicated upon some form of pre-
existing socio-cultural or economic context—in effect, some strange species
of artifactual syncategoremata—to be definitionally considered as such. Hu-
man tool use, unlike animal tool use, is never private: although one can
engage in solitary tool use by virtue of being alone when one commits the
act, our very use of the tool is premised upon other human beings. Al-
though you may sing to yourself in the shower, those artefacts you are
manipulating—the faucet, the soap, Céline Dion’s “My Heart Will Go On”—
are the products of hundreds of thousands of years of technical and artistic
development. Donne was correct when he wrote that no man is an island,
for even capacity to render such a statement is inherently and necessarily
predicated upon the right kind of socialisation. Accordingly: language and
tools are relevantly similar in that they are both premised upon having the
capacity and materials to engage meaningfully in some kind of recursive
economy of complementary action. In the case of our artefacts, they must
be able to work together; unlike the termite twig of a chimpanzee, our tools
imply the existence of other tools.
One can very easily imagine Allen endorsing the Latourian distinction
between sociogram and technogram (Latour, 1987: 138-140)—that is, accord-
ing to Latour, the claim that all artefacts or technological objects should be
properly understood as being comprised of both a sociogram (the external
network of commitments and alliances that a device has with other devices
and with human users that shape the social role of that artefact) and the
technogram (the internal network of commitment and alliances that com-
prises the technical aspect of the artefact). So, for instance, in the case of an
automobile, it should be understood both in terms of the means by which
it engages with the social sphere and other artefacts, i.e.: civic infrastruc-
ture, road rules, licensing requirements, cultural depictions, etcetera, and
as an artefact comprised of a collection of given complementary parts, i.e.:
wheels, drive shaft, carburettor, air-conditioning system, etcetera. Accord-
ingly, whereas a chimpanzee tool is a purely indexical object, human tools
(whether shovel or space station) must be understood not only in terms of
the internal network of commitments and alliances that comprise the tech-
nical aspects of the artefact, but also with regards to the external network of
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commitments and alliance that a given artefact has with other artefacts—and
with human users that shape the social role of that artefact.11
But does this relevant similarity, taken in conjunction with the historical
evidence, indicate that tool use is a precondition for language? Indeed, I be-
lieve it does. Consider: for something to be a linguistic symbol, it must be “a
sign that refers in two dimensions simultaneously, referring to nonlinguis-
tic things or events and referring to other symbols” (Allen, 2005: 196). So,
not only does the word “giraffe” refer to a nonlinguistic thing—namely, a tall,
silly looking ruminant with large spots and a long neck—it also must refer to
other other linguistic symbols that observe the same semiological structure.
So, in order to say something like the “giraffe eats leaves”, the words have to
be both referring to nonlinguistic entities, events or actions (giraffes, eating
and leaves) and also amenable to being organised according to an external
grammar, lest we find ourselves with something baffling and inscrutable
(“leaves eat giraffes”, “eat giraffe leaves”, “eat leaves, giraffe”, etcetera). Al-
though many animals demonstrate understanding of how sounds can refer
to non-linguistic things (as in the case of a howler monkey warning of a
leopard) very few animals have an understanding of grammar; certainly
none with as sophisticated an understanding as human beings, and none
to my knowledge that have not been trained by a human being.12 The de-
velopment and application of linguistic signs requires that speakers be able
to sustain the idea that lexemes have simultaneous relationships, and that
doing so allows us to enter what the realm of symbolic reference; animals,
having no capacity to do so, fail to grasp this “dual system of references”
(Allen, 2005: 196).
Full-blown language, with all of the efficiency and structural re-
finement of modern speech, is probably a gradual development,
11 It is obviously true that languages are no different, at least in this sense. Consider the
word “bifurcation”, as it might apply to a split in the road: although technogrammatically
simple, my decision to use the word “bifurcation” as opposed to, say “fork” cannot help but
say something that the sound “bifurcation” alone cannot: whether or not I use the word
out of euphony, pretension or precision, my lexical choice carries inevitable social baggage.
Or, perhaps more dramatically: shibboleth, made famous in the Book of Judges: technically
modest, it could be pronounced beginning with a /s/ or a /S/. However, the sociogram for
shibboleth was a more fraught proposition: in addition to signifying the part of a plant
containing grains, it also indicated where a person hailed due to the noted pronunciation
difference—much to the chagrin of the 42,000 Ephraimites killed who were unable to render
the unvoiced palato-alveolar approximate: “And the Gileadites took the passages of Jordan
before the Ephraimites: and it was so, that when those Ephraimites which were escaped said,
Let me go over; that the men of Gilead said unto him, Art thou an Ephraimite? If he said,
Nay; Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth: and he said Sibboleth: for he could not
frame to pronounce it right. Then they took him, and slew him at the passages of Jordan:
and there fell at that time of the Ephraimites forty and two thousand” (Judges 12: 5-6, KJV).
More recently, in the 1970s, Ulster loyalist gang the Shankhill Butchers did something
similar, cornering passersby and ordering them to recite their alphabets. In the event that
their victims said the “haitch” (/‘‘heItS/) associated with a Catholic education rather than the
“aitch” (/‘‘eItS/) of a Protestant education, they would find their throats slit and their bodies
rudely dumped in an alley.
12 Animals such as Alex the African Grey Parrot are among those I would cautiously consider
to have some grasp of linguistic syncategoremata.
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but what makes it the evolution of language was one step, the
greatest from an evolutionary point of view, and it had to have
happened quickly, indeed, all at once. (Allen, 2005: 196)
Appealing to the archeological evidence, Allen argues that language, un-
like material culture, developed extremely rapidly after a given point some
tens of thousands of years in the past. Furthermore, contra popular wis-
dom on the subject, Allen claims that language, unlike material culture, was
not an adaptation—at least, not in the sense of a value-adding change that
evolved in response to prevailing conditions (Allen, 2005: 198)—and indeed,
it has been argued that it is evolutionarily and theoretically impossible that
language is a development of that kind (Zahavi, 1993: 227-230). Language
is certainly not required for thought as Allen notes—after all, it would be
absurd to claim that those who crafted the Oldowan tools were incapable
of thought simply because they were pre-linguistic13—nor is it clear that it
would have had immediate utility for our Homo ancestors. Rather, language
is an example of what Steven Jay Gould calls a spandrel, or an example of
exaptation: “traits not ad-apted, or selected for what they do, but are, poten-
tially and contingently, adapted to functions for which they are recruited,
or exapted, after the anatomical fact” (Allen, 2005: 189)—an exaptation, in
our case, of the development of a massively developed prefrontal cortex.
Moreover, language exapted in other to help conserve that quality we had
already developed: the “order of socially complementary action” offered to
us via our artefactual syncategoremata.
Lie and alternative, inherent in language [. . . ] pose problems
to any society whose structure is founded on language, which
is to say all human societies. I have therefore argued that if
there are to be words at all it is necessary to establish The Word,
and that The Word is established by the invariance of liturgy.
(Rappaport, 1979: 210-211)
Allen claims that is it likely that the origins of language lie in communal
ritual: largely invariant codes and practices that serve to signify and enact
the acceptance of knowing participants. Following the cues of anthropol-
ogist Roy Rappaport, Allen argues that ritual becomes a kind of cultural
adhesive, whereby social obligation is encoded into public memory: “Al-
though ritual performance cannot ensure compliance, it irrevocably estab-
lishes obligation, and although it cannot eliminate insincerity, it makes it
loathsome, furtive and dangerous” (Allen, 2005: 200). Although only one
theory of early human language acquisition among many, Rappaport’s the-
ory has the benefit, in my view, of seeing language as but one aspect of a
broader symbolic culture wherein institutional facts may be collectively af-
firmed. Much the same way that the play of children is a means by which
social norms are developed and consolidated, so too are ritual and religion
13 For those interested in reading further on pre-linguistic thought, one could do worse than
beginning with José Luis Bermúdez’ work in Thinking Without Words (Bermúdez, 2003).
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activities of the exact same kind: “Language, play and ritual are cut from the
same cloth. Religion is not a different thing from childhood pretend-play:
it is pretend-play taken seriously and enjoyed also by adults” (Knight, 2010:
208).
Moreover, it was the development of material culture that engendered
this development. As our tools became more complex it became necessary
that our ancestors began to specialise; although it may well have been pos-
sible that a single human would have been fully conversant in the minu-
tiae of collecting berries and fruit, starting fires, fishing, making stone ar-
rows and knives, hunting large mammals, one assumes that early humans,
like modern-day chimpanzees, observed at least a partial division of labour
(Boesch and Boesch, 1981). As our tools and our praxes became more spe-
cialised, one can only imagine that early humans began to rely upon one
another more heavily—economically, socially and pedagogically—and ac-
cordingly, we encountered the imperative for establishing conventions and
social norms. In an early barter economy, it behoves participants to col-
lectively observe social norms lest they catalyse the dissolution of those
norms. Faced with the task of ensuring that our fellows would not behave
unexpectedly, and would instead act according to social convention, ritual
was our valiant attempt to collectively address this concern. This intersec-
tion of symbolic culture and ritual also suggests the development of moral
standards and public ethics: just as certain kinds of social arrangements
can be instantiated and institutionalised socially—a marriage, say, or a pub-
lic oath—so too could certain practices such as murder or theft be rendered
unambiguously verboten, with any guilty parties subject to social sanctions.
Although these rituals were almost certainly at least partially constituted
by gestures, it is Allen’s claim that early ritual was also comprised of “canon-
ical words”, much like the “I do” of a wedding ceremony, or the “Amen” that
concludes a prayer. Unlike the gibbon’s shrill shriek, these words—though
tied to the circumstances in which it was uttered—have a kind of symbolic,
mutually understood content. For the first time, words are gifted with the
ability to carry symbolic meaning, thus opening “the door to exploring other
things that can be done with words”. With time, the rituals themselves
became more complex, and grammatical structures appeared mapping our
language to our world and our objects in more and more particular ways.
What was once simple and indexical became sophisticated and polysemous;
words could mean different things, understood only by context. And so, let
out of its lamp, the multivalent, grammatical genie cannot be stuffed back
in: “Ritual practice is the matrix, the setting, in which full-blown language
first appears. Its dramatic usages establishes speech as a social fact and
conserve the structural constants that reliable use and acquisition require”
(Allen, 2005: 201).14
14 Those interested in reading further on Rappaport’s theory and its subsequent iterations
could do worse than the following: Rappaport, 1999, Power, 1998, Lewis, 2009, Watts, 2009,
Enfield, 2010 and Knight, 1998. We can also find an earlier iteration of this position inWalter
Burkert’s influential Homo Necans, first published in German in 1972: “If man nonetheless
survived and with unprecedented success even enlarged his sphere of influence, it was be-
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2.3 The Performance of a Lifetime
Having argued that the human being’s linguistic capacity is itself necessar-
ily premised upon practising the right kind of recursive tool-use, Allen then
argues for an epistemology that is both performative and artefactual. That is
to say: by Allen’s account, knowledge is not something you have, but rather
something that you do. He compares it to art in this respect: although I
have no doubt that philosophers of art and art theorists of a more post-
modern bent will find themselves at odds with this account, Allen happily
declares that art is a form of “success”; a kind of “sophisticated perceptual
innovation”. It must be impressive, both perceptually and aesthetically, even
if it is not to one’s taste (I, for instance, am not terribly partial to abstract
expressionism or colour field work, though I admit the quality of the expres-
sion). By this metric, “bad art” is an impossible contradiction (Allen, 2005:
66). Knowledge is something like art in this respect. Allen states that it
must be a “form of success, a superlative performance”. Let us unpack these
three terms—performance, success and superlativeness—each in turn:
1. Performance indicates that the action is a kind of intended action, ei-
ther of the kinds “I intend t” or “I intend T”. Writing a poem, catching
a train, designing a bridge and eating a hamburger are all kinds of
performances, as all of which are kinds of intentional action. Accord-
ingly, performance itself is a rather unremarkable quality or event: to
call something a “performance”, p, is simply to situate it within the
broader context of intelligible human action.
2. Success is a measure by which one can measure the efficacy of perfor-
mance. If eating a hamburger is a kind of performance, then the suc-
cess criteria for the performance in question are rather modest: not
choking, for example, and being forced to rely on the fact that your
dining companion is familiar with the Heimlich manoeuvre. Con-
versely, building a go-cart or solving a quadratic equation have rather
more rigorous success criteria that are conditioned upon the kind
of performance that is being conducted: in the instance of the for-
mer, a go-cart must track straight, must be evenly balanced and must
adopt an appropriate form in order to meet a compromised position
between speed and not upsetting the vehicle; in the instance of the
cause in place of his natural instincts he developed the rules of cultural tradition, this arti-
ficially informing and differentiating his basic inborn behaviour. Biological selection rather
than conscious planning determined the educational processes that helped form man, so
that he could best adapt himself to his role. A man had to be courageous to take part in
the hunt; therefore, courage is always included in the conception of an ideal man. A man
had to be reliable, able to wait, to resist a momentary impulse for the sake of a long-range
goal. He had to have endurance and keep to his word. [. . . ] Above all, the use of weapons
was controlled by the strictest—if also artificial—rules: what was allowed and necessary in
one realm was absolutely forbidden in the other. A decision point is the very possibility
that man may submit to laws curbing his individual intelligence and adaptability for the
sake of societal predictability. The educative power of tradition attempts to bind him in an
irreversible process analogous to biological ‘imprinting”’ (Burkert, 1983: 18-19).
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latter, the solution to the equation is subject to the internal logics
and boundary conditions posed by mathematical systems. Clearly
then, just as in the orthodox picture of tool-creation described above
any given performance has an accompanying set of K-conditions by
which we can assess whether or not a given performance has suc-
ceeded or failed: a performance p succeeds if it satisfies conditions k
for p (kp).
3. Superlativeness is the most difficult of the three terms to define, as
it is the most obviously qualitative. Although we might want to say
that success is also a kind of qualitative measure, or even that “suc-
cess” and “superlativeness” are describing the same thing, it seems
clear that most instances of successful performance are not so: if I am
performing in such a way as to tie up my shoelaces, whether or not I
succeed in this task seems unambiguous. The tying of one’s shoelaces,
just like eating a hamburger or catching a train, is merely a kind of
habit, or reliable performance. To call this “superlative” would cer-
tainly be setting the bar too low. Knowledge instead must be “exem-
plary”; to know is “to performwith notable accomplishment in a range
of artefacts” (Allen, 2005: 67). This is because success is merely a con-
dition that must be met for a performance to be superlative: although
one may succeed at a task, it does not mean that the performance was
superlative; however, in order for my performance to have been su-
perlative, I must have at least succeeded at the task. The performance
itself must be something extra; a kind of p+.
A “superlative performance” then is a successful performance of a certain
kind; to expand upon the nomenclature provided in chapter 2.1, it is an
instance of knowledge (n) if and only the exemplary performance satisfies
the success conditions: p+ is n iff p+ meets kp+. The performance cannot
merely be a habitual performance, but must instead be somehow exemplary,
whether by virtue of being innovative, elegant, or meeting some other like
criterion. Moreover because knowledge is a superlative performance, the
form that it takes is not in principle similar with other instances of knowl-
edge, much the same way that pieces of art are not identical. To recognise
knowledge forces one to be methodologically casuistic: although there ap-
pears little essentially in common with, say, utilising the naturally acoustic
properties of cardboard to make an iPod speaker out of a toilet roll and Ein-
stein developing his theory of general relativity, they are both superlative
accomplishments: they take what is given and, with that material, create
something exemplary. Indeed, it seems very much like Allen’s “superlative
performance” is a certain kind of Pye’s workmanship of risk: if the results
of workmanship are predetermined and the outcomes entirely known (“I in-
tend to create t”), it is a product of the workmanship of certainty, or what
Allen would describe as mere habit. Conversely, superlative performances
(P+) are not of this kind, for it is not known whether or not the p+ will
satisfies its k-conditions. Although not all examples of the workmanship of
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risk qualify as superlative performances for obvious reasons—some may fail
entirely, or others may only marginally satisfy their k-conditions—it seems
clear that superlative performances must be a kind of workmanship of risk.
There are two additional things to note, here. The first is that Allen’s
artefactual epistemology poses an explicit challenge to Gilbert Ryle’s now-
orthodox distinction between “knowing how” and “knowing that”, finding
the differentiation unhelpful. Although there is an intuitive appeal in ar-
guing for the separation of knowledge-how (performative) and knowledge-
that (propositional) by saying that they are different kinds of knowledge—I
know how to ride a bike, make a sandwich and tell a joke; I know that the
world is round, Napoleon I was Emperor of France and 3 + 5 = 8—Allen’s
epistemology does not allow for the distinction. That is to say: if knowledge
of all kinds is a type of superlative performance, then knowledge itself is “in
no case propositional” (Allen, 2005: 67). Rather than propositions them-
selves being knowledge, they are instead expressions of knowledge: just as
the toilet roll speakers are the artefactual expression of a superlative perfor-
mance, so too can a proposition—say, E = mc2—be the artefactual expression
of a superlative performance; the performance being the process by which
the theory was developed. The second thing of note is that if the method by
which one recognises knowledge is casuistic, then we are precluded from
stipulating criteria by which superlative performances can be recognised.
Of course, that is not to say that they are unrecognisable, just as new art-
works are not unrecognisable; rather, because superlative performances are
necessarily novel we are equally necessarily unable to predict the forms that
they will take, and thus as a corollary are unable to provide predictive cri-
teria: “There is no analytically recoverable unit, no common denominator
recurring in each instance of knowledge, by virtue of which performance
and artifact are considered superlative. [. . . ] New knowledge implies some-
thing the likes of which have never been seen, and one cannot law down
criteria for recognizing something the likes of which have never been seen”
(Allen, 2005: 69). The true test of knowledge lies not just in the efficacy
of the performance of the artefact, but is also determined by whether any
other artefact has been efficient for the same reasons, just as the true test of
an artwork lies not only in its beauty (such as, say, in a paint-by-numbers
of Monet’s Reflections of Clouds on the Water-Lily Pond), but in it being a
sophisticated perceptual innovation; the first toilet roll iPod speakers were
exemplary because nothing like that had ever been done before.
Of course, we might reasonably find these claims rather problematic, with
knowledge perception seemingly being conflated with something very like
personal taste. However, although “taste” is indeed relevant, Allen certainly
wants to avoid being branded as a subjectivist in this regard. Instead, in a
rather Humean turn, he claims that assessing the success of knowledge, like
assessing the success of art, lies in recognising the sense of aesthesis (per-
ceptual sensation or feeling) that the artefact elicits. Just as Hume argued
that, in the absence of strictly determined criteria by which one can eval-
uate matters of taste, we must instead rely on the fact that “the harmony
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of verse, the tenderness of passion, the brilliancy of wit, must give imme-
diate pleasure” (Hume, 1975: 171), Allen argues that knowledge and beauty
are relevantly similar in that their appeal lies in their ability to immediately
sensibly cohere: “Coherence cannot be delimited by analytically necessary
and eternally sufficient conditions because such definitions define determi-
nate concepts, while coherence is what Kant called an indeterminate con-
cept, the concept of a concept” (Allen, 2004: 262). However, Allen’s claims
cut far deeper than Hume’s: although Hume would agree that our capac-
ity to appreciate coherence is not, Allen argues, contingent upon rational
or logical values, Allen is at his most daring when he proceeds to claim
instead that our logical or rational values are themselves underwritten by
aesthesis itself: “Coherence is made and not found, invented and not dis-
covered, and an artifact of embodied, historically contingent understanding,
not the poetic mimesis of an intrinsic nature. It never comes naturally, inno-
cently, without art” (Allen, 2004: 263). Moreover, also unlike Hume, Allen
does not think that discerning knowledge is the sole purview of those true
judges who do more than merely evaluate “the grosser and more palpable
qualities of the object” (Hume, 1875: 278), but that knowledge can be evalu-
ated against the broader traditional of accomplishment, rendered into four
measures of performance:
1. Appropriateness to both use and users, considered against criteria of
affordability, ergonomics and efficacy. David Pye in The Nature and
Aesthetics of Design describes all designed objects as being failures, “ei-
ther because they flout one or another of the requirements or because
they are compromises, and compromise implies a degree of failure”
(Pye, 1978: 70), and it seems that by the “appropriateness” criterion,
Allen is attempting to provide a metric by which we can assess which
artefacts fail the least.
2. Design quality is the measure by which an artefact can be said be
superlative (as described above), and is thus primarily a measure of
innovativeness or novelty.
3. Fecundity is the measure by which an artefact can be assess as a
“source of fruitful, inventive extrapolation or inspired innovation in
adjacent fields of theory and practice” (Allen, 2005: 72). Allen uses
the examples of a sailing ship, being the “matrix of a great body of
wider knowledge, artifact, technique, and culture” (Allen, 2005: 73).
Something like the photographic image could also be considered to
be such a technology, as it has substantively altered our perception
of the world in a number of ways: not just in broader epistemic and
existential senses—as we will discuss in chapter 4 and chapter 5—
but also in the sense that photographic and cinematic technologies
have meaningfully impacted social policy, crime and punishment, in-
formation technology, news and current affairs, entertainment and
the lived environment more broadly. The photographic image, like
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other fecund artefacts, has found wide and unanticipated application
across a vast number of fields.
4. Symbiosis indicates an artefact’s “contribution to the expansive coher-
ence of a built environment” (Allen, 2005: 73). It not only describes
those artefacts we would prefer to retain (the wheel, fire, ceramics,
metallurgy, writing, underarm deodorant), but is also a measure of
the impact that the particular artefact has had upon our lifeworlds. In
the case of the photographic image, it could be considered a highly
symbiotic artefact as it seems not only desirable to keep, but also be-
cause it has catalysed such a radical shift in our lived experiences.
Allen’s claims are in essence two-fold. The first, as per the prior section,
is that we, as human beings, are necessarily constituted by our technology,
for our technology is that which facilitates that other necessary condition
for humanhood: the ability to use and navigate symbolic references in a
systematic and intelligible way. The second is that these artefacts are what
constitute our collective knowledge, being the right kinds of superlative
performance; by virtue of populating the world we inhabit, our technology
becomes importantly world-constituting. Those things that we tradition-
ally call knowledge—propositional claims—are instead mere expressions or
outcomes of a deeper, performative epistemology that is bound inextricably
with artefacts, culture and praxis. These artefacts interact with one another;
they imply complementary use; they knit together in an intelligible way by
being embedded within a socio-cultural economy of artefacts. The shape
and structure of the modern city implies the automobile, just as the automo-
bile implies the knowledge of metallurgy, of aerodynamics, of concessions
to the public interest. We cannot know the world without our objects; it is
our objects themselves that provide us with epistemic orientation.15
Accordingly, “superlative artefactual performances” are those specific per-
formances or processes that supplement or otherwise add to the set of arte-
facts that already constitute our material culture, and thus evidence of our
knowledge. When Allen speaks of the habitual use of an artefact (say, us-
ing a shoelace to tie one’s shoe) he is speaking of praxis involving use of
the object as intended. Meanwhile, a key aspect of knowledge creation
is discovering that our objects, like our hands and our tongues, also have
the unique property of “functionless functionality” that I mentioned in the
previous chapter. As Michael Tomasello argues in The Cultural Origins of
Human Cognition: although we as children may learn that certain objects
15 He shares this sentiment with Hannah Arendt: “[. . . ] the things of the world have the
function of stabilising human life, and their objectivity lies in the fact that men, their ever-
changing nature notwithstanding, can retrieve their identity by being related to the enduring
sameness of objects, the same chair today and tomorrow, the same house formerly from birth
to death. Against the subjectivity of men stands the objectivity of the man-made artifice, not
the indifference of nature. Only because we have erected a world of objects fromwhat nature
gives us and have built this artificial environment into nature, thus protecting us from her,
can we look upon nature as being ‘objective’. Without a world between men and nature,
there would be eternal movement, but no durability” (Arendt, 2000: 173-174).
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are “for” things (a hammer is “for” hammering, a screwdriver is “for” tight-
ening screws), an integral part of the process of education, of learning, is
discovering the multivalency of these objects. A hammer is not just “for”
hammering, but can serve as a weapon should the need arise; a screwdriver
is not just “for” tightening screws, but is also an extremely effective means
of opening obstinate tins of paint: “[The child then] comes to see some
cultural objects and artifacts as having, in addition to their natural sensory-
motor affordances, another set of [. . . ] intentional affordances based on her
understanding of the intentional relations that other persons have with that
object or artefact [and] the world through the artifact” (Tomasello, 1999:
85). To recognise the artefactual detritus of other humans is to be sensitive
to the intention that has come to bear when the item was created, and in
relaxing the strictures of artefactual denotation, the world is illuminated by
the process of artefactual manipulation; echoing Aristotelian techne¯, we are
anchored to the world by our capacity to perceive intended use, and we
make knowledge by knowingly perverting the artefact towards other ends.
When Angkor Wat was rediscovered in the West by Henri Mouhot in Jan-
uary 1860, there was never any apparent doubt that he had encountered a
artificially occurring phenomenon, despite the huge temporal and cultural
difference between his time and its construction. In spite of the yawning
chasm of years and culture, he still recognised that the crumbling city was
the product of human hands; a mute reminder of those who had come be-
fore: “[. . . ] ruins of such grandeur, remains of structures that, at the first
view, one is filled with profound admiration, and cannot but ask what has
become of this powerful race, so civilized, so enlightened, the authors of
these gigantic works?” (Mouhot, 2005: 279). Despite abandonment, the
temples of Angkor Wat—just like Machu Picchu, deserted by the Inca in
the 1500s and rediscovered by Hiram Bingham in 1911; or Pompeii, redis-
covered after 1,650 years by Rocque Joaquin de Alcubierre; or Palaeolithic
stone hammers—speak of human intention, of the lifeworlds of those who
created and used those artefacts. I again quote Arnheim: “All implements
tend to include in their appearance the invisible presence of what is needed
to fulfil their function. [. . . ] It is the direct perception completion of an
object that looks incomplete as long as it is unemployed” (Arnheim, 1969:
89-90). Just are we are constituted ontologically by our artefacts, so too are
our artefacts constituted by us; without us to afford them purpose, they are
mere ciphers or gravestones—mute epistles from long-dead lovers.
If today we are profoundly, vitally, irrevocably technological
beings, it is not because evolution made us that way. Natural
selection did not discover our capacity for the knowledge of ar-
tifacts. We did that ourselves when, well after the evolutionary
emergence of our species, the cultivation of knowledge came
into view as an option. At that moment biological forces like
adaptation or natural selection were well and truly done with
us, and the rest, which is everything, we made for ourselves.
(Allen, 2005: 188-189)
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And so Allen argues that our technology is our culture, or at least the
only part that really matters; the former shapes and impinges upon the lat-
ter, changing our form of life in the process. However, this is not something
to lament, as per Heidegger’s maudlin rejection of the industrial world and
the dangers of das Abstandlose (chapter 3.1); rather, technoculture for Allen
is “as old as the genus Homo, as old as language, or protolanguage, or rit-
ual, and much older than our belated species, for whom it has become as
indispensable as fresh water. The culture of artifacts is bred in our bones;
we are born to culture; for us culture is nature” (Allen, 2005: 219). Civili-
sation, understood as the culture of cities, is what happens when our tech-
noculture hits critical mass, when our artefacts become a kind of totalising
meta-artefact: “A city is an architectural actuality, an immensely complex
physical artifact, and today there is no way out of the urban net. There is
no outside. The human future is urban so far as it can be seen at all” (Allen,
2005: 266). For Allen, unlike Heidegger, praxis and scientific perception are
not two different modes of understanding being, but are instead deeply inte-
grated and mutually constituting. Having collapsed speech into knowledge-
how and thus dethroned logos, Allen argues that our capacity to render the
world scientistically—reducing the world to a series of abstract qualities—is
itself a kind of technical praxis; it is a process of knowledge-making.
Finally, in addition to being problematic for what we can call “conven-
tional” epistemologies, it seems clear that Allen’s story casts serious doubt
upon upon the received significance of designed objects. Speaking crudely,
we can distinguish between two conflicting models. The first—that which
I would call the design-as-truth thesis, of the sort endorsed by writers and
philosophers such as Robert Grudin—argues that our our design objects to
have some fundamental relationship with the truth. If truth “determines
that our bodies do not take off into the air and float about like birthday
balloons” and “asserts, without fear of contradiction, that light of a certain
spectrum makes things visible, that pleasure is sweet and pain is a drag”;
and given that truth (so the argument goes) “lies in the rough but workable
details of what we are and where we are”, then our designed objects—when
done well, when improving our lots and integrating seamlessly with our
lives—frame “appropriate responses to the truths that nature tells us”. Our
objects say something substantive about our circumstances, and the best de-
signed objects—Eames chairs, Volkswagen Beetles, Apple iPhones—mimic
and emulate “natural truth by being true to nature” (Grudin, 2010: 27); by
aping the world-as-given and, subsequently and presumably, the things-in-
themselves. Viz.: if nature is the realm of givens, then the best kind of de-
sign hugs the contours of the given, revealing more of the world to us in the
process, whilst bad design—and Grudin’s primary bugbear, over-design—is
“a pack of lies” (Grudin, 2010: 25).
The second explanation—that which I call the design-as-palliation thesis
(David Pye is representative of this view)—argues instead that design is a
palliative attempt to ease the difficulty of our passing through the world:
“From the fact that deadly injury, pain and exhaustion prevent the fulfil-
2.3 the performance of a lifetime 35
ment of the universal wish for happiness, men have always tended to infer
that if only life were safe, comfortable and effortless they would be happy.
It does not follow. [. . . ] But evidently this inference has largely determined
our modern wishes and hence the devices which have been born of them”
(Pye, 1978: 67). Because the world is a cruel and heartless place, we sur-
round ourselves with artefacts to ease the burdens that rude circumstance
has inflicted upon us; accordingly, our artefacts accrue “palliative devices”
that make achieving our desired goals easier with each passing iteration.
Pye himself uses the example of a typewriter:
All that remains after a typewriter has been used [. . . ] is marked
paper. That is the result of the typewriter, and the only parts
essential to it are the type-bar ends, the paper, the ribbon and
the roller. With those and some laborious care you could type
a letter. The rest of the machine is an accretion of subsidiary
palliative devices—keys, carriage and all the rest—which give
economy, i.e., eliminate labour and care and give speed. (Pye,
1978: 68)
In a palliation model, designed objects contain no presumption of truth,
but are merely the product of pragmatic inquiry: the best object is that
which has the best possible practical consequences. If life is indeed hard,
and design is indeed palliative, then the best objects are those which suc-
ceed in making life better than all of those other objects to which it can be
relevantly compared: i.e., contrasting the Eames Lounge Chair above with
the unforgiving wooden school chairs of my childhood. As a result it would
not be an error, I think, to consider the design-as-palliation thesis the ar-
ticulation of a profoundly existential form of scepticism. Indeed, it seems
almost pessimistic; a kind of pessimism that claims we are restricted to look-
ing through a glass, darkly. Although the design-as-truth thesis seems to
promise the possibility of accessing profound truths about the world via
our objects (though exactly what that means remains unclear), the claims
of design-as-palliation theses are far more modest: as imperfect beings in
an imperfect world, all we can offer ourselves are salves to the existential
agonies that life offers. However, even these salves are compromised. Pye
writes that all of our objects are inevitably failures; technique and design
will always outstrip our capacities to realise them (whether these imposi-
tion be those of cost, inability to realise materials, the laws of the universe,
etcetera): “The requirements for design conflict and cannot be reconciled.
All designs for devices are in some degree failures, either because they flout
one or another of the requirements or because they are comprises, and com-
promise implies a degree of failure” (Pye, 1978: 70).
Curiously however, Allen’s epistemology provides a means by which we
can synthesise the two methods. Although Allen certainly seems that he
would endorse David Pye’s fundamental claim that our objects in one way
or another ease the pain of being alive, his epistemology seems to suggest
that in palliating those pains something is revealed. In turning knowledge
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into a kind of artefactual performance, it seems clear that for something
to be truly palliative it must also be truth-bearing and world-constituting—
indeed, they simply seem like different ways of describing what is funda-
mentally the same quality. Our objects are of a far more profound impor-
tance than either the as-palliation or as-truth story would have us believe:
being so integral to our lifeworlds, crudely reducing them to a single facet
of that experience is a crude and unwelcome gesture. Instead, our artefacts
provide the nacreous surface that constitutes our phenomenal world whilst
easing our passing through the noumenal realm: “To drink water from a
waxed paper cup on the highway and to drink it from a crystal goblet are
different gestures. In the first case, you almost forget that you exist as you
drink. In the second [. . . ] you realize that you have in your hands an in-
strument that makes you reflect upon how you are living at that moment”
(Ettore Sottsass, quoted in Levine, 2006).16
2.4 Between Artefact & World
I believe that Allen makes a powerful case for his peculiar epistemology:
an epistemology that I would endorse for the simple reason that it allows
us to speak meaningfully about artefact creation in instances of the work-
manship of risk; it allows for superlative performances that nonetheless do
not have predetermined ends. However, even assuming we buy into Allen’s
epistemology, a question nonetheless remains about some of implications
of these claims, particularly with regards to how they overlap with meta-
physical claims. That is to say: it seems clear that we need to provide some
account of how the world is, if only so that we have some kind of coherent
characterisation of what it is exactly that an artefact captures. Accordingly,
if we are to buy into Allen’s model, what can we subsequently say about
Allen’s metaphysics? Allen himself does not seem disposed to provide any
coherent picture, believing it beyond the purview of our epistemic capaci-
ties: faced with the prospect of trying to get underneath the artefacts, as it
were, and obtain the world beneath, his response is quick, uncompromising
and brutal: “The end of human life is the end of the world, beyond which
is—nothing. Human existence and activity make a world where otherwise
there is—nothing. Kick a stone if you like. Slap the table if it helps. That
does not prove that in the absence of human beings such a thing as a stone
or a star exists” (Allen, 2005: 30). Given that Allen’s epistemology is our
material culture and its byproducts, he seems to categorically deny the pos-
sibility of achieving any great metaphysical insights, of understanding the
universe as it would exist without our presence. Allen’s artefactual episte-
16 I am also reminded of the opening passage from The Long Goodbye: “The first time I laid
eyes on Terry Lennox he was drunk in a Rolls-Royce Silver Wraith outside the terrace of
The Dancers. [. . . ] There was a girl beside him. Her hair was a lovely shade of dark red
and she had a distant smile on her lips and over her shoulders she had a blue mink that
almost made the Rolls-Royce look like just another automobile. It didn’t quite. Nothing can”
(Chandler, 1992: 3).
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mology seems to have quite clear boundary conditions; asking for knowl-
edge of necessary truths—of episte¯me¯, of obtaining the Kantian Ding an sich
(things-in-themselves)—is well beyond our meagre capabilities. Nonethe-
less, I believe that we can still draw some tentative conclusions.
If we are to endorse Allen’s epistemology, we can make the minimal claim
that knowledge, that which constitutes the human lifeworld, has some kind
of supervenience relation with the things-in-themselves, in that the things-
in-themselves determine (completely or incompletely) the form of the arte-
facts that comprise said lifeworld.17 Supervenience itself is a central notion
within the broad field of 20th century analytic philosophy, being first used
in its contemporary philosophical sense by R. M. Hare in his 1952 The Lan-
guage of Morals. However, supervenience theses did not begin with Hare;
in a paper published in 1984, he acknowledged that he first encountered the
term at Oxford in the 1940s, though he could not recall who utilised it (Hare,
1984).18 Regardless of the origin of the concept, supervenience describes a
relation wherein, in a given system, certain low-level properties of the sys-
tem necessarily inform the structures of certain high-level properties of the
system. For example, Brandon Carter’s weak anthropic principle—”we must
be prepared to take account of the fact that our location in the universe is
necessarily privileged to the extent of being compatible with our existence
as observers”—is a kind of supervenience thesis, for it supposes that human
life is supervenient upon the structural arrangement of the universe (Carter,
1974). Were the universe structured in a different way, it would necessarily
impinge upon either the quality, quantity or overall existence of observers.
Or, articulated more broadly: supervenience is the observation that there
cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference. Using consciousness as an
example, as Chalmers does: if one were a physicalist, say—that is, holding
the belief that there are no non-physical properties or qualities in the uni-
verse, because all positive properties globally and metaphysically supervene
on microphysical properties—one would hold the belief that consciousness
is reductively explainable in terms of the low-level properties of the system.
That is to say in this case: consciousness is supervenient upon cognitive
processes or states, which are themselves supervenient upon certain bio-
logical facts, which are then supervenient upon certain physical facts, ad
infinitum.19
17 For the following discussion I have broadly followed the cues of Jaegwon Kim and David
Chalmers (Kim, 1993a, Kim, 1993b and Chalmers, 1996).
18 Moreover, although he did not use the term, G. E. Moore describes a very similar phe-
nomenon in his 1922 book Philosophical Studies (Moore, 1922).
19 As one might expect of a key term in contemporary analytic philosophy, there has been
an enormous amount of debate sustained concerning the ways by which supervenience can
be speciated. Though I am for the most part both uninterested and unqualified to weigh
in substantively on such matters, I am happy to dumbly accept that supervenience can be
split into two dyads: local and global supervenience, and natural and logical supervenience,
thus rendering potentially four different categories: local/natural, local/logical, global/natu-
ral and global/ logical. That said, although a legitimate position to hold, this is by no means
a universally accepted view; whereas Sider, 1999, McLaughlin, 1997b and Stalnaker, 1996
would broadly agree with this notion, Kim, 1993a argues that global supervenience is lit-
tle more than a form of logical or strong supervenience, resulting in only two categories;
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Understood accordingly, I think it fair to claim that the artefacts that com-
prise our epistemology and our lifeworlds—the B-facts—are themselves su-
pervenient upon the A-facts of the world; certainly, it seems obvious that
the B-facts of our artefacts could simply not be without a universe capable
of supporting them. However, the relationship that holds between these
A-facts and these B-facts remain unclear; namely, as to whether the super-
venience relation between the two is, according to Chalmers’ nomenclature,
logical or natural:
The distinction between logical and natural supervenience is
vital for our purposes. We can intuitively understand the dis-
tinction as follows. If B-properties supervene logically on A-
properties, then once God (hypothetically) creates a world with
certain A-facts, the B-facts come along for free as an automatic
consequence. If B-properties merely supervene naturally on A-
properties, then after making sure of the A-facts, God had to do
more work in order to make sure of the B-facts: he had to make
sure there was a law relating the A-facts and the B-facts. [. . . ]
Once the law is in place, the relevant A-facts will automatically
bring along the B-facts; but one could, in principle, have had a
situation where they did not. (Chalmers, 1996: 38).
Consequently, logical supervenience demands that if I assume certain A-
facts about a given system, then those logically supervenient B-facts are
necessary products of the A-facts. As a result, we might say for instance
that the motions of interplanetary bodies are themselves logically super-
venient upon Newtonian laws of gravity and motion, and are necessarily
so; although we obviously need to posit certain material conditions being
met (i.e.: the presence of planets), there is no need on our part to posit
the existence of an additional law or rule tying together classical mechan-
ics with Mercury’s orbit around the sun. However, it seems clear that the
relationship of our artefacts with the world is not the same kind of rela-
tion; although the B-facts of our artefacts are indeed contingent upon the
A-facts of the world and human intention, it seems bizarre to think that the
A-facts necessarily dictate the B-facts; although the forms of our artefacts
are informed by circumstance, it seems plainly incorrect to claim that they
are dictated by circumstance, as we will see in the dispute between Jürgen
Habermas and Andrew Feenberg in Section 3.2. Although the B-facts could
not be that way without the A-facts, they are by no means determined by
the A-facts, indicating that the relationship between artefacts and world is
one that is naturally supervenient; our artefacts are not a necessary product
of the our relationship with the world but merely a contingent product.
That noted, if they are naturally supervenient, it seems clear that—as per
Chalmers above—we require some additional rule or set of rules to relate the
Chalmers, 1996 seems to endorse global, logical/local and natural/local supervenience, indi-
cating three categories; and Shagrir, 2002 and Bennett, 2003 both argue not only for strong
and weak global supervenience, but also an intermediate form, thus rendering a grand total
of five categories. There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio.
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A-facts of the world with the B-facts of our artefacts. Furthermore, this rule
must also point to the boundary conditions of Allen’s artefactual epistemol-
ogy: we must not only find a means to account for the fact that not only do
the A-facts exist, they are also beyond our direct access. Given those facts,
it is my claim that the natural supervenience relation between artefacts and
world is guaranteed by the fact that our artefacts are a nomological, emer-
gent property of the relationship between the world and human intention:
“If P is a property of w, then P is emergent if and only if (1) P supervenes
with nomological necessity, but not with logical necessity, on properties the
parts of w have taken separately or in other combinations; and (2) some
of the supervenience principles linking properties of the parts of w with
w’s having P are fundamental laws” (McLaughlin, 1997a: 39). These fun-
damental supervenience principles are not metaphysically necessitated by
any other laws, as well as being temporally contingent; the B-facts at time t
synchronically depend on the basal A-facts at time t and could not emerge
prior.20
The common characteristics [of emergence] are: (1) radical nov-
elty (features not previously observed in systems); (2) coher-
ence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain
themselves over some period of time); (3) A global or macro
“level” (i.e. there is some property of “wholeness”); (4) it is the
product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is “osten-
sive” (it can be perceived). For good measure, Goldstein throws
in supervenience—downward causation. (Corning, 2002)
Accordingly, we can compare the qualities of Allenian artefacts to the
criteria that Corning poses:
1. Instances of knowledge according to Allen’s epistemology are indeed
radically novel; indeed, as described above, radical novelty is required
for something to be rightly considered an example of an exemplary
performance p+.
2. Our artefacts, again per Allen, are mutually complementary, and con-
stitute a socio-cultural economy of artefacts. That very mutual com-
plementarity is what guarantees conceptual and praxical coherence
amongst the emergent phenomena in this case.
3. The global or macro level of our artefacts is constituted by the sum
total of human knowledge; a kind of superset constituted by all other
exemplary artefactual performances.
4. Tying in with the observation made above regarding synchronicity,
our artefacts—operating in response to (a) shifting base conditions,
20 For more information on the subject of emergence, particularly as it relates to superve-
nience, please refer to Broad, 1925, Kim, 1992, Kim, 1999, Kim, 2006a, Kim, 2006b, McLaugh-
lin, 1997a, O’Connor, 1994, Cleve, 1990 and Crane, 2001.
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(b) other kinds of artefacts and (c) a broadly palliative telos, as per
David Pye—are themselves the product of a dynamical process. Cer-
tain artefacts are suggested by certain other kinds of artefacts: the
needle by the thread, for instance, or the highway by the car. Our
artefactual landscape ceaselessly evolves in response to these kinds
of conceptual and praxical tectonics.
5. Our artefacts are the objects of our perceptions in a very literal sense;
they are the only means by which we are able to engage with the
world.
6. Our artefacts have downwards causation; being supervenient, they do
not have a merely epiphenomenal relationship with the world, but
can cause material changes in the dynamics and properties of their
parts. Not only does the world influence the form of our artefacts
(aeroplanes, for example, are designed with the boundary conditions
of the world in mind), so to do our artefacts change the basal con-
ditions of the world—dams changing the course of rivers, built en-
vironments providing new ecologies for urbanised animal and plant
species, the endemic reduction in biodiversity as a result of artefac-
tual performances or their by-products, a reduction in glaciation and
increase in mean global temperature due to anthropogenic climate
change—as well as changing the way we think by enabling other
kinds of hitherto-unanticipated action, as per 4.
There is, however, an additional property that I believe we can ascribe to
Allenian artefacts: that of irreducibility. That is: with regards to emergent
phenomena in physical or biological systems (bird flocks, termite cathedrals,
snowflakes, etcetera), although the kinds of patterns that emerge are un-
expected, they still nonetheless explicable—they are both contingent upon
and deducible from lower-level phenomena (i.e.: logically supervenient).
The same is not true of our artefacts. To explain: in “Strong and Weak
Emergence” Chalmers examines emergent properties with respect to cel-
lular automata, which are discrete models used in a number of academic
disciplines.21 In essence they are quite simple: a regular grid of cells, with
each cell in one of a number of finite states. Each discrete cell has a neigh-
bourhood, defined in relation to that specific cell. The initial state of the
automata (t=0) serves to define the starting state of each discrete cell. All
subsequent states (t=n, t=n+1, t=n+2 etcetera, where n is greater than or
equal to 0), will change the states of each discrete cell according to some
function that determines the new state of each cell in terms of the current
state of the cell and the states of the cells in its neighbourhood. The result-
ing dynamic patterns that form can be quite complex and unexpected (see
figure 5), and are similar in kind to reducibly emergent phenomena in the
natural world.
21 Chalmers’ distinction between “strong” and “weak” emergence seems to carry unnecessary
metaphysical baggage; the distinction I draw is between reducible and irreducible emergence.
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Figure 5: A single iteration of Conway’s Game of Life
However, though they are unexpected, they remain explicable: although
the functions governing the behaviour of the discrete cells may not be imme-
diately apparent, they are nonetheless “straightforwardly deducible” from
the set of available data (Chalmers, 2006: 245). Similarly, bird flocks, ter-
mite cathedrals, the formation of snowflakes and other emergent phenom-
ena in the natural world are subject to similarly simple functions. Although
the sum total of actions may suggest an internal cohesion or a kind of di-
rectedness, these structures are absolutely reducible to the algorithmically
determined actions of those actors participating in the system—birds, ter-
mites and water molecules, respectively. Moreover, if these are examples
of reducible emergence, then what constitutes irreducible emergence seems
clear: if reducibly emergent phenomena are those logically supervenient
effects that are both contingent upon and deducible from lower-level phe-
nomena, irreducibly emergent phenomena are those naturally supervenient
effects that are contingent upon but not deducible from lower-level phenom-
ena. This being the case, it becomes apparent that our artefacts are phenom-
ena of this kind: naturally supervenient and irreducibly emergent, with the
supervenience relationship guaranteed by nomological necessity. Indeed, it
seems prima facie unlikely that our objects are reducibly emergent proper-
ties of the system.
[One] wonders whether the question ought not to have been
raised long before the level of life [. . . ]. The question: Is chem-
ical behaviour ultimately different from dynamical behaviour?
seems just as reasonable as the question: Is vital behaviour ul-
timately different from non-vital behaviour? And we are much
more likely to answer the latter question rightly if we see it in
relation to similar questions which might be raised about other
apparent differences of kind in the material realm. (Broad, 1925:
44)
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C. D. Broad, in his early monograph on emergence, argues in favour of
the existence of what he calls “trans-ordinal laws”: that is to say, laws that
connect strata related by irreducible emergence relations: “A trans-ordinal
law would be a statement of the irreducible fact that an aggregate com-
posed of aggregates of the next lower order in such and such proportions
and arrangements has such and such characteristic and non-deducible prop-
erties” (Broad, 1925: 78). It is my argument that the relationship between
the A-conditions of the world and the B-conditions of our artefacts is con-
tingent upon the existence and effect of these trans-ordinal or irreducibly
emergent laws. Consider: were the relationship between our artefacts and
the world reducible, this would strongly imply a kind of bilateral symme-
try between the base A-conditions and the emergent B-properties; that is,
with a sufficiently complete picture of the emergent B-properties we could
presumably successfully extrapolate the A-conditions that gave rise to the
B-properties, just as with a sufficiently complete picture of the A-facts then
we can predict the emergent B-properties. Such a picture seems similar to
that which is offered by Laplace and his infamous demon: given the strictly
and transparently determinate relationships between all relevant facts, then
it should prove possible to account for all of the constituent parts of that
system if one is both in possession of and has a sufficiently sophisticated
account of each of these facts.22 However, this seems likely not to be the
case: we have certainly been thus far incapable of completely extrapolating
the facts of the matter via our artefacts, and, as I will make clear in my sec-
tion on the disagreement between Jürgen Habermas and Andrew Feenberg
(chapter 3.3), it is also impossible to extrapolate the specific forms of our
artefacts by appealing to the rules of the world.
The absence of this apparent epistemic symmetry strongly seems to sug-
gest that our artefacts are not reducible to the world—and indeed, this is to
be expected: “The only peculiarity of [trans-ordinal laws] is [. . . ] that we
cannot possibly deduce it beforehand from any combination of laws which
we have discovered by observing aggregates of a lower order” (Broad, 1925:
79); just as we are categorically incapable of isolating the B-facts in any
complete or comprehensive way via the A-facts, so too are we unable pro-
vide a complete account of the A-facts even were we in possession of a
complete account of our B-facts. Moreover, this outcome maps nicely onto
Allen’s epistemology, for its bloody-minded pragmatism and metaphysical
suspicions renders his view explicitly not symmetrical; though it is certainly
causal, it is by no means strictly and transparently determined. In addition
to superlative artefactual performances being radically novel, his claims im-
ply that our artefacts are categorically irreducible to the A-facts; the world
remains forever beyond our grasp. Consequently, it seems obvious that the
irreducibly emergent nature of our artefacts presents an excellent reason
as to why it is impossible in Allen’s view to attain any kind of complete
22 “An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and
all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough
to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the
greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom” (Laplace, 1951: 4)
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or unambiguous picture of the things-in-themselves beneath the artefacts—
impossible, even, to make contact with the Real in any significant, non-
attenuated way.
Although Allen’s description of the artefactual topography of our knowl-
edge is, I believe, a convincing one, a significant question nonetheless re-
mains. There is in Allen’s work a certain kind of positivity: the idea that
our technologies and praxes constitute our knowledge seems to testify to
the fact that human beings are in some sense privileged; that we are the
lords and masters of the universe, and that the things within it are only
afforded importance or value because we have ascribed those qualities to
those objects. Insofar as epistemologies go, it is one characterised by a cer-
tain kind of uncompromising bloody-mindedness with regards to the kinds
of ontological claims we can make about the universe, as well as one that
emphasises the importance of retaining awareness or prudence with regards
to the development and application of our technologies: the buck starts and
ends with us, and if something undesirable occurs we have only ourselves
to blame. Accordingly, I do not think it inaccurate to claim that Allen’s epis-
temology is fundamentally optimistic, if mediated by the acknowledgement
of our own absolute culpability.
However, despite the generally empowering (if somewhat solipsistic) sen-
timent that underpins these kinds of assumptions, Allen is curiously silent
on what is perhaps the most significant question asked by philosophers of
technology more generally: to what extent do our tools present an existen-
tial threat to our lifeworlds? Allen’s response seems easy enough to extrapo-
late: given that we are constituted by technology—we are literally made hu-
man by our tools—the question itself is something of a non-starter. The idea
that technology is threatening seems to imply that the concept of the human
is somehow distinct from the technology we wield, and Allen would almost
certainly reject that assumption out of hand—indeed, would likely claim
that the sentiment isn’t even worth seriously entertaining. Nonetheless, we
find the sentiment endlessly recur, particularly amongst those thinkers in-
fluenced by Heidegger: there is a distinct and palpable anxiety that the tech-
nology we wield—particularly modern technology—presents some kind of
existential threat to our essential Being.23
Accordingly, the next chapter is my modest attempt to trace the thread of
these kinds of anxieties, beginning with Heidegger and ending with several
contemporary philosophers of technology who should be understood as in-
heritors of his position. For although I do not believe that Heidegger and
his contemporaries are correct in thinking that technology is existentially
threatening—indeed, I strongly suspect that the problem, at least as posed,
is entirely incoherent—I nonetheless cannot escape the suspicion that they
23 In this respect, it is not dissimilar from other critiques of technology, particularly those
broadly associated with the green anarchism movement—though obviously the tenor of
those criticisms is necessarily different based upon their ontological and political commit-
ments. Although we will not be dealing of criticisms of this type here, for more information
please refer to Kohr, 1957, Ellul, 1964, Mumford, 1970, Illich, 1973, Schumacher, 1973, Gold-
smith, 1988, Postman, 1993, Sale, 1996 and Kaczynski, 2008.
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have diagnosed a legitimate source of tension with regards to our relation-
ships with technology and the world. Although the answer may not be
the one they provide, the fact that these fears resonate—and continue to
resonate—so powerfully suggests to me that Allen’s epistemology is in some
important sense incomplete: there is an experiential and phenomenological
aspect to living with technology that we should not and cannot ignore.
3 NO MAPS FOR THESE T ERR I TOR I E S
As scientific understanding has grown, so our world has be-
come de-humanized. Man feels himself isolated in the cosmos,
because he is no longer involved in nature and has lost his emo-
tional unconscious “identity” with natural phenomena. These
have lost their symbolic implications [...] and with it has gone
the profound emotional energy that this symbolic connection
supplied. [. . . ] Our language no longer participates mystically
in the things it describes. We have “matter” instead of “the
Great Mother” and “intellect” instead of “the Father of All.” All
our thoughts have to fit the limited ego-rationality of man and
this denial of the unconscious puts modern man at the mercy
of his psychic “underworld.” (Jung, 1964: 95)
3.1 Existence without Distance
Phenomenology is, in brief, the study of appearances, of things as they ap-
pear to consciousness. Such was Husserl’s motivation when writing the
Logical Investigations and the Ideas—following in the footsteps of Brentano,
Husserl was attempting to rigorously reconcile idealism with empiricism
by speaking of things as we are made aware of them: as worldly objects
perceived by a transcendent ego: “A new fundamental science, pure phe-
nomenology, has developed within philosophy: This is a science of a thor-
oughly new type and endless scope. It is inferior in methodological rigor
to none of the modern sciences. All philosophical disciplines are rooted in
pure phenomenology, through whose development, and through it alone,
they obtain their proper force” (Husserl, 1981b: 10). Although there is unde-
niably a world beyond our perceptions, just as there is an internal universe
comprised of mental structures, it is in consciously apprehending the things
in the world and making sense of them that both the internal and external
worlds become constituted for us. Whatever passes for our world-views
are, although contingent upon the world being a certain way, cobbled to-
gether from the perceptual adumbrations we have of the things in the world.
Husserl writes:
The unity of a “world view” must confirm the world-possibility
in all further fashioning of world-apperception—as the possibil-
ity and the universum of open possibilities which make up a
fundamental composition of the world’s actuality. The core of
actual experience is optically what is experienced of the world
from this or that side; and it possibly already obtains as known
45
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actuality on the basis of the experiential synthesis in harmony.
The core becomes as an experiential core of the world, a core
of what is predesignated by the world and as an open range of
possibilities: and this signifies a range of harmonious possibil-
ity to be iteratively continued. The world is [. . . ] constituted
according to horizons in which something existent is consti-
tuted as actual in being-possibilities predesignated at any time;
the world is predesignated and is subsequently conceptualized
and expressed in judgments by ontology [. . . ]. (Husserl, 1981a:
223)
Husserl originally developed phenomenology out of the philosophy of
Franz Brentano, being particularly inspired by the concept of intentional-
ity, or “about-ness” (when I perceive an object in the world, I intend the
object; my perception is “about” the object). Husserl’s phenomenological
method was developed in order to provide something of a third method
of inquiry between the ancient divide of materialism and idealism: rather
than committing to a reductionist account of the world as a collection of
objective properties—or conversely, committing to the concept of the world
as a collection of mental properties—Husserl’s phenomenological program
sought to provide an anti-reductionist means of analysis that could serve as
a meaningful alternative to the two methods. Invoking the Ancient Greek
concept of epoché or “bracketing”, Husserl asks that we attempt to “bracket”
or suspend judgement about the world in order that we may concentrate ex-
clusively on the deep analysis of mental experience. As Rüdiger Safranski
writes: “[Husserl’s] great ambition was to disregard anything that had until
then been thought or said about consciousness or the world [while] on the
lookout for a new way of letting the things [they investigated] approach
them, without covering them up with what they already knew” (Safran-
ski, 1999: 78). Moreover and in addition, Husserl argues that this discrete,
bracketing entity—this “irreducible, inquiring kernel of transcendental con-
sciousness” as I wrote earlier—serves to constitute the objects of the world.
That is to say: the object of perception—that which is being phenomeno-
logically intended—is transformed into or collapsed with the thought of the
object of perception (what Husserl calls noema. According to Husserl, we
can no longer take faith in the fact that our naïve understanding of the
world as having an independent belief beyond our perception (the “natural
attitude”), but instead must commit to the concept of the world as a mess of
acts of Sinngebung, or “sense-bestowal” by a collection of intentional agents
(Dodd, 1996: 420).1
Conversely, unlike Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, Heidegger
applies a phenomenological reading to our relationships with technology;
rather than writing about the means by which Being is partially comprised
by perceptual phenomena, Heidegger’s Being is comprised of a tension be-
tween our bodies and our artefacts: hammers, tables, windmills. Further-
1 Although I have attempted to reconcile Husserl’s sophistication with my need for parsimony,
prudent readers could do worse than to return to his Ideas itself (Husserl, 1983).
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more, by virtue of providing this analysis, Heidegger serves as a distinct
philosophical antecedent to those writers and theorists who cite the danger
of technology to the human’s individual Being; although his work may not
be explicitly referenced, nor may his conceptual descendants retain his id-
iosyncratic nomenclature or his theoretical concerns, Heidegger’s influence
upon analyses regarding the potential for technology to impinge upon hu-
mankind’s Being is inescapable. Technology, despite being integral to the
means by which we gain access to the world, nonetheless becomes a threat
to our bodily instantiation, and not just in the rather banal way that a sword
or a gun proves a threat; rather, the danger is existential, providing a distinct
and very specific kind of challenge.
Within Heidegger’s phenomenology, our bodies are characterised as di-
alectics between inside (mental processes) and outside (the external world),
and personhood is presumed to reside in that tensile liminality; to be a Be-
ing is to have a certain kind of body. It must possess an existence that is in-
stantiated bodily—an existence possessing certain sensory and mechanical
apparatuses that allow that body to both experience and impinge upon the
world in a meaningful way. Moreover, the nature of a human’s being is not
purely physical, but rather necessitates the presence of an appropriate form
of mind that is somehow associated with the body; a mind which is first
capable of sorting and correlating received sense data and then applying
those findings to direct its respective mechanical apparatuses. Plainly how-
ever, this is an insufficient account of our embodied existence. Although
necessary, these conditions are not sufficient for an entity to be considered
to have Being, for these necessary conditions also describe the experiences
of any number of lived bodies. If nothing else, it is true of other higher
vertebrates: although one might need to give a rather creative account of
how a paramecium has the kind of embodied existence articulated above, it
requires none at all to say that a pig or an elephant has embodied existence:
“it is clear that in the animal world as a whole the way in which the animal
is bound to its environment is almost as intimate as the unity of the body to
itself” (Heidegger, quoting F. T. Buytendijk in Safranski, 1999: 199). Heideg-
ger’s response to this quandary is to postulate an additional quality that is
held by embodied beings and not by “world-poor” entities such as animals
or “worldless” things such as rocks and chairs: “We can formulate these
distinctions in the following three theses: [1.] the stone (material object) is
worldless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming”2 (Hei-
degger, 1995: 177). This world-forming quality is the infamous Dasein—that
is, the property in the human’s Being that allows us to consider our own Be-
ing (Heidegger, 1962: 68). Animals, being world-poor, are categorically not
Dasein for the simple reason that they merely accept the world as-given;
although they can certainly navigate the world, the world is merely a collec-
tion of sensible surfaces, rather than an entity upon which they can act in a
meaningful way— a distinction premised upon the observation that animals
and human beings have differing capacities for intentional action.
2 That is to say: he is world-constituting.
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Indeed, it is Dasein that differentiates Heidegger’s scholarship from that
of his teacher, Husserl. Whereas Husserl in Logical Investigations claims
that philosophy should renounce theory and simply analyse those things
presented to the irreducible, inquiring, intending kernel of transcendental
consciousness, Heidegger instead seeks a being that is both pre-theoretical
(though nonetheless with an intuitive grasp of the a priori structures that fa-
cilitate modes of Being) and also has a non-intentional openness to the expe-
rience of the world—with the latter of these concepts eventually becoming
rendered Being-in-the-world and the former becoming Dasein itself. Dasein
is something of a curious beast: curious in both its uniqueness and curiosity
as its modus operandus; it is the wont of Dasein to test and probe the world,
deriving theories and seeking inconsistencies: “Dasein exists. Furthermore,
Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am. Mineness belongs to any
existent Dasein, and belongs to it as the conditions which make authentic-
ity and inauthenticity possible” (Heidegger, 1962: 78). A compound derived
from the German da—there; sein—being, Heidegger’s being there is neither
purely object nor subject, but something that transcends the Cartesian sub-
ject/object schema entirely; a Being-in-the-World (In-der-Welt-sein) that is
capable of “intending” other entities—its perception is “about” the entities
it perceives. In this sense, Dasein functions in opposition to (or is at least
adjacent to) the Beings of other, non-intending entities:
What is meaning by “Being-in”? Our proximal reaction is to
round out this expression to “Being-in ‘in the world”’, and we
are inclined to understand this Being-in as “Being in something”
[. . . ] as the water is “in” the glass, or the garment is “in” the cup-
board. By this “in” we mean the relationship of Being which
two entities extended “in” space have to each other with re-
gards to their location in that space. [. . . ] Being-present-at-
hand-along-with in the sense of a definite location-relationship
with something else which has the same kind of Being, are on-
tological characteristics which we call “categorical”: they are of
such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not
of the character of Dasein. (Heidegger, 1962: 79)
Those beings that do not have Dasein are “categorical” in the sense of
their Being being concrete rather than existential, perceptual or praxical—
and this is where early Heidegger commences his discussion of tools. All
objects that are without Dasein are either ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit)
or present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit), and each category reflects the specific
means by which we approach and interact with the world. Breaking with
Husserl, Heidegger claims that objects are not dealt with by having them
in consciousness, but rather are taken for granted as items of everyday use.
To illustrate this point, Heidegger asks us to imagine that we are using a
hammer, perhaps to built a bird-box or to fix a creaky step; in using the
item without hindrance, the item itself remains concealed to us as long as
it successfully serves to facilitate a certain kind of act. Curiously though,
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the invisibility of ready-to-hand objects serves to illustrate the nature of its
Being; in being able to be ignored, the hammer is acting according to its
Being: “the less we just stare as the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize
hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become,
and the more unveiledly it is encountered as that which is is—as equipment”
(Heidegger, 1962: 98). That is to say, the hammer’s “equipmentality”—our
capacity to use the hammer as equipment via the very act of hammering
itself—reveals the manipulability (Handlichkeit) of the hammer (Heidegger,
1962: 98). Meanwhile, those objects that are present-at-hand are, by Hei-
degger’s reckoning, “broken tools”: imagine that, whilst in the middle of
making your bird-box, the hammer cracks, or you crush your thumbnail af-
ter a savage, if uncoordinated, blow. The hammer is no longer concealed,
but rather abuts onto our phenomenological field in a particularly violent
manner, and you are struck with its physical qualities: the heft of the object,
the unwieldy mass of the tempered steel head, the wooden haft shiny with
age and slick with sweat. The hammer makes itself known to you as a col-
lection of physical qualities which you are then able to isolate and analyse.
By becoming visible to you it becomes present-at-hand, and in doing so, its
surface properties become explicitly accessible.
Objects are not cleanly divided into ready-to-hand and present-at-hand,
however. The same hammer, when repaired, freely returns to its former
ready state: “this conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as
in a certain un-readiness-to-hand. [. . . ] Pure presence-at-hand announces
itself in such equipment, but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of
something with which one concerns oneself—that is to say, of the sort of
thing we find when we put it back into repair” (Heidegger, 1962: 102-103).
The two categories are better understood as modes of being: objects, when
ready-to-hand, are cryptic yet exemplify their Being; objects, when present-
to-hand, are sensible to Dasein yet do not articulate their Being: “No matter
how sharply we just look at the ‘outward appearance’ of Things in whatever
form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand” (Heidegger,
1962: 98).
However and despite this fact, Heidegger believes that the modes of in-
quiry in the post-industrial era have committed an error in not properly
understanding this state of affairs; he characterises the realms of science
and philosophy as mistaken in only examining and quantifying that which
is present-at-hand. When we cultivate genetically engineered tomatoes or
create new subatomic particles or extrapolate the mass and distance of stel-
lar entities, we are engaging with the sensible qualities of entities to the
exclusion of their ontological properties. Heidegger characterises this po-
sition as “ontotheology”—the position that declares that there are certain
privileged entities that can be uses to explicate all other entities, “whether
it be water, atoms, perfect forms, substance, God, monads, subjectivity or
power.” To render the world explicable by reducing it to its surface prop-
erties, “[t]o single out one entity or type of entity as an explanation of the
entire cosmos is the same bad step [. . . ]. All of these options amount to treat-
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ing one specific type of present-at-hand entity as the incarnation of being
itself” (Harman, 2009: 20). Effectively, Heidegger claims that the pursuits
of science and philosophy have seen fit to remove questions of ontology
from their fields of inquiry altogether—an error he considers particularly
grievous. Indeed, as Graham Harman explains in “Technology, Objects and
Things in Heidegger”, science and philosophy are crudely reductionist dis-
ciplines in that they do not go “deep enough”; in collapsing the world into
a set of sensible, present data, the mystery of Being is rudely and fatally
eviscerated (Harman, 2009: 20).
Heidegger’s criticism of the valorisation of presence-at-hand in philoso-
phy and the physical sciences at the expense of ontology in Being and Time
serves to pave the way for his analysis of technology in his later works.
Beginning with the 1949 Bremen Lectures and concluding with “The Ques-
tion Concerning Technology”, Heidegger’s later work is less concerned with
hammers than it is with sophisticated technological apparatuses such as hy-
droelectric dams. However, as Graham Harman argues—contentiously, I
admit, but in a move of which I broadly approve—it would be an error to
consider this evidence of a thematic break in Heidegger’s work; rather, even
despite the different nomenclature and shifting objects of analysis, his later
works serve to further elaborate upon his analysis of the general ontology
of tools (Harman, 2009: 17). We find a similar sentiment in Allen’s brief
treatment of Heidegger in Knowledge and Civilization, when he argues that
Heidegger’s emphasis upon the “givenness” of Being over rude ontotheol-
ogy “is no ‘early’ view that is later abandoned” (Allen, 2005: 51), but is rather
a common thread that runs throughout his work, all the way from 1927—
the year Being and Time was published—to 1968’s “Time and Being” (Allen,
2005: 46-52):
The knowledge attained in science is a truth such as epistemol-
ogy from Plato to Descartes desired, a vision of beings as they
are, which under the right methodological conditions turns out
to be the way they look. It is not Heidegger’s purpose to prove
(against skepticism) that such cognition is possible for us, even
less that it is a mistake or confusion to expect knowledge of
this caliber. He takes the possibility for granted and thinks he
can “explain” it in terms of ontological difference and human
existence. (Allen, 2005: 51)
According to later Heidegger, one of the projects of Dasein is that it
explicitly pursues what Heidegger calls aletheia, (translated as “truth” or
“revealing”—the sensory perception of something as true) via the process of
poiesis, or “bringing-forth” of Being: “in the realm of thinking, a painstaking
effort to think through still more primally what was primally thought [. . . ]”
(Heidegger, 1977b: 22). In this way, technology (along with poetry) is some
kind of attempt to render the world clear to us; as in Being and Time, the
process of “revealing” is one that serves to call forth the object’s Being; viz.:
its ontological “equipmentality”. Consider: in Being and Time, Heidegger
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makes note of the fact that spectacles (assuming they fit well and the per-
son wearing them has a correct prescription) are in fact further away than
the objects upon which they help us to focus. That is not to say that the
spectacles are physically further away—that, after all, would be committing
the ontotheological fallacy by reducing it to mere presence-at-hand—but
rather they are further away from human concern. The object’s distance
from our concerns guarantees the closeness of its Being; to be distant is to be
close, and readiness-to-hand is the state of tension between these two poles.
Although by the time of the Bremen Lectures and “The Question Concern-
ing Technology” Heidegger is no longer discussing entities with regards to
their presence or readiness, he nonetheless retains this conception of on-
tological distance via the concept of das Abstandlose, or “the distanceless”
(Harman, 2009: 20). The concept of “distancelessness” is isomorphic to his
prior use of presence-at-hand; rather than examining ontological Being via
the tension of the close and distant, the world collapses into a “uniform lack
of distance” (Heidegger, 1994: 6, via Harman, 2009: 20), where everything
enters a state of “standing reserve” (Bestand). Technology itself, just like
philosophy and science in Being and Time, dissolves the world into some-
thing without depth or texture—a manipulable, accessible thing that is all
surface and no substance. Of course, this is not entirely problematic: by
reducing the world to certain sensible qualities, it allows us to make mean-
ingful claims about it; not the least of which being that we are able to con-
clude that the world retains certain qualities even when we are not directly
experiencing it: “Enframing (Gestell) means the gathering together of the
setting-upon that sets upon man, i.e. challenges him forth, to reveal the
actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing reserve. If we give heed to this,
then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up
to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (Heidegger, 1977b: 20). After
all, Heidegger is no Luddite; in “The Question Concerning Technology”, he
notes with approval that a windmill serves as a form of poiesis; in harness-
ing the rhythms of the world, the Being of the world may be revealed to
us. However, modern technology—that is, machine-like, calculated, exact—
despite also being a revealing, is not a revealing of the same kind: “the
revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold
into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that is in modern
technology is a challenging (Herausfordern), which puts to nature the unrea-
sonably demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as
such” (Heidegger, 1977b: 14).
Heidegger’s concern is not just that we are capable of Enframing the
world and making it a “distanceless” quality (after all, as per Being and
Time, it seems clear that objects can escape being Enframed via appropriate
praxis); it is that certain kinds of technology (just like science and philoso-
phy) render the world in standing reserve to the exclusion of readiness-to-
hand relations, and thus to Being itself. And so it is with the advent of the
Industrial Revolution that Dasein becomes subject to its own vast hubris; in
“challenging” (Herausfordern) the natural order by subverting natural pro-
3.1 existence without distance 52
cesses for our own nefarious ends; by no longer being subject to the whims
of the world, we are no longer engaged in a process of poiesis. Rather, we
may only observe Being through a glass darkly, our vision occluded by our
own rapacity and insensitivity:
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It
sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then
sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those machines in
motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for which
the long-distance power station and its network of cables are
set up to dispatch electricity. In the context of the interlock-
ing processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electri-
cal energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at our
command. The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine
River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank
for hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the
power plant. What the river is now, namely, a water power
supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station.
(Heidegger, 1977b: 16)
We have in a sense manufactured the river; we have compromised our
capacity to recognise its aletheia in some fundamental way; we can no
longer recognise the river’s essential Being, but instead can only describe
it in terms of its utility—Being subsumed within function. Indeed, as Hei-
degger claims in the Bremen Lectures, this process of Enframing is one of
danger (Heidegger, 1994: 54). Of course, it would be an error to consider
this danger unequivocally negative. After all, as stated above, reducing the
phenomenal sphere into distanceless data via technology has certain unde-
niable benefits. Rather, the point lies with the observation that Heidegger’s
“technology” is less a body of tools that facilitate certain kinds of action,
and more an integral part of our Being itself, with the tools that we use are
merely products of that Being. “Technology” is not something that Dasein
does, but rather is something that Dasein is. The danger lies in the fact that
this capacity to disqualify or marginalise Being is an inherent facet of our
own collective makeup; like the protagonist in any Greek tragedy, technol-
ogy is our hamartia, or fatal flaw. “In the danger of being lies the possibility
of a turn (Kehre) away form the forgetting of being into the truth of being
itself”. Our only redemption lies in the fact that we, as the “shepherds of
being” are able to be confronted with the “call of distress from being itself”
(Harman, 2009: 23) and can thus attempt to reattain our understanding of it.
The first step in reigniting our understanding of Being is to understand
that the world is not merely comprised of objects—that is to say, objects of
something—but that these objects may also be understood as things. Now,
if objects are those sensible entities subsumed within a systematic under-
standing of the orderliness of the universe, a thing is that which has con-
tent and purpose independent of our awareness of it. “Thingness” is contin-
gent upon nearness or readiness-to-hand, for a thing should “thing” in the
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sense of “thing” being a verb—in being that which it is, a thing does what it
does (namely, it “things”). Accordingly, a thing is not merely a “stockpile of
present-at-hand correlates of consciousness” (Harman, 2009: 24), but rather
it is an entity that stands independent of the standing reserve.3 According
to Heidegger, it is important that we attempt to reclaim our understanding
of the inner life of things, even as the inner life withdraws from our des-
perate grasp. To only permit scientific renditions of the world is to engage
in analysis that is willingly and necessarily blinkered, for “science always
encounters only that which its type of representation permits in advance as
the object that is possible for it” (Harman, 2009: 24). The world is reduced
to some kind of garish pastiche of colours and sensations: a form of not-
terribly-flattering caricature that has recognisable features but is nonethe-
less without substance. To live in such a world is not living at all; the world
becomes an inert, purely causal entity. Even when damage is done to the
world—say, by acts of violence—this is merely a necessary product of the
true crime of technology, whereby Being is expunged from our experience
of the world. Indeed: “science annihilated the things as things long before
the atom bomb exploded. This explosion is only the crudest of all crude
confirmations of the annihilation of the thing that transpired long ago: that
the thing as thing remains null and void” (Heidegger, 1994: 9, via Harman,
2009: 24). There are no longer any maps for these territories.
3.2 Industrialising the Revolution
Already it becomes clear that technology is understood to pose a certain
existential threat to human beings; there is something about it that threat-
ens the kinds of beings that we are, even if the concern, as articulated by
Heidegger, is slightly inchoate. However, we find in subsequent scholar-
ship, particularly in scholarship of a Marxian disposition, a concretisation
of these concerns; an elision between the purported threat to ontological
Being and the fear of losing of political agency due to the encroachment of
technology on our collective form of life. Accordingly, this section is my
attempt to provide a rough guide to this aspect of Heideggerian scholarship:
beginning with Herbert Marcuse’s plea in favour of a new kind of political
agency via the development of what he calls a “New Technology”. From
here, I trace a thread, via Jürgen Habermas and Andrew Feenberg, of how
post-Heideggerian political theorists have understood the relationships that
exist between technology and political agents.
Herbert Marcuse studied under Heidegger during his formative academic
years, having written his Habilitationsschrift during the old master’s tenure
at Freiburg, completing his Hegel’s Ontology and Theory of Historicity in
1932: the year before Heidegger began his explicit affiliation with the Na-
3 Please be aware that I will not be maintaining the Heideggerian distinction between “thing”
and “object” throughout the rest of this this work.
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tional Socialists.4 Accordingly, it should be unsurprising that something of
Heidegger’s astringency remains in the work of Marcuse, particularly with
regards to the means by which technology can be understood as partially
constituting the human condition, and thence how that constitutive aspect
can be leveraged as an agent of political control. His most famous work,
One-Dimensional Man, is perhaps his best-known articulation of these is-
sues.5 Like others broadly associated with the Frankfurt School and its satel-
lite arms, he arrives at a certain conclusion: that contemporary capitalism
has seen fit to somehow endanger the freedom and agency of its political
constituents, the citizenry. Although in the work of someone like Hannah
Arendt this is fear is articulately by claiming that man’s life has become re-
duced to the merely social, and is thereby denuded of the capacity for mean-
ingful action, but in Marcuse the nature of this criticism has a distinctly
Marxian flavour.6 For Marcuse’s bugbear is consumerism—specifically, con-
sumerism as understood to be an agent of social control.
Marcuse claims that, rather than empowering consumers by offering us
more choices with regards to what we consume, consumerism in fact serves
to do the opposite; indeed, Marcuse makes the claim that, by “virtue of the
way it has organised its technological base, contemporary industrial soci-
ety tends to be totalitarian” (Marcuse, 1964:3). This is not to say that it is
politically totalitarian; he is not arguing in favour of the claim that tech-
nologised society must necessarily devolve into a one-party state. Rather,
the argument runs in favour of the existence of “a non-terroristic economic-
technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs
of vested interests”, which “precludes the emergence of an effective oppo-
sition against the whole” (Marcuse, 1964:3). Although we may speak of
living in a free society, Marcuse wonders about the nature of that freedom;
though we might say that we have certain positive liberties with regards to
economic, political and intellectual freedom, true negative liberty eludes us.
We require “new modes of realisation”. He writes:
Such new modes can be indicated only in negative terms be-
cause they would amount to the negation of the prevailing modes.
Thus economic freedomwould mean freedom from the economy—
from being controlled by economic forces and relationships;
freedom from the daily struggle for existence, from earning a
living. Political freedom would mean liberation of the individ-
uals from politics over which they have no effective control.
Similarly, intellectual freedom would mean the restoration of
individual thought now absorbed by mass communication and
4 Readers of Heidegger have long found his Nazi affiliations fact hard to swallow. In the
words of Richard Rorty: “Heidegger’s books will be read for centuries to come, but the smell
of smoke from the crematories—the ‘grave in the air’—will linger on their pages” (Rorty,
1998).
5 First published in 1964, though some of his earlier works—most notably “Some Social Impli-
cations of Modern Technology” (Marcuse, 2005), first published in 1941—prefigure many of
these concerns.
6 For more on Arendt, there are worse places to start than Arendt, 1998 and Arendt, 2000.
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Figure 6: Screencap from Metropolis, 1927
indoctrination, abolition of “public opinion” together with its
makers. The unrealistic sound of these propositions is indica-
tive, not of their utopian character, but of the strength of the
forces which prevent their realisation. (Marcuse, 1964: 4)
For Marcuse, technology is fundamentally complicit in this process of
disempowerment, of denuding Man of his political (that is to say, human)
character. As Marcuse argues in “Some Social Implications of Modern Tech-
nology”, the rise of individualistic rationality—that is, the concept of Man as
rationally pursuing his own economic interests7—actually sowed the seeds
for its own destruction. As “competition” became the byword of economic
reform, increased industrialisation and mechanisation forced weaker, less
efficient, less mechanised participants to become subsumed within the “do-
minion of the giant enterprises of machine industry”, thereby abolishing
the “free economic subject” (Marcuse, 2005: 141). Technology becomes
a method of discovering the putatively most excellent means of meeting
human needs, and is thus to be considered (by an uncritical political con-
stituent) Reason itself.
Let us be clear: this is not a criticism of technology as a means of control
in the same way that Nineteen Eighty-Four is a criticism of technology as a
means of control, nor is it the kind of subtle panoptic oppression that one
finds in Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. Rather, the control to which Mar-
cuse refers is even more insidious—a form of technologically premised con-
trol which excludes the possibility of criticism as something “neurotic and
impotent”: “[. . . ] in the contemporary period, the technological controls
7 Cf.: Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations.
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appear to be the very embodiment of Reason for the benefit of all social
groups and interests—to such an extent that all contradiction seems irra-
tional and all counteraction impossible” (Marcuse, 1964:9). Human beings
in technologised capitalism are “motivated, guided and measured” by exter-
nal standards, whilst efficiency and worth become subject to an economic
calculus wherein they are judged according to a person’s “proper reaction
to the objective requirements of the apparatus” (Marcuse, 2005:142). Thus
the human subject becomes merely matter-of-fact: a constituent cog work-
ing in the belly of a vast, belching, industrial machine. Both true political
agency and true phenomenological anchoring elude us; being deterministic
constituent parts, human action only matters insofar as it participates in
the grander capitalistic apparatus of production and consumption, with the
inevitable result that our conception of ourselves is rudely reduced to that
which we consume:
We are again confronted with one of the most vexing aspects
of advanced industrial civilisation: the rational character of its
irrationality. Its productivity and efficiency, its capacity to in-
crease and spread comforts, to turn waste into need, and de-
struction into construction, the extent to which this civilisation
transforms the object world into an extension of man’s mind
and body makes the very notion of alienation questionable. The
people recognise themselves in their commodities; they find
their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen
equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to
his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the
new needs which it has produced. (Marcuse, 1964: 9)
Consequently, Marcuse argues for the possibility that technologised soci-
ety invades and whittles down our capacity for engaging in introjection, the
process by which (according to psychoanalysts) subjects obtain, internalise
and replicate certain behaviours or attributes of the surrounding world. The
technologised subject is instead claimed by mass production and mass distri-
bution, leaving a series of mechanised internal processes in the place of true
introjection; like an animal wandering dumbly through the world, technol-
ogised man undergoes a kind of mimesis: “an immediate identification of
the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole”
(Marcuse, 1964: 10). This is the dark power of Reason: as industrial capital-
ism adopts the mantle of objective Goodness, there is no longer fertile soil in
which the seeds of opposition can take root. Indeed, constituent consumers
have no longer even retained the vocabulary of opposition; in a rather Or-
wellian twist, we are now no longer able to recognise or articulate viable al-
ternatives: “The efficiency of the system blunts the individuals’ recognition
that it contains no facts which do not communicate the repressive power of
the whole” (Marcuse, 1964: 11).
The necessary product of these processes is the “one-dimensional man”
of Marcuse’s book of the same name. As the ideologies of late capital-
ism become absorbed into lived experience, lived experience itself becomes
3.2 industrialising the revolution 57
denuded and flattened out; the danger of our collective tendency towards
Heideggerian ontotheology—towards rendering the world das Abstandlose.
Technology, rather than being a mere tool of control, is instead an active
constituent of forms of control. Marcuse speaks of technological rational-
ity being of the same kind of process as operationalism in the physical sci-
ences and behaviourism in the social sciences: as a kind of total empiricism
wherein concepts find complete identity with their corresponding set of op-
erations. When Marcuse approvingly quotes P. W. Bridgeman’s analysis
of the concept of length, he finds an early articulation of the conceptual
concerns inherent in this total empiricism; given that we “shall no longer
permit ourselves to use as tools in our thinking concepts of which we can-
not give an adequate account in terms of operations” (Marcuse, 1964: 13),
the one-dimensionality of our collective experience must soon follow. The
technological rationality of total empiricism allows for the elimination of
concepts (such as “mind”) for which there is insufficient account. More
dangerously, by Marcuse’s account, total empiricism also serves to “coor-
dinate ideas and goals with those exacted by the prevailing system, to en-
close them in the system, and to repel those which are irreconcilable with
the system” (Marcuse, 1964: 13-14). This even remains true for those prac-
tices which we might be inclined to think about as providing a challenge
to materialistic technological rationality. Instead, even “spiritual, metaphys-
ical and bohemian” occupations are able to be reconciled with the techno-
rational apparatus, being little more than the “ceremonial part of practical
behaviourism, its harmless negation, and are quickly digested by the status
quo as part of its healthy diet” (Marcuse, 1964: 14).8
Escape from this system seems impossible, as all forms of protest are
inherently self-negating; as with other Frankfurt School criticisms of late
capitalism, there is the grim acknowledgement that there exists no entity
with sufficient agency to exceed these boundary conditions: “There are in-
numerable blueprints for utopian futures that are, in varying degrees, egal-
itarian, cosmopolitan, ecologically sustainable, and locally responsive, but
no solution to the most intractable problem of all: who is going to make
it happen?” (Bull, 2005: 19). However, Marcuse sidesteps this concern by
claiming that Marxist teleology will necessarily engender an internal cri-
sis of faith for capitalism’s technological rationality and thus give us the
opportunity to re-vocalise via the development and application of certain
technological processes. Although he does not use the term explicitly, Mar-
cuse seemingly argues in favour of a kind of post-scarcity society wherein
8 Giorgio Agamben, in his essay “In Praise of Profanations” makes a similar point, arguing
that “secularisation” does little to subvert the prevailing state of affairs: “Secularization is a
form of repression. It leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply moving them from one
place to another. Thus the political secularization of theological concepts (the transcendence
of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) does nothing but displace the heavenly monarchy
onto an earthly monarchy, leaving its power intact. [. . . ] Profanation, however, neutralizes
what it profanes. Once profaned, that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and
is returned to use. Both are political operations: the first guarantees the exercise of power
by carrying it back to a sacred model; the second deactivates the apparatuses of power and
returns to common use the spaces that power had seized” (Agamben, 2007: 77).
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“material production [. . . ] becomes automated to the extent that all vital
needs can be satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to marginal
time”. Once this point is reached, technical progress is no longer restricted
to meeting its own internal requirements but instead would “transcend the
realm of necessity [. . . ]; technology would become subject to the free play
of faculties in the struggle for the pacification of nature and society”. It
is this state of Marxist eschatology—what Marcuse dubs the “pacification
of existence”—that is the desirable outcome of the process of Western late
capitalism (Marcuse, 1964: 16). Under this new system, the solutions of
technoscience would become “open to objectives which go beyond utility”
and instead develop a New Technology to provide solutions to the “art of
living” (Marcuse, 1964: 232).
Unfortunately, the self-negating properties of technological rationality
mean that concepts such as Freedom and Reason are necessarily prejudged
by virtue of being capable of cleanly integrating with the techno-political
system (“the mature industrial society closes itself against the alternative”)
so although this internal threat to capitalism will necessarily eventuate,
there is no guarantee that this threat will succeed against the status quo
(Marcuse, 1964: 17). Although short of a call to arms, Marcuse does ask us
to remain vigilant. It befits us to pursue alternatives, lest we find ourselves
golems trapped in an endless cycle of production and consumption from
which there is no exit: “Technological rationality reveals its political charac-
ter [. . . ], creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature,
mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilisation for the defence
of this universe” (Marcuse, 1964: 18).
Habermas begins his essay “Technology and Science as Ideology” with a
wry dedication: “For Herbert Marcuse on his seventieth birthday, July 19,
1968” (Habermas, 1987: 81). A dedication, yes—Marcuse had an enormous
influence upon the intellectual development of the young Habermas, hav-
ing been taught by Marcuse’s Frankfurt School colleagues Theodor Adorno
and Max Horkheimer—but wry indeed, as it proves the opening move in an
essay intended to cast doubt upon the validity of Marcuse’s entire critique
of the prevailing social order, as well as disputing Marcuse’s arguments in
favour of the mere possibility of a New Technology. Citing Arnold Gehlen
as an inspiration, Habermas argues that technological progress unfolds in a
fashion that is both bodily-oriented and broadly teleological. Bodily-oriented
in that Habermas believes that technological progress is the development
of technics by which we are able to objectify senses or other bodily con-
stituents and subsequently amplify the effects of those constituents and/or
redress perceived faults in their normative function: levers for hands, spec-
tacles for eyes, calculators for brains. Broadly teleological in that the em-
bodied orientation of technological progress demands that this process of
bodily objectification trundle along a trajectory given by the morphological
composition of the human form, allowing no deviation; what is occurring
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must necessarily occur as assured by the crude diktats of our shared physi-
ology:
If we comprehend the behavioral system of action regulated by
its own results as the conjunction of rational decision and in-
strumental action, then we can reconstruct the history of tech-
nology from the point of view of the step-by-step objectivation
of the elements of that very system. In any case technologi-
cal development lends itself to being interpreted as though the
human species had taken the elementary components of the be-
havioral system of purposive-rational action, which is primar-
ily rooted in the human organism, and projected them one after
another onto the plane of technical instruments, thereby unbur-
dening itself of the corresponding functions. At first the func-
tions of the motor apparatus (hands and legs) were augmented
and replaced, followed by energy production (of the human
body), the functions of the sensory apparatus (eyes, ears, and
skin), and finally by the functions of the governing center (the
brain). (Habermas, 1987: 87)
Trapped as we are in bodies with our specific morphological features—
two fully prehensile hands with thumbs, upright posture, two legs, capped
off by a cranium containing a brain and a number of sensory organs—our
technics are necessarily and inescapably informed by these features. Some-
thing intended to be a chair adopts a certain form based upon brute bodily
requirements that are not contingent upon language or cultural variabil-
ity. Whether one is in 21st century Sydney, Australia, or a denizen of the
Indus Valley Civilisation circa 3000 bce, things that serve the purpose of
chairs will be recognised as objects upon which to sit. We write today of er-
gonomics—a word first used by Wojciech Jastrzębowski in 1857—to describe
something like the science of work, analysing the best means by which hu-
man agents may be integrated into given systems. It is something very
much like “ergonomics” to which Habermas is referring: human agents re-
quire that objects have certain properties and of a certain scale in order to
use them effectively, and this necessarily dictates the limits of the objects
themselves. Were our forms different—say, in the event that we had the mor-
phology of elephants—our ergonomics would be entirely different in order
to accommodate for a vastly different physiology: prehensile trunk, large
body, weak eyesight, quadrupedal locomotion. These facts are inalienable.
Marcuse, in An Essay on Liberation argues that the New Technology of
which he writes would allow us to shake off the shackles that restrain us,
and indulge in an entirely new form of life:
The liberated consciousness would promote the development
of a science and technology free to discover and realise the
possibilities of things and men in the protection and gratifica-
tion of life, playing with the potentialities of form and matter
for the attainment of this goal. Technique would then become
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art, and art would tend to form reality: the opposition between
imagination and reason, higher and lower faculties, poetic and
scientific thought, would be invalidated. Emergence of a new
Reality Principle: under which a new sensibility and a desubli-
mated scientific intelligence would combine in the creation of
an aesthetic ethos. (Marcuse, 1969: 24)
Habermas rejects this claim, arguing instead that the fact of our embodied
existence renders even conceiving of a New Technology entirely impossible,
with technological developments following an internal logic corresponding
to a goal-oriented—what Habermas calls “purposive-rational”—structure of
action that becomes necessarily “regulated by its own results, which is in
fact the structure of work”. Habermas argues that, realising this, it becomes
impossible to conceive of a means by which we could renounce our technol-
ogy in favour of one that substantively differs; we are without the capacity
to render a New Technology (Habermas, 1987: 87). Insofar as Habermas
is concerned, Marcuse’s claims that a New Science would be necessarily
premised upon a renouncement of our goal of mastery of nature, instead
seeking out a “fraternal rather than an exploited nature” wherein we can
ascribe subjectivity to those things that constitute nature and thereby at-
tempt to communicate with her (Habermas, 1987: 88). However, Habermas
believes that this New Science is insufficient to the task, for “the achieve-
ments of technology, which are indispensable as such, could surely not be
substituted for by an awakened nature”. Instead, for nature to become our
partner rather than merely an object of our exploitation, we would be re-
quired to utilise an “alternative structure of action: to symbolic interaction
in distinction to purposive-rational action” (Habermas, 1987: 89)—a struc-
ture of action that Habermas argues is impossible for science: “The idea
of a New Science will not stand up to logical scrutiny any more than that
of a New Technology, if indeed science is to retain the meaning of modern
science inherently oriented to possible technical control. For this function,
as for scientific-technical progress in general, there is no more ‘humane’
substitute” (Habermas, 1987: 89).
The question ofwhyHabermas believes this to be the case is a rather more
complex question, and has its origins in an historical debate: that of Marx’s
conflation of the categories of labour and speech by “assimilating the self-
reflective basis of speech and social philosophy to a crude materialist model
of laboring” (Agger, 1976: 178). As Ben Agger writes, Habermas criticises
this collapse of categories for he wishes to preserve the “hidden unity” of
“knowledge” and “interest” that rational self-reflection is capable of reveal-
ing. If, as Marx claims, speech and self-reflection are forms of labour, then
not only does no such unity exist, but science itself (understood as a con-
ceptual entity) becomes incapable of reflecting meaningfully upon its own
praxes, heaving been reduced to a mere form of production. Meanwhile,
Marcuse accepts this Marxian welding-together of self-reflection and labor
and uses it to underpin his entire program, arguing from the premise that
science and technology, rather than being mere “abstract social forces”, are
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instead each forms of the life-instinct, and thus forms of labor, and so can
thus be transformed by virtue of altering the nature of labour itself (Agger,
1976: 178).
This point of difference between Marcuse and Habermas is extremely im-
portant, for it speaks directly to and of the post-Marxist revolutionary spirit.
If reflection and speech are not labour, as Habermas claims, then science—
and by corollary, technology—are not labour, and thus are not subject to
Marxist historical ructions. As he argues in Knowledge and Human Interests,
the idea that the “resurrection of nature” can be conceived within materi-
alism is a product of a kind of Marxist “heritage of mysticism”. He writes
that “[nature] does not conform to the categories under which the subject
apprehends it in the unresisting way in which a subject can conform to
the understanding of another subject on the basis of reciprocal recognition
under categories that are binding on both of them” (Habermas, 1971: 32-
33). Given that fact it is nonsensical to think that nature adheres to our
categories in the same way that we might make demands of another human
being, categorical claims such as scientific claims cannot be correctly consid-
ered to be materialist (viz.: to be subsumed within the category of labour).
Rather, science and technology are to be considered forms of speech, and
thus categorically distinct from labour. Furthermore, given that the relation-
ship between man and nature is accordingly premised upon our capacity for
speech, it is foolish to think that this relationship can be revolutionised by
changing the nature of labour: “Habermas feels that there will never be a
‘new’ science or technology, only the same old apparatuses used differently
by enlightened technocrats and ‘rational’ interlocutors” (Agger, 1976: 178).
Understandably, this has grave implications for Marcuse’s theory: in argu-
ing that the Marxist conflation of speech and labour is the product of a mere
category error, Habermas elegantly negates (and eviscerates) the possibility
of either a Marcusian New Science or New Technology by claiming that
science and technology are categorically distinct from labouring modes of
production.
This thesis has other ramifications, also. Later in “Technology as Ideol-
ogy”, Habermas makes the claim that the transition from neoclassical polit-
ical economy to the Keynesian welfare state saw ideology neatly removed
from political discourse, with the “ideology of free exchange” replaced by
a “substitute program” (Habermas, 1987: 102). Habermas sees the transi-
tion to Keynesianism as a fundamentally technocratic shift oriented “not
to the social results of the institution of the market but to those of govern-
ment action designed to compensate for the dysfunctions of free exchange”;
the good and proper locus of political attention becomes the body itself,
with the government offering a guaranteed minimum level of welfare and
guarding against risks to growth (Habermas, 1987: 102). The act of govern-
ing becomes denuded of its inherent political character, but instead takes
on a character which is distinctly negative. He writes: “For [government]
is oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of
risks that threaten the system: not, in other words, toward the realization
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of practical goals but toward the solution of technical problems” (Habermas,
1987: 102-103). What were once political problems become mere technical
problems; although the title of Habermas’ essay refers to “Technology as
Ideology”, it is ideology only insofar as technology has supplanted it; inter-
nal tensions within polities are relegated to being mere technical problems,
and as a result the political sphere becomes infected with “technological
rationality” (Fisher, 2007). This is in sharp distinction with Marcuse, for
whom technology is actively ideological; for Habermas, technology only in-
strumentally impinges upon our lifeworlds. As it is not to be considered
within the purview of labour, the content and development of technology is
of little philosophical interest: insofar as Habermas is concerned, these are
questions best left to engineers and other experts (Achterhuis, 2001: 72).
It is Habermas’ conclusion that technology only instrumentally impinges
upon our lifeworlds that is of interest to philosopher of technology Andrew
Feenberg. Although Feenberg admits that Habermas won his debate with
Marcuse (Feenberg, 1996: 49), he is careful to note that the mere fact of
Habermas’ victory is not sufficient cause for us to unhesitatingly endorse
his position, on the basis that a purely instrumental picture of technology
is necessarily incomplete.
Borrowing a distinction from Albert Borgmann (Borgmann, 1984: 7-12),
a figure with which we will engage shortly, Feenberg in Critical Theory of
Technology distinguishes between two broad camps with regards to philo-
sophical treatments of technology: instrumental theories of technology and
substantive theories of technology. Instrumental theories are those models
that presuppose that technological devices are fundamentally inert; neutral
to social and political choices. Although not given much credence in con-
temporary philosophy of technology (Achterhuis, 2001: 68), these intuitions
continue to substantively inform public debate on the ethics of certain tech-
nologies. The common catch-cry of “guns don’t kill people, people kill peo-
ple” is the sine qua non of these kinds of intuitions, endorsing a model of
human action whereby technological artefacts do not bear relevantly upon
the realisation of certain intended actions. Meanwhile, substantive theo-
ries are those such as we are discussing in this chapter; beginning with the
work of Heidegger and French philosopher Jacques Ellul, substantive theo-
ries have sought to question purely instrumental definitions of technology
by casting suspicion upon their purported cultural and social inertness and
thereby posit the reduction of human agency to being reduced to mere cogs
within a vast, dehumanising technocratic apparatus. Feenberg sees reason
to doubt both of these stories; although he acknowledges that both have a
part to play in analyses of technological systems, he considers both symp-
tomatic of a boolean approach, reflecting an innocent “take it or leave it”
mentality (Achterhuis, 2001: 69). Feenberg hopes to reinvigorate what is
otherwise an unhelpfully obstructed debate by opening up a middle path
between the two: a path that can not only successfully account for the con-
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tent of technology, but also provide an opportunity to address the possibility
of an “alternative” technology.
It is both Habermas’ technological determinism and his instrumental as-
sessment that proves problematic for Feenberg. As we have noted, Haber-
mas considers even discussing the possibility of New Technology (to bor-
row Marcuse’s term) an exercise in a kind of science-fictional, indulgent,
mystical Marxism; an inane utopianism premised upon a category error
and pursued with pointless revolutionary zeal. For Habermas, technology
is a mute, mechanistic articulation that unfolds in a fashion determined by
the human body, with the only real danger it poses is that it may serve to
occlude or otherwise compromise our capacity for public speech should it
be applied inappropriately: “Habermas’s approach implies that in its proper
sphere technology is neutral, but outside that sphere it causes the various
social pathologies that are the chief problems of modern societies”. That
having been said, Feenberg continues with a strike at Habermas’ teleolog-
ical instrumentalism: “Although his position too is powerfully stated, the
idea that technology is neutral, even with Habermas’s qualifications, is rem-
iniscent of the naïve instrumentalism so effectively laid to rest by construc-
tivism” (Feenberg, 1996: 46-47). Following the cues of sociologists Trevor
Pinch and Wiebe Bijker, Feenberg in Democratic Rationalisation claims that
even something as banal as the early history of the bicycle is evidence that
technology does not evolve teleologically. To this end, he posits that what
we now consider a bicycle—a self-evident technological black box—is in fact
the product of two entirely different devices: a utilitarian mode of transport
with two equal-sized wheels known as a “draisine” or a “velocipede”; and
a sportsman’s racing vehicle, with the front wheel substantially larger than
the other, commonly referred to as a “penny-farthing”. Feenberg argues
that, rather than being two instances of the same technology, they are in
fact different technologies with certain shared elements, as a) they met en-
tirely different social needs and b) neither form was a stage in the other’s
development. Indeed, he argues that a deterministic reading of the devel-
opment of the bicycle Whiggishly (and inaccurately) projects “the abstract
technical logic of the finished object back into the past as a cause of devel-
opment” (Feenberg, 2003b: 654-655).
However, perhaps Feenberg’s most damning indictment of the Haber-
masian view can be found in his analysis of the board game Go, in “Alter-
native Modernity? Playing the Japanese Game of the Culture”. Analysing
games such as Go provides a unique insight into questions of technological
determinism and neutrality, for unlike most forms of technology, games are
examples of devices with built-in boundary conditions regarding the way
in which play is conducted. By outlining explicit rules and various quan-
titative methods, board games are arenas in which “ambiguity has been re-
moved from the field of play”, as well as enforcing “the artificial equalisation
of the players who, in everyday life, are sure to be subtly differentiated in
ways the game ignores” (Feenberg, 1995: 112-113). These unique properties
mean that the game itself can be analysed separately from the environment
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(a) Velocipede, circa 1820 (b) Penny-farthing, circa 1880
Figure 7: Early bicycles: two distinct devices
in which it is being played; whether or not the Go board is on a cruise
ship, a sub-arctic island or a lava field will not bear relevantly upon the
means by which the game is played. Purportedly “abstracted from all cul-
tural and symbolic differences”, players and the rules they observe are, in
some relevant respect, strongly resemble those Habermasian “characteris-
tics of modern science and technological rationality” (Achterhuis, 2001: 82
and Feenberg, 1995: 113).
Purported indeed, for even the game of Go is subject to social and cultural
pressures. In Yasunari Kawabata’s classic novel The Master of Go, Kawabata
describes an historic match between the imminently retiring Master of Go,
Shusai, and his much younger competitor, Otaké. Otaké is an example of
what Kawabata refers to as the “modern sort”: young, upcoming Go play-
ers who do not share the aesthetic sensibilities of the older generation, who
have no interest in bringing about “a work of art on the Go board”, but
are instead entirely motivated by winning or losing, much to the dismay
of the old masters (Achterhuis, 2001: 84-85). Indeed, when Otaké makes
an unorthodox (though legal) move, the Master feels obliged to speak out,
complaining that “it was like smearing ink over a picture we had painted”
(Kawabata, 2006: 187). Kawabata describes this hostility and incommuni-
cability between modern sorts and the older players in even more explicit
terms:
From the veranda outside the players’ room, which was ruled
by a sort of diabolic tension, I glanced out into the garden,
beaten down by the powerful summer sun, and saw a girl of
the modern sort insouciantly feeding the carp. I felt as if I were
looking at some freak. I could scarcely believe that we belonged
in the same world. (Kawabata, 2006: 29)
Kawataba’s revulsion suggests that there is more going on here than
Habermas would have us believe. Despite his arguments in “Technology
as Ideology”, even games such as Go continue to evolve and develop in
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the face of new cultural contexts, despite the fact that the rules of the game
have remained unchanged since spreading from China into Japan and Korea
in the 7th century ce. Contra Habermas’ claims to the effect that technol-
ogy is inert and fundamentally non-reactive with the social sphere—arguing
that technological progress is mutely teleological—Feenberg’s analysis goes
to show that even thousand-year-old board games with ossified rulesets
are subject to social, cultural and historical contingencies; were this not
the case, there could be no possible justification for Shusai’s dismay or
Kawataba’s disgust. He argues that Kawataba’s novel is in fact a savage crit-
icism of the “pretensions of false universality”, instead arguing for a kind
of technological pluralism wherein alternative types of rationality—each of
which are “candidate[s] for modernity”—vie for supremacy (Feenberg, 1995:
134). In short, despite Habermas’ claims to the contrary, Feenberg concludes
from this discussion that alternative versions of modernity—such as Mar-
cuse’s New Technology—are indeed possible (Achterhuis, 2001: 86). In spite
of Habermas’ pessimism, we need not be content with our lot.
Despite the fact that Habermas can be faulted on these points, Feenberg
acknowledges that Habermas’ criticism of Marcuse’s romantic metaphysics
nonetheless continues to stand, thus preventing a return to Marcuse’s orig-
inal model wherein speech is subsumed as part of labour. Appealing to the
possibility of a third path, he asks: “Couldn’t one work toward [. . . ] a trans-
formation gradually, using existing technical principles but reforming them,
modifying them, applying them somewhat differently?” Feenberg, 1996: 55).
He salvages from Marcuse (and by extension Heidegger) the acknowledge-
ment that technology can, by virtue of its substantive properties, prove prob-
lematic for not only our political structures, but also the composition of the
human being itself, whilst also attempting to provide a concrete alternative
definition of technology that is anti-essentialist and non-teleological (Feen-
berg, 1999: 1). In response to this problem, Feenberg differentiates between
and then synthesises what he considers two different bodies of work in the
field of technology studies into a single instrumentalisation theory.
The first level, that of primary instrumentalisation, is the body of scholar-
ship that retains certain Heideggerian assumptions about technology with
regards to its essential properties; it would not be unfair to say that each
of the theorists we have so far discussed (Heidegger, Borgmann, Marcuse
and Habermas) belong in this camp. Meanwhile, the second level, that
of secondary instrumentalisation is comprised of the scholarship produced
by empirically-oriented sociological studies of technology, particularly the
work of Bruno Latour. Primary instrumentalisation allows us to under-
stand our technology as a kind of entity that decontextualises nature, re-
placing the natural rhythms of the given world with brutishly mechanistic
processes that serve to automate certain actions. Due to having replaced
natural rhythms, and thus the possibility of dynamical feedback, the world
becomes unnoticed by our technology: “The hunter experiences a slight
pressure on his shoulder as the pullet from his gun strikes the rabbit; the
driver hears a faint rustling in the wind as he hurtles a ton of steel down the
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highway” (Feenberg, 1999: 204). The world we occupy is becoming increas-
ingly technologised—removed from nature’s textures and towards the fea-
tureless Heideggerian Abstandlose—and as the inhabitants of this featureless
world, we find our own actions dispassionately dictated by the needs and ne-
cessities of this totalising and denatured system. However, we find the pos-
sibility for alternative modernities by invoking secondary instrumentation;
although Feenberg does not dispute the findings of primary instrumentalisa-
tion, secondary instrumentation grants us the ability to re-appropriate and
systematise objects by introducing them to what Latour in We Have Never
Been Modern calls a “parliament of things” (Latour, 1991: 142-145): just as a
needle can do nothing without the presence of thread, the vast majority of
our objects only make sense in conjunction with other objects. Furthermore,
this process of re-appropriation engenders the possibility of using these ob-
jects in hitherto unintended ways; the presumed passivity of the subject in
primary instrumentalisation is rejected in favour of the acknowledgement
of our collective agency.
What human beings are and will become is decided in the shape
of our tools no less than in the action of statesmen and political
movements. The design of technology is thus an ontological de-
cision fraught with political consequences. The exclusion of the
vast majority from participation in this decision is profoundly
undemocratic. (Feenberg, 2002: 3)
Though it is true that Feenberg acknowledges that technology presents
certain existential risks to democratic political systems, echoing Marcuse, it
is equally true that Feenberg argues that technology, by virtue of being co-
opted into unintended use per secondary instrumentation, can lead us safely
out of this political and existential minefield. To use one of Feenberg’s ex-
amples: in 1982, the French government began a nation-wide rollout of a
service known asMinitel—terminals that provided telephone subscribers ac-
cess to various networked databases, allowing clients to check the phone
directory, book train tickets or engage in mail-order retail. Despite the fact
that the service was provided as an informational adjunct to a home phone
service, the service provider (Poste, Téléphone et Télécommunications) did
not expect consumers would begin using it for less wholesome purposes:
anonymous online chatting, organising drug deals and swapping text-based
erotica (Feenberg, 2003b: 657). As Hans Achterhuis notes, it was long ago
predicted that the widespread adoption of the computer would lead to the
development of an “information society”; no one, least of all Minitel’s en-
gineers, expected online networks to become a means of communication
(Achterhuis, 2001: 80).
By Feenberg’s analysis, technology always incorporates social values, con-
tra Habermas’ claims. Were this not the case, there would have been no im-
perative towards abolishing slavery in the United Kingdom and Europe, nor
would the factory reform movement of the 1800s in the United Kingdom
have proved successful. According to the Habermasian view, the abolition
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of slavery and child labour would only have occurred in the instance that
modes of production became sufficiently efficient as to render slavery and
child labour redundant. However, the historical record indicates that this is
not in fact the case, the “violated imperatives of technology” did not come
back to haunt them; although it is true that current forms of production
are far more efficient than historical forms of production, those industrial
processes which were to become the current forms were only developed af-
ter those key pieces of legislation were ratified (Feenberg, 2003b: 655). In
these cases, “efficiency” was not the catch-cry that catalysed technologi-
cal change; rather, it was “social justice” that led the charge. Feenberg’s
scholarship serves to demonstrate that these apparent dilemmas of tech-
nology, rather than being intractable, are only problematic because they in-
completely take into account the efficacy of collective ethical and existential
agency.
3.3 The World of Our Making
Leaving behind our discussion of the uncertain bearing that technology has
upon political agency, this section concerns technological relations—that is,
the means by which we interface with both our technology and the world.
Rather than providing an historical account, as in the last section, here I
will explore two opposing views: the first a rather pessimistic position, de-
veloped by Albert Borgmann, who endorses a theory of technology that
is quite explicitly premised upon those Heideggerian tensions that we dis-
cussed in chapter 3.1; the second a value-neutral examination of these con-
cerns by Don Ihde, who attempts to salvage Heideggerian philosophy of
technology by introducing aspects of Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology to
the body of scholarship. We will examine each of these in turn.
Happily buying into the Heideggerian distinction between thing and ob-
ject, Borgmann introduces what he calls the device paradigm—a description
of the undesirable but inevitable state of affairs to which we inhabitants
of technologised society are invariably subject. If we recall the distinction
between “thing” and “object” from our précis of Heidegger earlier, we re-
member that “objects” are those entities that are merely objects of our con-
sciousness, blandly inhabiting the standing reserve. Meanwhile, “things”
are those entities that maintain an existence beyond the standing reserve;
unlike objects, they are acting in accordance with their Being by doing what
they do—leading inevitably to awkward constructions like “the thing things”.
Maintaining this Heideggerian distinction, Borgmann instead draws a par-
allel between “things” (as understood by Heidegger), and “devices”, the ag-
gregate of which results in the afore-mentioned “device paradigm”: “The
defining development of modern technology, then, is the rise of the device
paradigm, the distinctive conjunction of an easily available commodity and
a sophisticated and impenetrable machinery” (Borgmann, 2000: 420). Just as
treating entities in the world as Heideggerian objects denudes them of Be-
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ing, so too do devices (broadly understood as “technology”) unmoor us from
things (Tijmes, 2001: 12), as devices are artefacts that have been developed
to deliver a product.
Borgmann, in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, asks us
to consider a stereo player. Now, the purpose of a stereo player is “well
understood”, as Borgmann writes: it is to “provide music”. In this capacity
it is predated by a number of other artefacts with similar purposes: brass
bands, punk acts and full chamber orchestras all fulfil the same basic role.
It is true, he notes, that a group of his friends might well band together
and decide to provide live music accompaniment for his birthday party: in
that particular case, the role of stereo player and live band do indeed serve
the same purpose. However, such ready reductionism occludes the truth
of the issue: that the stereo player allows the owner of the device to lis-
ten to music whenever he or she feels and, moreover, is not restricted by
the talents, equipment or known repertoire of musicians, nor by the avail-
able infrastructure or resources of the host. Borgmann explains: “A stereo
set [. . . ] secures music not just on a festive day but at any time, and not
just competent flute and violin music but music produced by instruments
of any kind or any number and at whatever level of quality” (Borgmann,
1984: 3-4). Rather than being forced to endure the ambient migraine buzz
of your neighbour’s noise rock collective, you can instead choose to indulge
in an original recording of Rachmaninoff’s “Prelude in C# minor, Op. 3, No.
2”, Tom Waits’ lusty roar in “Clap Hands”, or the blues-jazz sensuality of
Morphine’s “French Fries with Pepper”.
However, in empowering consumers, the stereo also serves to conceal
the process by which music is made. When you observe a trained bluesman
plucking at a tuned steel-body resonator guitar, there is something in the
playing that allows you to conceive of the method by which sound is pro-
duced: the vibration of strings, the amplifying qualities of the resonating
chamber and the material imposition of the steel all lend themselves to the
bright, jangling waver of the notes rendered. The stereo, on the other hand,
allows for none of this feedback; they “do not bespeak [. . . ] what kind of
music they contain”, just as speakers have “no visible affinity” to the musi-
cal output, beyond perhaps the dull pulse of the speaker driver (Borgmann,
1984: 4). Further developments in multimedia technology have only exacer-
bated this process which was already well underway when Borgmann wrote
of it in 1984. With the prevalence of digital music and portable music play-
ers such as iPods, one need not even be tied to a location in order to listen
to music; the process has been abstracted to the point where place no longer
relevantly bears upon the experience of listening. This is what Borgmann
means when he says that devices—modern technology—are all about deliv-
ering a product. In the case of the stereo—indeed, the MP3 player—the focus
is upon delivering the music, whilst the device itself withdraws from view.
The machinery by which sound is produced becomes hidden, invisible, de-
tached from the form of production itself—and it is this general trend that
defines his device paradigm.
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Borgmann hesitates to render an unequivocally negative judgement of
this state of affairs. Unlike Heidegger, Borgmann accepts that the device
paradigm may even have positive effects: without it, we would not have
ready access to clean drinking water from our spigots, nor would we have
access to the same breadth of affordable, sanitary and functional food and
vestments: “Goods that are available to us enrich our lives and, if they are
technologically available, they do so without imposing burdens on us. Some-
thing is available in this sense if it has been rendered instantaneous, ubiq-
uitous, safe, and easy” (Borgmann, 1984: 41). That said, however positive
these products of the device paradigm are, Borgmann is nonetheless con-
cerned with the effect this has on our understanding of the hidden nature
of technological devices. Although we may have access to the clean drink-
ing water from our spigots, we are not cognisant of the byzantine network
of plumbing that lies just beneath the bricks or plasterboard, let alone the
dams or desalination plants in which the water is ultimately reclaimed from
the natural world. We may be warmed by the central heating in our office
blocks, disburdened of other elements (the trouble of finding fuel, construct-
ing a stove, stoking the fire) and making “no demands on our skill, strength,
or attention”, the devices responsible for these products exhibit therefore “a
tendency to become concealed or to shrink” (Borgmann, 1984: 42). Invisible
and ubiquitous, these devices are transformed into black boxes—and it is to
our partial detriment that this is the case.
The problem prosed by technology is not one that involves the loss of
Being, as Heidegger would argue, but is more in line with the criticisms of
Marcuse and his inheritors. Like many of those influenced by the Frankfurt
School, Borgmann argues that the primary danger that technology poses is
to democratic institutions because of the objectifying (in the Heideggerian
sense) tendencies of the device paradigm. However, there is an unavoid-
able tension at the heart of Borgmann’s analysis: in addition to claiming
that technology endangers democratic processes and dispositions, he also
acknowledges that contemporary democracy would be impossible without
it: “[democracy] can be realized jointly only according to the pattern of
technology” (Borgmann, 1984: 86). The putative ends of a democracy—the
abolition of concrete inequalities—are best served by technology, for it is in
increased production that one finds the most efficient answer to these con-
cerns. However, in making this realisation and acting accordingly, a subtle
shift takes place. As the insightful Borgmann commentator Pieter Tijmes
writes: “[although] technology is conceived instrumentally, it makes the
good life equal to consumerism” (Tijmes, 2001: 19, emphasis mine).
Borgmann notes that our choices concerning technology cannot be re-
voked; like the cyborg in Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto”, we would
not recognize the Garden of Eden; we are not made of mud and cannot
dream of returning to dust (Haraway, 1991: 151). Any decision that we
might want to render about the nature of eudaimonia has been made, al-
beit implicitly, once we begin to participate in technologised society. We
speak of technology as a means by which consumers are afforded additional
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choices: choice between films, fast food restaurants, mid-range Japanese
cars. However, echoing Marcuse, this choice is false, without substance. Al-
though you might be afforded the choice between Kentucky Fried Chicken
and McDonalds, at no point are you granted the choice to not participate
in this technologised way of life, because such a decision is prima facie ex-
cluded on the basis of being politically suspect: “[A] decision against tech-
nology or, more accurately, against technologically specified democracy is
one against freedom simply and for prejudice, paternalism or totalitarian-
ism” (Borgmann, 1984: 103). As in Marcuse, we are without the vocabulary
to beg out of the system, or even to criticise it internally. Instead, technology
provides “the inescapable horizon of our existence” (Tijmes, 2001: 20); not
only are we unable to render any meaningful criticism, but the instrumental
properties of technology (mirroring Habermas) subsume all questions of the
good life into a totalising technocratic calculus (mirroring Marcuse). Tijmes
summarises this issue nicely:
The political discussion always comes down to a matter of money
or its distribution: political goals are discussed in market terms.
However deeply they purport to cut, proposals for greater re-
sponsibility, greater technical efficiency, and more citizen par-
ticipation leave the basic structure of technology untouched.
These reform efforts may arise from a dissatisfaction with tech-
nology but, however strong, are doomed to fail because they
remain on the side of technology, and are blind to its idiosyn-
crasies. (Tijmes, 2001: 20)
At this point, one could forgive readers for thinking Borgmann a mere fac-
simile of Marcuse, minus the trenchant Marxism and with the addition of
some nuance and novel nomenclature. However, what sets Borgmann apart
from his predecessors is that his specific diagnosis presents the possibility
of a substantive response. For one must consider the fact that Borgmann’s
concern regarding the dangerous political consequences for democracy are
premised upon a fundamental observation: as the machinery surrounding
our lives becomes more invisible, we become further removed from real-
ity or nature (Feenberg, 2003a: 329). Pre-device paradigm, our tools—our
Heideggerian “things”—moored us to the world. Not only was a commu-
nal well the source of water in the same way as a spigot, a well was also
a community’s proverbial office water cooler: a place for gossip, meeting
and romantic sojourns. Borgmann, quiet Catholic that he is, points out that
Abraham’s servant discovered the future wife of Isaac at a well, and a well
was the location of the first kiss between Jacob and Rachel (Borgmann, 1984:
41). We have already spoken of Borgmann’s interest in centralised heating
and the fact that it demands nothing of us. He compares this to the process
of obtaining heat, pre-device paradigm: a division of labour wherein the
procurement and ordering of firewood, the building and the maintaining
of the fire, were conducted by familial constituents. It required both phys-
ical and social engagement—a multilayered, textured understanding of the
3.3 the world of our making 71
world that was more than just mere featureless Abstandlose: “These features
of physical engagement and of family relations are only first indications of
the full dimensions of a thing’s world. Physical engagement is not simply
physical contact but the experience of the world through the manifold sensi-
bility of the body” (Borgmann, 1984: 42). It is this kind of meaningful physi-
cal and social engagement that the device paradigm endangers, and without
this kind of engagement we are left disempowered, mute and atomised.
By Borgmann’s 1992 work Crossing the Postmodern Divide, his prognosis
of contemporary society at the beginning of the book is even more sav-
age and unapologetic, proving that age has only sharpened his expository
scalpel: “We live in self-imposed exile from communal conversation and ac-
tion. The public square is naked. American politics has lost its soul. The
republic has become procedural, and we have become unencumbered selves.
Individualism has become cancerous. We live in an age of narcissism and
pursue loneliness” (Borgmann, 1992: 3). The loss of “authentic” practices,
Borgmann argues, has engendered an era of hyperactivity, hyperintelligence
and hyperrealism that is synonymous with the postmodern age. For we are
in the closing stages of the modernist epoch, an historical stage for which—
Borgmann argues—realism, universalism and individualism were the cen-
tral tenets: tenets that saw the rise of sovereign powers, industrialisation,
human rights and the liberal humanist subject. However, as at the end of
any age, the slow expiration of modernism has seen the “fundamental con-
viction begin to weaken” and the slow and inexorable erosion of those tenets
(Borgmann, 1992: 48). Borgmann characterises philosophy as a kind of seis-
mograph for these changes, citing Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Na-
ture as symptomatic of the paradigmatic shift away from realism and Carol
Gilligan’s In a Different Voice as symptomatic of a similar paradigmatic shift
away from universalism—before finally making the point that postmoder-
nity even serves to cast doubt upon our intuitions concerning the fidelity
and coherence of the individual itself:
Despite its beneficence, the transformative power of postmod-
ernism is in doubt because it has failed to resolve the ambiguity
of individualism. The latter term designates the human condi-
tion that has lost its premodern communal bonds. But we lack
a unified and positive understanding of the person who would
answer to the term. The individual was thought to be the begin-
ning and end of the modern project, its author and beneficiary,
but this coherence was an illusion. (Borgmann, 1992: 79)
Borgmann is equivocal about the role that modern science has to play in
this process. Although he concedes that any “credible” view of the way
things are must be consistent with (or at the very least must not com-
promise) observed physical laws, he also wishes to avoid the conceit that
the universe can be reduced into a mere description of its constituent bits
(whether atoms, strings or otherwise), lest this inert, mindless, probabilistic
view—entirely removed from human concern—serve to provide further jus-
tification for the erosion of the modernist project. Instead he asks that we
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Figure 8: Kazimir Malevich, “Black Square”, 1915
grant a scientific view of the world the “proper scale”, much like “a painting
that would vanish as such if viewed through a microscope or from a satel-
lite”. Without the proper perspective, the machinery of nature becomes a
mere instrument in the service of the machinery servicing our own needs,
providing a hyperreal collection of “disposable and discontinuous experi-
ences” (Borgmann, 1992: 118). So how do we find the proper perspective?
Of course, we cannot merely return to the modernist triad even were we
inclined to do so; although the erosion of these concepts ushered in the hy-
perreality against which Borgmann rails: too much damage has been done;
we cannot stuff the genie back inside its bottle. So instead he proposes the
adoption of a disposition he calls postmodern realism: “The alternative ten-
dency [postmodern realism] is to outgrow technology as a way of life and to
put it in the service of reality, of the things that command our respect and
grace our life” (Borgmann, 1992: 82). Although I would almost certainly
dispute the accuracy of Borgmann’s term (postmodernity’s ontological un-
easiness seems to be prima facie incompatible with Borgmann’s normative
ontology of authenticity—also see Kellner, 2000: 239) the sentiment itself
seems clear enough: the incoherent products of technological processes are
to be co-opted to reflect the fundamental coherence of the natural, authen-
tic world and the materials it offers us: “‘Nature’ does not disappear in the
crafted piece, but becomes observed and celebrated in new kinds of skills”
(Tijmes, 2001: 27). Postmodern realism is but a stepping stone on the way
to his true goal: the re-invigoration of authentic focal practices.
Although the word “focus” is now generally used to denote a central point
of attraction or attention, the word finds its origin in the Latin word for “fire-
place” or “hearth”. For the fireplace was the focal point of everyday activity
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in the pre-paradigmatic home: the locus at which cooking, heating and in-
terpersonal exchanges take place; the place of dwelling for the Roman house
gods; the location of the mantelpiece adorned with photographs, timepieces
and other sentimental olla podrida—in short, it was the object of attention
for domestic life. (It is no accident that Malevich’s “Black Square” was first
exhibited in a corner, as per a fireplace [figure 8]: he wished the Supre-
matist image par excellence to supplant the cornerstone of Russian family
life.) Although the word no longer carries this semantic weight, Borgmann
attempts to reclaim the traditional use of “focus”, arguing that focal points
are those locations like the pre-paradigmatic hearth: a central point around
which human beings engage in practices that “center, orient and enlighten
our lives” (Tijmes, 2001: 22). These practices are unquantifiable—although
we can place an explicit dollar value on the amount of hamburgers sold at a
fast food restaurant in any given period, we cannot do the same for a fam-
ily meal “thoughtfully prepared and celebrated at home” (Borgmann, 1984:
56). These things and practices serve to provide context for our lived ex-
periences, whether it be physical labour, meaningful social interaction or
even the sheer sublimity of experiencing the unmediated trappings of na-
ture (Borgmann, 1984: 190-191).
Of course, we have already noted that Borgmann believes that technol-
ogy is not such a thing that can be revoked; finding these focal things is not
merely a matter if turning back the clock—there is no possibility for redemp-
tion, here. However, Borgmann’s analysis allows us to transform technol-
ogy in such a way that it is no longer a mere vehicle for products, but instead
is the kind of entity or process which grants focal things and practices a cen-
tral place. In a turn of events that no doubt appeals to Borgmann’s Catholi-
cism, although there is no possibility for redemption, there is nonetheless
the possibility for salvation. The introduction of focality into contempo-
rary technological discourse allows for a meta-technological return to the
possibility of the Aristotelian good life.
Moreover, this is not a mere question of raising the standard of living (a
quantitative measure), but is instead an attempt to increase quality of life (a
qualitative measure). By Borgmann’s reckoning, it is already the case that
people collectively acknowledge the fact that an increase in technological
comforts does little to increase satisfaction or happiness (at least once cer-
tain basic requirements are met), but this is but the first step (Borgmann,
1984: 106). Without some kind of collective, effort towards repurposing
our technology in the right way—this is, towards reintroducing focal things
and practices—escape from the inertness of the device paradigm will not be
possible: “The reforming of technology does not consist of a definite, imple-
mentable plan, but rather of the flowering of focality” (Tijmes, 2001: 26). As
Borgmann writes, we should let the world speak to us once again:
Amidst the complication of conditions, of the Bedingungen, we
must uncover the simplicity of things, of the Dinge. A jug, an
earthen vessel from which we pour wine, is such a thing. It
teaches us what it is to hold, to offer, to pour and to give. In its
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clay, it gathers for us the earth as it does in containing the wine
that has grown from the soil. It gathers the sky whose rain and
sun are present in the wine. It refreshes and animates us in our
mortality. And in the libation it acknowledges and calls on the
divinities. (Borgmann, 2003: 294-295)
And, to conclude, what is the best articulation of this kind of collective
focal practice? Borgmann—perhaps unsurprisingly—nominates worship as
the most fundamental kind of focal practice: it is “not just one among many
focal points” (Borgmann, 1992: 122). Although the family of focal practices
is a broad church indeed—a shared meal, reading poetry, playing baseball—
in a sense it is worship that is the most fundamental. “All focal practices”,
Pieter Tijmes argues, “display an analogy with worship as a concentrated
way of dealing with reality” (Tijmes, 2001: 27); in engaging in the act of
worship, one is participating in a kind of ur-practice from which all other
focal practices emerge, and to which all other focal practices return. Even
games like baseball are subject to this assessment, being ideally a kind of
collective and communal celebration of the authenticity of competition and
athleticism and grass and wood: when played in the right way, “divinity de-
scends on the game, divinity of an impersonal yet potent kind” (Borgmann,
1992: 135). It is a focal moment, without technology and without mediation:
outside the device paradigm there is only left the pure, untrammelled plea-
sure of happy people involuntarily rejoicing in their own existence.
For a slightly less critical take on our relation to the technological life-
world, we move to the world of Anglo-Continental philosopher of technol-
ogy Don Ihde—a thinker perhaps most valuable for his attempt to recon-
cile Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontyian phenomenology. As one might ex-
pect, Ihde shares with Heidegger some fundamental observations, the first
of which is that tools are not context-independent, but are rather related to
the context in which they are used. If we recall Heidegger’s thing/object
distinction, it is worth noting that in neither case did Heidegger believe the
artefact to exist unmoored to anything else, as if it had erupted ex nihilo
from the unforgiving morass of possibility. Just as the “objects” of our atten-
tion are subsumed within a systematic understanding of the orderliness of
the universe, so too are the independent “things” engaged in processes and
interactions with other kinds of “things” that are beyond our understand-
ing. In either case, both object and thing must be understood in situ, for not
doing so would necessarily leave us with an incomplete story: “there ‘is’ no
such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always
belongs a totality of equipment in which it can be this equipment that it
is” (Heidegger, 1977b: 97). The second observation that Ihde reclaims from
Heidegger is that our artefacts are for something. A corollary of this fact is
that the field in which equipment can be what it is is full of what Ihde calls
“cross relations”—cross relations which grant the artefact a certain kind of
intentionality or reference, defined by the boundary conditions of the task;
the artefact is for something. Quoting Heidegger, he writes: “[Equipment
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is] in order to . In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure, there lies an
assignment or reference of something to something” (Heidegger, 1977b: 97).
Finally, he accepts the claims that technology is not itself an object of expe-
rience, but is rather—at least when ready-to-hand—the means of experience
(Ihde, 1990: 32).
Conversely, he obtains from Merleau-Ponty a deeper and more sensitive
appreciation of the “embodied” quality of human consciousness. In précis:
rather than committing to Husserlian transcendentalism, wherein objects
of our perception are collapsed with the thought of the objects of our per-
ception, Merleau-Ponty claims that bodies cannot be separated from the
world; they are moored to it by the process of perception as it occurs in
one’s own body (le corps propre). In the face of this, Merleau-Ponty wishes
to redeem the Husserlian program, and re-orient in such as way as to pro-
vide a form of genuinely phenomenological reflection without committing
to Husserl’s obscure idealism. Although Merleau-Ponty preserves certain
aspects of Husserl’s thought—epoché, for instance, is maintained though
enfeebled9—he rejects the Husserlian transcendental subject in favour of
something far more mundane: the embodied or corporeal subject.
I am, not a ‘living creature’ nor even a ‘man’, nor again even
‘a consciousness’ endowed with all the characteristics which
zoology, social anatomy or inductive psychology recognize in
these various products of the natural or historical process—I
am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my
antecedents, from my physical and social environment; instead
it moves out towards them and sustains them, for I alone bring
into being for myself (and therefore into being in the only sense
that the word can have for me) the tradition which I elect to
carry on, or the horizon whose distance from me would be
abolished—since that distance is not one of its properties—if I
were not there to scan it with my gaze. (Merleau-Ponty, 2002:
ix)
Merleau-Ponty argues that returning to the Husserlian transcendental ob-
ject via epoché is an impossible task. However, it is not impossible due to say,
certain epistemic impositions; rather, it is impossible because the subject
itself is simply not transcendental, but is rather bodily and immanent. The
body is the only thing that remains with us in all cases; it is the fundamental
point of orientation. This is not some mundane case of the body-as-object—
to assume that would be to indulge a kind of Cartesian error assuming the
separation between mind and body—but rather, this body is a lived body
with a corporeal consciousness. Although this body can well be the object
of scientific study—we can, after all, examine ourself in the mirror—we must
9 “Reduction does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the
world’s basis: it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a
fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to the world, and thus brings them
to our notice. It, alone, is consciousness of the world, because it reveals the world as strange
and paradoxical” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: xii)
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nonetheless acknowledge that the body is, in some important respects, not
like other objects. Though my “visual body” may suffer my gaze in the mir-
ror and our “tactile body” may be subject to the impertinent groping of my
hands, this perceived body is not the totality of the entity. When I look at
myself in the mirror I see my head, arms, fingers and toes; however, if I
lean in close, matching my own gaze, the perceived body disappears and
“becomes divorced from objects, and reserves among them a quasi-space
to which they have no access.” Similarly, if I touch my left hand with my
right hand as my right hand touches an object, the “right hand as an object
is not the right hand as it touches”: the first is what it is—flesh, skin and
bones—whereas the latter “shoots through space like a rocket to reveal the
external object in its place”. It is in this way that the body is incapable of
being “completely constituted”, and is thus not an object in the same way
that my chair is an object; though the body is always there, it can neither
be completely seen nor touched (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 105). Membraneous
and shot through with contingency, consciousness itself unfurls at the point
of contact with the world; the body becomes the permanent condition of ex-
perience, the “meaningful core which behaves like a general function, and
which, nevertheless, exists and is susceptible to disease” (Merleau-Ponty,
2002: 46). Any other knowledge we have is in virtue of this fact, for it is
completely inescapable: we are our bodies, as they are us (Merleau-Ponty,
2002: 206); it is the most fundamental axiom that we are forced to accept:
We must not wonder why being is orientated, why existence
is spatial, why, using the expression we used a little while ago,
our body is not geared to the world in all its positions, and
why its co-existence with the world magnetizes experience and
induces a direction in it. The question could be asked only if
the facts were fortuitous happenings to a subject and an object
indifferent to space, whereas perceptual experience shows that
they are presupposed in our primordial encounter with being,
and that being is synonymous with being situated. (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002: 293-294)
All of which is to say: although we habitually speak of an intuitive dis-
tinction between that which perceives and that which is perceived, Ihde,
following Merleau-Ponty, instead argues that the act of perception itself im-
plies no such easy differentiation. Rather, both perceiver and perceived are
inextricably intertwined: “[in] experiencing, people are as much ‘in’ the
world as the world is ‘in’ them: they cannot be separated” (Verbeek, 2001:
122). Moreover, this understanding of perception as an integrative process
bears meaningfully upon the intuited limits of our bodies: Ihde approvingly
quotes Merleau-Ponty’s description of a woman with a feather in her hat,
who can, “without any calculation, keep a safe distance between the feather
in her hat and things which might break it off. She feels where the feather
is just as we feel where our hand is” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 165). That is
to say: her inherent sense of proprioception—the awareness of the loca-
tion and velocity of the different parts of one’s body—has accommodated
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the feather in her hat as if it were no different to her hand. This leads
Merleau-Ponty (and subsequently Ihde) to conclude that perception may be
“materially extended”, not being limited by the “line of my body or the sur-
face of my skin” (Ihde, 1990: 40). This only becomes more explicit when
when Merleau-Ponty discusses the cane of a blind man: his interface with
the object is so profound that the cane “[ceases] to be an object for him and
is no longer perceived for itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 165). The world it-
self becomes mediated through some kind of technical artefact that is itself
seamlessly integrated with the lived body. And so we are led to the first
reconciliation in Ihde’s attempt to reconcile the two thinkers: Heidegge-
rian equipment withdraws from our consideration in facilitating the perfor-
mance of certain kinds of acts (readiness-to-hand), whereas the example of
the Merleau-Pontean cane outlines the means by which that Heideggerian
equipment allows us to better perceive—and thus better access—the world
(Ihde, 1990: 40).
This emphasis on perception is one that pervades much of Ihde’s work.
Near the beginning of 1990’s Technology and the Lifeworld, Ihde draws the
distinction between two complementary modes of perception, micropercep-
tion and macroperception; the former being the mode of brute sensory per-
ception (sight, touch, equilibrioception, hearing, etcetera) and the second
being a kind of cultural or “hermeneutic” perception. They are complemen-
tary because neither can operate without the other: microperceptual sen-
sory/bodily data cannot help but be read (we cannot encounter it naïvely),
just as microperception provides context and orientation for that macroper-
ceptual reading (Ihde, 1990: 29). 2002’s Bodies in Technology continues this
theme, though with a slightly adjusted nomenclature. Rather than speaking
of macro- and microperception, Ihde instead prefers the terms body one and
body two, with the added implication that body one is the phenomenological
locus of microperceptual data: it is “the sense of being a body”. Meanwhile,
body two—the macroperceptual locus—is the “zone of bodily significance”;
just as the process of macroperception impregnates the world with meaning,
so too is body two pregnant with social and cultural constructions, such as
the contingent locations and properties of erogenous zones (Ihde, 2002: xi).
However, cutting across both of these bodies is a third aspect to the analysis:
the aspect of the technological that Melissa Clarke, in her review of Ihde’s
book, dubs “body three” (Clarke, 2004: 339).
Although Ihde himself seems reasonably happy with Clarke’s amendment
to his theory, 10 I would perhaps dispute the necessity of her inclusion. For
it seems to me that what makes technology important is that it is not itself
a body, but that it serves to inform and constitute the qualities that define
and differentiate bodies one and two. To wit: if body one is the locus of
microperceptual data, then the capacity of technology to effect a change in
both the means by which we receive perceptual information and kind of
perceptual information then we receive—for example, the visible rendering
of infrared energy by thermographic cameras—then technology can be said
10 See “A Response to My Critics”, Ihde, 2003: 113.
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Figure 9: Thermal image of steam locomotive made by infrared camera
to impinge upon body one in some important way by virtue of instantiating
a technological relation. Likewise, if body two is the locus of macropercep-
tual data, then our understanding of body two is similarly continent upon
technological relations—as in the case of (following Ihde’s example) James
Laver’s work on the shifting nature of female erogenous zones in his 1937
fashion history classic Taste and Fashion:
The female body consists of a series of sterilized zones, which
are those exposed by the fashion which is just going out, and
an erogenous zone, which will be the point of interest for the
fashion which is just coming in. The erogenous zone is always
shifting, and it is the business of fashion to pursue it without
ever actually catching it up. (Laver, 1945: 201)
Furthermore, this technological relation between bodies one and two can
itself be divided into a number of separate relations that, all together, con-
stitute technological relations. We will briefly discuss each in turn.
Mediation relations are those relations that allow us to experience the
world via our artefacts; our perception and our activities are enacted through
our technologies. Recalling Merleau-Ponty’s blind man’s cane or our ther-
mal camera, technology in a mediation relation allows us to access—or, at
the very least, better access—the world. This is in distinction with unmedi-
ated perception which is perception that occurs without the aid of artefacts.
In a move with which Allen would disagree, Ihde endorses the possibility
of a kind of “naked perception” that is not pre-interpretive, but merely op-
erates without artefactual intervention. Ihde schematises the distinction
between unmediated perception and mediated perception as follows:
unmediated relation: I—world
mediated relation: I—technology—world
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Ihde then further speciates mediation relations into two additional kinds
of relation. The first, embodiment relations, are those relations such that I
have with my eyeglasses; my relationship with the glasses is so close (they
are so “ready-to-hand” according to the Heideggerian schema) that I am
not consciously aware of them unless they are somehow brought to my at-
tention. Were I without my glasses, my perceptual experience would be
presumably direct and unmediated, and I would perceive—instead of my
laptop and a happy chaos of books—an ugly melange of colours and blurry
polygonal shapes. Conversely, my glasses—assuming that they are fitted
with the correct prescription and have a form that is amenable to sitting
on the bridge of my nose—seemingly disappear into my bodily schema. I
do not perceive the glasses themselves, but rather I perceive through them;
they withdraw from my perception. The same is true for Merleau-Ponty’s
feathered hat or the blind man’s cane; the devices themselves are somehow
transparent to the body; what Ihde calls an “enigma position” emerges be-
tween the collapse between “I” and “technology”, as our devices aid us in
facilitating meaningful action whilst allowing the world to be given through
the artefact itself:
embodiment relations: (I-technology) → world
The other kind of mediated relations that Ihde discusses he dubs hermeneu-
tic relations, as they allows us to better understanding the world by virtue
of reading an artefact. In this case, the enigma position has changed placed,
being instead between “technology” and “world”; contra embodiment rela-
tions, the device does not withdraw from our attention, as in embodiment
relations, but rather reveals an aspect of the world that would have been
hitherto inaccessible. That is to say: it is not the device itself that is be-
ing read; rather, the device becomes a means by which we perceive. Our
thermographic camera is a device of this kind. Although I may be able to
detect heat sources due to the electrochemical network of nerves embed-
ded in my skin, the thermographic camera makes explicit this relation via
a kind of hermeneutic process: the device reads the world and then pro-
vides a translation for the data—whether by virtue of providing a thermal
image, or whether by rendering that perceptual data into degrees Fahren-
heit or Celsius, or even by rendering the information into a heartbreakingly
beautiful piece of contemporary prose. It is this translated representation of
raw data—this hitherto inaccessible aspect of the world—that we access in
hermeneutic relations (Ihde, 1990: 73-96):
hermeneutic relations: I→ (technology-world)
Moving away from mediated relations, Ihde also introduces the possibil-
ity of what he calls alterity relations, or relations that are strictly between
the “I” and “technology”. It seems clear that in mediation relations (whether
they be embodied or hermeneutic), the “I” and the “world” are each the
other’s other; they have a kind of tensile, inextricable, mutually constitut-
ing relationship. However, in the case of alterity relations, “world” is neatly
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removed from the schematic and “technology” takes its place, becoming a
kind of quasi-other. He borrows the term “alterity” from Emmanuel Lév-
inas’ Totality and Infinity, taking it to mean “the radical difference posed to
any human by another human, an other [. . . ]. Extrapolating radically from
within the tradition’s emphasis upon the non-reducibility of the human to
either objectness [. . . ] or as a means [. . . ], Levinas poses the otherness of
humans as a kind of infinite difference [. . . ]” (Ihde, 1990: 98). Although
phenomenologically distinct from our relationship with either other human
beings or non-human animals, Ihde describes alterity relations as the kind
of relationship that occurs when we treat objects as if they were an other
(thus “quasi-other”). He writes:
The religious object (idol) does not simply “represent” some ab-
sent power but is endowed with the sacred. Its aura of sacred-
ness is spatially and temporally present within the range of its
efficacy. The tribal devotee will defend, sacrifice to, and care
for the sacred artifact. Each of these illustrations contains the
seeds of an alterity relation. (Ihde, 1990: 99)
The alterity relation describes technology when it is in the capacity as
something to be interacted with, such as a spinning top, or a computer, or an
automatic teller machine. They are fascinating because there is something
strangely autonomous about them, in the same way that human beings and
other animals are autonomous—they appear to have some kind of Being or
form of life which is not contingent upon our interaction or continued inter-
vention. That is to say: although their animation is superficial and the ap-
pearance of automation is but a mere semblance, they nonetheless demand
our attention because they appear to be, in some important phenomenolog-
ical respect, like us. Rather than simply enabling us to differently access
the world as in mediation relations, the device itself becomes the object of
our attention because it compels us to do so. Accordingly, Ihde argues, the
relation can be articulated thus:
alterity relations: I→ technology-(-world)
Finally, there are background relations, which are the most subtle of all
technological relations. If embodiment, hermeneutic and alterity relations
can be understood to exist upon a kind of spectrum or continuum—embodied
relations occurring when “I” and “technology” collapse into one another at
the site of the enigma position, alterity relations occurring when “technol-
ogy” is treated as a kind of attenuated other, and hermeneutic relations
existing somewhere in the middle—background relations are not explicitly
related to the “I” at all, but rather serve to provide and shape “the context
of our experience in a way that is not consciously experienced” (Verbeek,
2001: 132). This kind of relation has a great deal in common with a certain
articulation of Borgmann’s device paradigm, being constituted of silent, au-
tomatic technologies such as central heating and refrigeration. In a way not
dissimilar to embodiment relations, background relations are only detected
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in the effect of some kind of mishap or error. However, their influence is
far more subtle, for they provide the necessary context for the other kinds
of relations we have already discussed; indeed, many (if not most or all)
instances of embodiment, hermeneutic or alterity relations would be impos-
sible without the mute cooperation of background relations.
Through this analysis of the kinds of relationships we have with our
technologies, Ihde does something rather novel when compared to his an-
tecedents and colleagues: he outlines a brief but nonetheless helpful taxon-
omy of the different kinds of objects that we encounter. Although Heidegger,
Feenberg and Borgmann present deep analyses of technology as a whole
and the kinds of internal pressures to which it is subject, Ihde is the only
one concerned by the fact that we can have phenomenally distinct kinds
of experiences with our devices, and that these experiences help constitute
what those devices are.
It seems obvious that Ihde’s sensitivity to objects is a product of the debt
he owes to Merleau-Ponty. Although Merleau-Ponty at no point developed
a theory of artefacts, his work on embodiment could well be understood as
a kind of proto-theory of artefactual engagement; and, moreover, it seems
that Ihde himself was made early aware of this fact and has run with the
concept ever since. However—particularly as Ihde’s scholarship in this field
will recur in the next chapter—it is worth now addressing what may well
appear to be a burgeoning concern: namely, that Ihde’s theory of embodi-
ment relations runs counter to the aims of the phenomenological program
by virtue of the causal story it presents. Certainly, if we return to Ihde’s
articulation of the embodiment relation (“I—technology—world”), there ap-
pears to be an implicit return to a kind of dualism, with “I” and “world” once
again placed in dualist opposition, rather than being (as per the phenomeno-
logical story) mutually constituting. Indeed, it is perhaps tempting to con-
ceive of the “I” and the “world” as fixed points in this conceptual schematic,
with the only thing being impinged upon is the manner in which the sub-
ject experiences the object. Furthermore, any attempt to derive some kind
of historical account of this mediation—technology being a point of contact
between subject and object—leaves us unable to speak of technology pre-
ceding either “I” or “world”, forcing us to ungraciously recommit to either
idealism or materialism.
Tempting though this characterisation is, I believe it to be a fairly pro-
found misreading of the thrust of Ihde’s argument. Although the idea of
technology serving to phenomenologically constitute the “I” and “world”
might seem prima facie a little odd, I would argue that it nonetheless holds
water. Consider: Ihde asks us to acknowledge that we cannot possibly
conceive of a human being without some kind of substantive material cul-
ture or technical skill. Although we might think of certain Palaeolithic
and/or hunter-gatherer societies as human cultures of this type, character-
ising them so would be a grave disservice, and freely underrates not only
their technological sophistication in the face of adverse conditions (mak-
ing clothes, weapons, other palliative devices—that is to say, body one), but
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also the cultural contingencies that are premised upon these technologies
being the case (body two). Although Ihde allows for the possibility of a
pre-technological human to exist, such a creature would have to be living
in something very much like the Garden of Eden for such a lifestyle to be
tenable:
What this initial imaginative exercise reveals is that it might
be possible for humans to live non-technologically as a kind of
abstract possibility—but only on the condition that the environ-
ment be that of a garden, isolated, protected, and stable. The
price for such a non-technological existence is to be enclosed.
Here would be the “milieu of nature” in purer form. But there is
no such empirical-historical human form of life because, long
before our remembering, humans moved from all gardens to
inherit the Earth. (Ihde, 1990: 13)
We might like to think of such a creature as living an unmediated exis-
tence in the most pure form: Ihde’s “I—world” schematic. The em-dash in-
dicates the point at which consciousness unfurls, constituting both “I” and
“world”—whether the em-dash be Husserl’s transcendental subject, Heideg-
ger’s Dasein or Merleau-Ponty’s embodied subject. Indeed, perhaps it would
be more appropriate to replace Ihde’s em-dash with a double-ended arrow,
in order to better demonstrate the conditional relationship between the re-
spective parts: “I ←→ world”. Moreover, given that Ihde’s technology cuts
across both body one and body two, particularly in the case of embodiment
relations, Ihde claims that technology can indeed be constitutive of “I” and
“world”: in an attempt to clarify “I—technology—world”, I instead present
an alternative formulation: “I ←(technology)→ world”, with technology
partially constituting that first phenomenological point: “Mediating arti-
facts shape not only the way a pre-defined subject related to a pre-defined
object or the way a predefined object can appear to a predefined subject.
They shape the interrelation itself between subject and object, from which
both are constituted” (Verbeek, 2001: 131). Our technological relations—
particularly our mediation relations (embodied and hermeneutic)—not only
directly impinge upon our access to reality and the way we believe it to be
constituted, but also impinge upon our sense of ourselves; we are the partial
products of our own technological mediation.
3.4 Hominem te Esse Memento
Assuming that Allen is correct, their points of departure from these broadly
Heideggerian accounts seem obvious. First, and most obviously, is the fact
that there is a broad tendency among Heideggerian philosophers of technol-
ogy to consider technology somehow existentially threatening, whether this
threat be ontological (Heidegger, Borgmann) or political (Marcuse, Haber-
mas and Feenberg). Obviously, this is not true in all cases—Feenberg cer-
tainly allows for the possibility that technology can be made subject to our
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collective desires (even if it is not necessarily the case that it will), just as
Don Ihde seems to think that the purported threat to Being is of little sub-
stance or concern—but the fact that technology is anxiety-inducing seems
impossible to ignore. We will explore these concerns further at the conclu-
sion of this section. The second point of departure is that the purported
ontological distinction between humans and technology is something that
undercuts all of the scholarship in this area; there is the distinct implication
that technology and humankind are not necessarily contingent upon one
another. Although seemingly a minor point, the fact that even someone as
sympathetic to technology as Ihde incorrectly allow for the possibility of
a human being that is both linguistic and pre-technological has profound
ramifications for their phenomenological programs.
In Technology and the Lifeworld, Ihde distinctly differentiated between
what he calls unmediated perception, which is artless, bodily, unattentu-
ated (“There, disrobing except for a modest set of swimming trunks, I first
sit on the sand and look about me. The tactile sense of the breeze, the
warmth of the sand, the sound of the ripples from the waves, the vision
of the Persian reeds bordering the cove—are are present to my senses non-
mediatedly” [Ihde, 1990: 45]); and mediated perception, which describes
the phenomenon of sensing through something, whether the process be em-
bodied or hermeneutic. It is our adoption of mediated perception that has
served to shape our lifeworlds: as I noted at the conclusion of the prior
chapter, our technological relations—particularly our mediation relations—
not only directly impinge upon our access to reality and the way we believe
it to be constituted, but also impinge upon our sense of ourselves; we are
the partial products of our own technological mediation. However, Allen’s
account casts doubt on the plausibility of this narrative. If, as Allen claims,
skills and capacities such as language are necessarily premised upon the
prior development of a material culture, then rather than human beings be-
ing the partial products of our own technological mediation, we are instead
the total products of our own technological mediation. Material culture it-
self becomes the core premise upon which all recognisably human action
rests, and it is a development from which we cannot return and that cannot
help but inform our relationship with the Real.
If we recall, Ihde writes that “it might be possible for humans to live non-
technologically as a kind of abstract possibility—but only on the condition
that the environment be that of a garden, isolated, protected, and stable”
(Ihde, 1990: 13). I reject even the abstract possibility of non-technological
human action, for it is only with the introduction of technology that lin-
guistic humans could begin emerging in the first place. For a creature to be
Dasein or something very much like it (a transcendental ego, an embodied
self), they must have the capability to consider their own being in some re-
spect. It is a capacity that is, if not linguistic, then at least premised upon
a kind of economy of complementary action that means that we remain un-
bound to the world; we are no longer enslaved by the tyranny of indexical
relations. Furthermore, those creatures that are non-technological and thus
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non-linguistic are to be pitied as “world-poor” for they are shackled to the
world in a way that we are not: “Thus it is clear that in the animal world as
a whole the way in which the animal is bound to its environment is almost
as intimate as the unity of the body to itself” (Safranski, 1999: 199).11 The
kind of unmediated experience of which Ihde believes us capable is one that
is inherently and exclusively world-poor, more akin to the experience of a
sea slug or a thermostat: reacting to crude sense data, but bereft of qual-
itative experience. For it certainly seems to be that to be rich-in-world is
to have something like the capacity for qualitative experience: experiences
that can be judged, sorted by preference and compared across a wide range
of criteria. However, the indexicality of world-poor experience seems to
prevent this prima facie: the capacity for assessment, much like the capac-
ity for language, requires that we be capable of a kind of abstraction that
is premised upon participating Allen’s economy of complementary action.
Indeed, I would argue that even the most “unmediated” experience remains
mediated by our linguistic, cultural and material contexts.
Is it possible that Ihde’s problem is less one of confusion and more an
issue of clarity: although he and I obviously differ on this point, it is not
as if he is not philosophically sympathetic to the material. It does seem
though that Ihde’s programme, although a step in the right direction, does
not quite go far enoughwith regards to discussing the relationship with man
and technology. Although ideas such as “body one” and “body two” are con-
ceptually helpful when discussing certain elements of the problem, I would
argue that they serve to impede analysis when the separation between the
two serves to argue in favour of a given body being technologically medi-
ated and the other not. Indeed, I would argue that it is both unhelpful and
philosophically nonsensical to speak of unmediated relations, because every
relation that we have is mediated by something—by our language (“Persian
reeds”), by the presence or absence of our artefacts (swimming trunks), by
our praxes (the ability to swim)—and, if they are not mediated, they are in-
stead an example of possessing a kind of inhuman world-poorness. Indeed,
it could not be otherwise; our tools help us live, help us know, and make
us human. Nonetheless, though, niggling questions remain: if we as hu-
mans are necessarily constituted by our technology, then why do we react
with such distrust and suspicion when it enriches upon our lives? If tech-
nology is literally the instantiation of knowledge, as Allen claims, why the
post-Heideggerian fears that it will somehow threaten our political agency
or attenuate our relationship with the Real?
To readers of a certain non-analytic background, Allen’s work on the ori-
gins of technics may seem quite similar to another contemporary theorist;
one deeply entrenched in the Continental tradition, but who is no less icon-
oclastic. The story behind Bernard Stiegler and his introduction to philos-
ophy is invariably the first thing one learns about him: incarcerated for
11 I understand that this might, by definition, exclude some Homo sapiens from being consid-
ered humans (very young children, those in vegetative states, etcetera), but this concern is
well beyond the purview of this work.
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armed robbery between 1978 and 1983, he (in a stunningly and quintessen-
tially French development) discovered the joy of philosophy from behind
bars. Eschewing the conventions of the academy, Stiegler’s work in recent
decades—particularly his three-volume magnum opus, Technics and Time—
have nonetheless attracted the attention of a number of different writers in
the Continental traditions, particularly in the genres of film and media stud-
ies. His appeal is obvious: two things are readily apparent when one reads
Stiegler. The first is the grandness of his vision, as well as his systematic
approach to solving the posed problems; freely drawing upon the work of
figures such as Heidegger, Jacques Derrida and Gilbert Simondon, he pro-
vides a daring synthesis of many of the grand figures within the broader
Continental tradition. The second thing of note is that Stiegler has an obvi-
ous sensitivity to the problems inherent in technics and adopts what can
broadly be described an an anthropological approach to these questions.
Relying heavily upon the scholarship of mid-20th century palaeoanthropol-
ogist André Leroi-Gourhan (a figure on whom Allen is unusually silent),
one is struck with the distinct sense that Stiegler remains beholden to the
world in a way that philosophers such as Derrida perhaps are not. It is for
this reason that although Technics and Time, 1—the object of my exegesis in
this section—is clearly characterised by a willingness to indulge in explana-
tory metaphor at the expense of concrete rationalisation, I will demonstrate
that Stiegler’s scholarship can be understood to quite happily complement
Allen’s artefactual epistemology in that he attempts to answer those live
questions that Allen eschews.
Stiegler borrows from Leroi-Gourhan the idea that all anthropology is
grounded by the interplay between what he calls the ethnic—”the unity of
social being” (Stiegler, 1998: 25)—and the technical, or the material substrate
that underpins lived experience. Echoing Marx’s sentiments in Capital, it
is in the interplay between these two abstractions that the active relation
between man and nature is revealed.12 The history of mankind is prop-
erly understood as the history of technics, although not in a reductive way;
echoing the comments made by Feenberg earlier in this chapter, the tech-
nology available to a group of people—an ethnic group—is contingent upon
a number of different factors he boils down to internal (cultural) and exter-
nal (geographical) milieux (Stiegler, 1998: 59).13 It is the interplay between
these conflicting milieux that renders contingent the forms adopted by tech-
nology. Contrary to the claims of someone like Habermas, it is clear that
12 “A critical history of technology would show how little any of the inventions of the eigh-
teenth century are the work of a single individual. And yet such a book does not exist.
Darwin has directed attention to the history of natural technology, that is, the formation of
the organs of plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of production for sustain-
ing their life. Does not the history of the productive organs of man in society deserve equal
attention? [. . . ] Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process
of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of the production of
the social relations of his life, and of the mental conceptions that flow from these relations.”
(Marx, 1976: 493, n. 4)
13 This distinction shares obvious similarities with Ihde’s body one and body two distinction
articulated earlier.
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Stiegler and Leroi-Gourhan acknowledge that although the forms adopted
by technologies are constrained by given boundary conditions reflected in
physical laws or the human body, deference must nonetheless be paid to-
wards both cultural sentiments (as in the case of Feenberg’s analysis of the
game of Go) and also realities of geography—natural resources, relationship
with neighbours, general climate. So Stiegler writes that the “technologi-
cal tendency”—this tension between internal and external—comes “from an
enigmatic intention of the interior milieu, [. . . which] diffracts into a diver-
sity of facts, like a ray of light passing through an aqueous milieu when it
is reflected by the exterior milieu [. . . ]” (Stiegler, 1998: 60). Stiegler then
quotes Leroi-Gourhan:
The [technological] tendency is proper to the interior milieu;
there can be no tendency of the exterior milieu: the wind does
not propose a determined roof to the house, the human gives
to its roof the most favorable profile. [. . . ] The exterior milieu
behaves like an absolutely inert body into which the tendency
collides: the material sign is found at its point of impact. [. . . ]
Empowered, thanks to its universal nature, with all the possi-
bilities expressible in general laws, the tendency cuts across the
interior milieu, which is suffused by the mental traditions of
each human group. It acquires therein special properties, as a
ray of light acquires diverse properties in crossing through dif-
ferent bodies, and encounters the exterior milieu, which offers
to the acquired properties an irregular penetration; and at the
point of impact between the interior and exterior milieus this
membrane of objects constituting the furniture of humans ma-
terializes. (Leroi-Gourhan, 1945: 339 in Stiegler, 1998: 60)
Furthermore, echoing Feenberg, there seems to be a clear sense that the
fact that this technology is contingent does not make it in any way inci-
dental to historical outcomes. As seems perfectly clear, technology is not
merely and passively instrumental, but is rather a substantive constituent
in the realm of human action: despite what appears to be a common intu-
ition to the contrary, our artefacts not only have a material effect on the
kinds of actions we can take, but also on the kinds of actions we do take.
There is a clear parallel to Allen’s comments on complementary, elaborate
networks of tools: tools which not only rely on other tools in order to have
any clear use, but that also allow for the possibility of new kinds of objects
and thus new kinds of actions: “Having the principle of the wheel gives one
that of the chariot, the potter’s wheel, the spinning wheel, the lathe; know-
ing how to sew provides not only a piece of clothing of a particular form
but also vases of sown bark, sown tents, sown dinghies; with the master of
compressed air comes the blowpipe, the piston lighter, the piston bellows,
the hypodermic needle” (Leroi-Gourhan, 1943: 41, in Stiegler, 1998: 53).
But it is Stiegler’s scholarship on what constitutes the human that has
the most distinct resonance with Allen’s program. He phrases the ques-
tion in distinctly Heideggerian terms: “technology has disquietingly cast
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doubt upon, while perhaps for the first time directly confronting, the very
form of this question: what is the nature of the human?” (Stiegler, 1998:
88)—it seems reasonably clear that both writers are preoccupied with the
same fundamental observation: the the human being is necessarily consti-
tuted by the presence of our technics. However, what each thinker does
in response to this realisation is where things begin to get interesting. Al-
ready we have seen Allen’s response to the quandary: that our tools are
both human- and world-constituting by virtue of their epistemic signifi-
cance. Knowledge of the world is praxis, performance; generating the right
kind of artefact (whether physical, lexical, cybernetic, etcetera) in response
to not only the task at hand, but that makes the right kinds of concessions
to the boundary conditions of both the world and lived experience. How-
ever, Allen’s account is plainly not the whole story: even if we do buy into
his artefactual epistemology (and I do), he provides no adequate account
for the kinds of anti-technological intuitions that dominate the first chap-
ter of this work. If the relationship between technology and knowledge
is so indelible, then why is it that human beings suffer these suspicions
that our technology serves to attenuate our relationship with or otherwise
disenfranchise the world? What is it about technology and rationalisation
that led Max Weber, in 1920, to claim that industrialisation was responsible
for the “disenchantment” of the world in his Sociology of Religion (Weber,
1966)—a world wherein “everything becomes understandable and tameable,
even if not, for the moment, understood and tamed. Increasingly the world
becomes human-centred and the universe—only apparently paradoxically—
more impersonal” (Jenkins, 2000: 12)? Allen is deafeningly silent on this
point. Stiegler, however, is not. Indeed, Stiegler notes that even though
the interior and the exterior are mutually constituting, the “double consti-
tution is also that of an opposition between the interior and the exterior”
(Stiegler, 1998: 142). As Stiegler argues, this doubt surrounding the realm of
technics—this intuitive opposition between interior and exterior—is indeli-
bly tied into the question of death.
Stiegler, like Allen, traces the origin of the symbolic order to the develop-
ment of technics. The story finds its metaphorical beginnings in the Platonic
retelling of the myth of Prometheus, with Prometheus giving man fire in an
effort to offset the error of Epimetheus; the origins of the human being are
found in the moment when man makes the first tools, with flint “the first re-
flective memory, the first mirror” (Stiegler, 1998: 142).14 It is in the process
14 “Once upon a time, there existed gods but no mortal creatures. When the appointed time
came for these also to be born, the gods formed them within the earth out of a mixture of
earth and fire and the substances which are compounded from earth and fire. And when
they were ready to bring them to the light, they charged Prometheus and Epimetheus with
the task of equipping them and allotting suitable powers [dunameis] to each kind. Now
Epimetheus begged Prometheus to allow him to do the distribution himself—’and when I
have done it,’ he said, ‘you can review it.’ So he persuaded him and set to work. In his
allotment he gave to some creatures strength without speed, and equipped the weaker kinds
with speed. Some he armed with weapons, while to the unarmed he gave some other faculty
and so contrived means for their preservation. To those that he endowed with smallness,
he granted winged flight or a dwelling underground; to those which he increased in stature,
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of interfacing with the material—eye and hand and stone, in the “anterior
field”, as Leroi-Gourhan dubs it—that we find our own interiority speaking
to us. This capacity obliquely reflects itself, “somber, buried, freeing itself
from the shadows like a statue out of a block of marble”; it unfurls in and
is constituted by the reflexive point of contact between mind and world:
where we find our own internal intentions marked upon the world, though
necessarily limited by the external facts that the world imposes. The cre-
ation of the first human is a paradox, for we speak of an exteriorisation
(the first stone tool) without that exteriorisation being exterior to some-
thing, without an intelligent and intelligible homunculus having taken up
residence behind one’s eyes. Instead, echoing Allen’s basic phenomenolog-
ical point, the interior is instead constituted by that first tool-making act:
“The movement inherent in this process of exteriorization is paradoxical:
Leroi-Gourhan in fact says that it is the tool, that is, tekhne¯, that invents
the human, not the human who invents the technical. Or again: the human
invents himself in the technical by inventing the tool—by becoming exteri-
orized techno-logically” (Stiegler, 1998: 141). Thus we see in Stiegler that
Leroi-Gourhan’s interior and exterior are collapsed into a single entity: the
man is defined by the tool he wields, but the tool itself is rendered impossi-
ble without the presence of the man. Speaking of one preceding the other
is naught but foolishness.
This human-making capacity for tool-creation, Stiegler argues, has a fun-
damental relationship with the Derridean concept of différance, arguing in
Technics and Time, 1 that the development of the gramme¯ (cf.: Derrida, 1998)
is synonymous with the development of the human being: “[différance is]
above and below the who and the what; it poses them together, a compo-
sition engendering the illusion of an opposition. The passage is a mirage:
the passage of the cortex into flint [. . . ]” (Stiegler, 1998: 141). Far older
than “specifically written human forms” (Stiegler, 1998: 137), gramme¯—any
their size itself was a protection. Thus he made his whole distribution on a principle of compen-
sation, being careful by these devices that no species should be destroyed. . . . Now Epimetheus
was not a particularly clever person, and before he realized it he had used up all the avail-
able powers on the brute beasts, and being left with the human race [non-aloga] on his
hands unprovided for, did not know what to do with them. While he was puzzling about
this, Prometheus came to inspect the work, and found the other animals well off for every-
thing, but man naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed, and already the appointed day had
come, when man too was to emerge from within the earth into the daylight. Prometheus
therefore, being at a loss to provide any means of salvation for man, stole from Hephaestus
and Athena the gift of skill in the arts [ten enteknen sophian], together with fire—for without
fire there was no means [amekhanon] for anyone to possess or use this skill—and bestowed
it on man. In this way man acquired sufficient resources to keep himself alive, but he had
no political wisdom [sophia]. This art was in the keeping of Zeus. . . . Through this gift man
had the means of life, but Prometheus, so the story says, thanks to Epimetheus, had later on
to stand his trial for theft.
Since, then, man had a share in the portion of the gods, in the first place because of his
divine kinship he alone among living creatures believed in gods, and set to work to erect
altars, and images of them. Secondly, by the art which they possessed, men soon discovered
articulate speech [phonen] and names [onomata], and invented houses and clothes and shoes
and bedding and got food from the earth” (Plato, Protagoras, quoted in Stiegler, 1998: 187-
188).
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one of arbitrary marks from which our signs are constructed—is the object
of the “general history of life” (viz.: différance). To track the path of the
gramme¯ is to engage in a history of our signs and our grammars; to mark
the process by which the human being is able to not only mark between
what differs between entities in the realm of space, but also to introduce a
temporal axis by virtue of articulating that which is deferred. That it to say:
it seems reasonably clear that what Stiegler is describing is the process by
which human beings develop the capacity to enter and manipulate a sym-
bolic order—the kind of ability that allows me to say things like “I saw a
leopard last year whilst on safari” or “Imagine that you are faced by a hun-
gry leopard”. If the capacity for différance is the capacity to not only speci-
ate or differentiate objects and things, but also to discuss them in regards to
other things—whether spatially, temporally, conceptually or existentially—
then the development of the capacity for différance indicates a break away
from animalistic, sphexish indexicality. We are, in short, speaking of the
creation of syncategoremata whether linguistic or artefactual; the history
of the gramme¯ is the history of the symbolic order itself.
And so it is the case that when Prometheus (“foresight”) came down from
the heavens to gift mankind with fire in order to correct the error of his
brother Epimetheus (“hindsight”), he becomes single-handedly responsible
for the birth of the first symbolic order; this rupture is the site of the first
gramme¯, and thus the birth of différance. Having noted the polysemy of
différance (to differentiate in space; to defer in time), the birth of a symbolic
order—even one that is technical or artefactual—situates us in the temporal
realm: “Before the [Promethean] fault, nothing had happened” (Stiegler,
1998: 189). Now able to think of objects as being in time, Dasein becomes
able to project itself forwards and backwards in that time: we are able not
only to inductively extrapolate that which came before us based upon the
available evidence, but we also become able to imagine that the future, like
the past, is similarly not contingent upon our observation of it. In exhibiting
elpis, or being-toward-death, we are able to imagine a future that does not
contain us; we become aware of ourselves as mortal entities, as beings of
limited span upon the Earth (Stiegler, 1998:198).
Accordingly, Stiegler believes that anthropogeny, or the origin of mankind
(that is, the origin of technics), commences humanity’s hopeless relation-
ship to the divine: “the real issue here concerns the relation of mortals to im-
mortality” (Stiegler, 1998: 189). Unlike animals doomed to live or perish, it is
with the development of a symbolic order that we begin to understand our-
selves as mortal. For, Steigler writes, we should understand that the human
is less an animal with additional qualities than it is an immortal without the
property of immortality (Stiegler, 1998: 190). Unlike the merely perishable
creatures that comprise the natural world, human beings are not defined by
our positive qualities; instead, we are only noteworthy by virtue of the fact
that we have a relative lack of capacities and powers. Thus he argues that
whereas we might say that a lion or a crocodile or a gazelle is in some sense
an aggregate of more primeval forms, a human being is better understood
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by what it is not.15 Although this might seem bizarre, we find echoes of
it in Allen’s scholarship: whereas lions have claws, crocodiles have teeth
and gazelles have long legs, the “functionless functionality” of the human
hand—and the human body more broadly—is indicative of a kind of physi-
cal and ontological lack. Just as our tools require users in order to be made
sensical (cf.: Arnheim, 1969: 89-90), so too do our hands require prostheses.
Without natural qualities, excepting maybe a large brain and the rather
modest capacity to pinch our forefingers to our thumbs, we overcome this
qualitative vacuum bymanufacturing prosthetic qualities: “[humanity] must
invent, realize, produce qualities, and nothing indicates that, once produced,
these qualities will bring about humanity, that they will become its qualities;
for they may rather become those of technics” (Stiegler, 1998: 193-194). Ac-
cordingly, we orient ourselves and our limitations by posing the possibility
of immortality as a kind of conceptual limit; it is only in addressing our
physical and mental limitations in the face of a hostile universe that we are
able to overcome them with the aid of our artefacts. Subsequently, not only
is technology responsible for making us aware of our ontological lack (that
is: immortals without immortality; mortals without properties), it promises
to provide a means of escape from this condition that is “both forgotten and
unforgettable, since it is re-evoked and recalled antithetically by the coun-
terimage of the Immortals” (Stiegler, 1998:190). In effect, our relationship
with the technical and divine is nothing more than an admission of our own
weakness. Our prosthetics serve in the stead of natural qualities, with our
form of life “entirely made up of trepidation at the conditions of technicity
(its power, implying equally the powerlessness of mortals)” (Stiegler, 1998:
189).
Animals are perishable; humanity is mortal. There is a differ-
ence, and this difference is marked in the text by the reference
to the cult of the gods. Humanity, qua mortal, “has a share
in the portion of the gods” (Plato 1961, Protagoras, 322a). Its
mortality appears through its relation to immortals for whom
it erects temples and fashions images. It is only then (epeita)
on the basis of this partaking that it acquires “the art of emit-
ting sounds and swiftly articulating nouns” (322a). Once this
difference with beings deprived of reason or logos, aloga (un-
able to mimic immortals because not partaking of their lot) is
made, the unqualifiable race will have become logoin, logical,
endowed (but through default) with logos. To partake of the
lot of immortals means to endure one’s mortality by the fact of
being in (privative) relation with immortality. (Stiegler, 1998:
195)
15 “[Whereas] animals are positively endowed with qualities, it is tekhne¯ that forms the lot of
humans, and tekhne¯ is prosthetic; that is, it is entirely artifice. The qualities of animals make
up a sort of nature, in any case a positive gift of the gods: a predestination. The gift made to
humanity is not positive: it is there to compensate” (Stiegler, 1998: 193).
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Consequently, Stiegler argues that our prostheses should, as palliative ex-
ercises that ease the pain of being alive, also be understood as “marks of
mortality”—as reminders of not only our physical weakness but also our
ontological lack (Stiegler, 1998: 198). However, as reminders of our mor-
tality, they concern or frighten us; faced with these reminders, we do all
we can to ensure that their visibility is reduced (Stiegler, 1998: 199). And
so it is that we design better and better objects, artefacts, technologies;
we subsume working parts into sleek, oblique black boxes that work qui-
etly and efficiently without our input: “There is a teleologism in technics
linked to the principle of tendency. [. . . ] [The] technical system devel-
ops in ever-growing complication and integration; [. . . ] the phenomenon
of concretization, that is, of their tendential path [acheminement] toward
perfection” (Stiegler, 1998: 54). This seems Stiegler’s take on Heidegger’s
point in The Question Concerning Technology: although we lose something
of the world when we instrumentalise our surroundings, we do so because
of the existential tension—the Heideggerian “danger”—that occurs as we oc-
cupy the liminal space between animal perishing and the immortality of the
gods.
A metaphorical analysis indeed, as I fairly warned. However, without re-
lying too heavily upon the Derridean literature that Stiegler obviously takes
quite seriously, it seems unfair to think that Stiegler’s description of tech-
nology as a mark of mortality is without value. Indeed, I think such an
understanding quite happily complements Allen’s artefactual epistemology:
we seek superlative performances because they ease the pain of living; they
ease the pain of living because they distract us from the existential realities
of being mortal.16 Moreover, the ability to render technology invisible also
fulfils at least two of Allen’s criteria for accomplishment: appropriateness
(if an artefact is truly invisible to us, it is maximally ergonomic, affordable
and efficient) and design quality (a measure of superlativeness). However,
this complementary analysis still leaves us with one final question: if the
invisibility of technology is broadly a sign of technical accomplishment—at
least in the sense that it successfully deludes us into forgetting that we will
one day shuffle off this mortal coil—why then do we distrust the invisibil-
ity of technology, particularly the invisibility of those technologies (power
plants, air conditioning, mobile computing) that have occurred since the
advent of the Industrial Revolution?
Stiegler, quoting Simondon, notes that “culture has made itself into a sys-
tem of defense against technics, in which the defense is presented as a de-
fense of humanity, supposing that technical objects do not contain human
reality. [. . . ] If there is such a thing as the alienation of humanity (or of
culture) by technics, it is caused not by the machine but by the misunder-
standing of its nature and essence” (Simondon, 1958: 10, in Stiegler, 1998:
66). Assuming we are to follow Stiegler’s lead, it seems clear that these
16 We wish to escape the warning given in Tertullian’s Apologeticus: “Look behind you! Re-
member that you are but a man! Remember that you’ll die!” (Respice post te! Hominem te
esse memento! Memento mori!).
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intuitions are clearly the product of a cognitive error, a kind of general mis-
understanding of our terms of engagement with the world. However, it also
seems clear that it would be harmfully reductionist if we were to simply
write them off because they are mistaken; plainly there is a very specific
kind of anxiety being exhibited that deserves an equally specific response.
To this end, we have already spoken of the fact that our technology takes on
forms contingent upon the interplay between internal and external milieux:
it evolves not only due to the internal pressures of culture, but also to the
external pressures of geography and political circumstance. In a broader
evolutionary sense, this is not particularly unusual; as evolutionary biol-
ogist Stephen Jay Gould noted, biological evolution, like its technological
counterpart, is “a dialectic of inside and outside, not ecology pushing mal-
leable structures to a set of adaptive positions in a well-oiled world” (Gould,
1989, p. 30). However, what differentiates human beings from merely per-
ishable animal life is that we have the ability to completely artefactualise
our environments, as per Allen on urbanisation: “A city is an architectural
actuality, an immensely complex physical artifact, and today there is no way
out of the urban net. There is no outside. The human future is urban so far
as it can be seen at all” (Allen, 2005: 266). Although other animals may act
upon their environment in a substantive way—and thus serve to partially
constitute said environment (beaver dams, termite mounds)17—it is only hu-
man beings that can completely constitute our own environments with our
behavioural products.
What happens when there is no longer any exterior milieu as
such, so-called “physical” geography being saturated with hu-
man penetrations, that is, technical ones, and the principle re-
lations of interior to exterior milieus being mediated by a tech-
nical system having no “natural” remainder in its wake? One
wonders if the technical system, being now worldwide, does
not form a realm in which the distinction between interior and
exterior milieu, having totally altered their relations, has be-
come highly problematic, and if the technical group does not
find itself totally emancipated from the ethnic group, an archaic
remnant. (Stiegler, 1998: 64-65)
What happens, of course, is what Allen describes in Knowledge and Civ-
ilization and Ihde mentions in Technology and the Lifeworld: our artefacts
and technologies no longer interact with one another via a human agent
(the hammer hits a nail, wielded by a human arm), but interface directly
with one another. At any one time, my modest little laptop is conducting
17 “Environments cannot be conceptualised (or even operationalised) as objective places or cir-
cumstances in a world fully external to the organisms involved. First of all, environments
include all interactions with other organisms, both conspecific and belonging to different
taxa, and not just the climates, substrates and other more measurable properties of a sur-
rounding physical world. Second, and more important, [. . . ] environments are intrinsically
referential, and actively constructed by the organisms in question. Environments, in short,
are made, not found” (Gould, 2002, p. 707).
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thousands of parallel computations; my car, having detected that the am-
bient temperature is high, thoughtfully turns on the air conditioning; the
interest generated by the money in my bank account dynamically and auto-
matically fluctuates according to both bank policy and the amount of cash
contained therein. Moreover, in heaven as it is on earth: in 2012, over 60
per cent of stock trades were conducted by computer programs in what
is called algorithmic or black-box trading;18 while the methods of modern
warfare have changed irrevocably with the now-widespread practice of us-
ing semi-automated combat drones, particularly in rural and remote areas
of South Asia and the Middle East.19 Indeed, it seems clear that although it
is true that, prior to the Industrial Revolution, most technological relations
were either mediated or alterity relations as Ihde describes, the tenor and
form of contemporary technoculture guarantees that most technological re-
lations are in fact background relations of a very specific kind. That is to say:
although it is true that something that might be a background relation for
me (my relationship with the ambient air temperature) will be a mediated or
alterity relation for someone else (i.e.: an air conditioner repairman), what
Stiegler, Simondon and Allen are describing is an hitherto unencountered
technological relation: a relation that exists entirely without human media-
tion. Adding to Ihde’s taxonomy, I would call it an Epimethean relation—a
relation where the human being has been forgotten. As Stiegler writes:
“Technical evolution stems completely from its own technical object. The
human is no longer the intentional actor it this dynamic. It is its operator”
(Stiegler, 1998: 66):
technology←→ technology
This, I believe, is the political aspect of the Heideggerian suspicion of
technology. Although we may speak of the loss of being, what we are really
mourning is the loss of our own sense of agency, of having been shunted
aside by something mute and unintelligible. It is not only the world that is
disenchanted by science and technology, contra the claims of Weber, Hei-
degger and Borgmann; rather, it is our sense of our own agency, our own
capacity for intelligible action, that has been disenchanted. Driven by the
need to reduce, to render automatic our technologies, we—having been suc-
cessful thus far in our endless quest—are instead faced with the problem that
they are now too invisible; that not only is the world beyond our reach (per
Heidegger and Borgmann), but we are no longer in the driver’s seat: “In the
industrial age, the human is not the intentional origin of separate technical
individuals qua machines. It rather executes a quasi-intentionality of which
the technical object is itself the carrier” (Stiegler, 1998: 67). This is automa-
tism, the price of palliation: our lives get easier, but at the expense of the
extent of our perceived capacity for freedom. We can rely on the fact that
18 “In 2005, the average time to execute a trade on the New York Stock Exchange was 10 sec-
onds. By 2012, that time dropped to 8/10,000 of a second” (Poppick, 2013.)
19 For an interestingly Heideggerian take on the use of drone warfare, John Naughton’s piece
in The Guardian from April 2012, “Cyberwarfare takes Heidegger’s ideas to their logical end”,
is well worth a look (Naughton, 2012).
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our physical lives are made better by virtue of inhabiting our artefactualised
lifeworlds—we live longer; our food is cheap and packed with delicious sug-
ars and fats; we consume iPhones and sports cars; we can rely on the safety
nets of education and healthcare—but with all life reduced to mere zoë, we
are no longer capable of true social or political agency, of bios: “Agency
is an anxious topic [. . . ]. As the automatic machine becomes increasingly
suggestive of agency, any appearance of the automatic in human behaviour
conversely seems to suggest loss of agency. It was as though agency could
leak from bodies into machines through the circuitry by which they were
interconnected” (Goodall, 1997: 441). Although or lives are no longer soli-
tary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, the fear seems to be that we have left
the state of nature and exchanged it for an existential threat: even despite
Feenberg’s claims to the contrary in favour of the power of human agency,
we are struck with the intuition that we are painlessly and unconsciously
entering a form of servitude that must indelibly change the character of
lived experience.
However, even this fear is premised upon a more profound, distinctly
Heideggerian terror: one that not only threatens the quality of our lived
experience, but also the kind of creatures that we are and the Being that
we are afforded. Like Marcuse, Borgmann, and Stiegler, Heidegger is keenly
aware that there is a kind of tension apparent in automatising technolo-
gies that seems to denude us of agency, whether political or ontological.
Moreover, he argues in “The Age of the World Picture”—as he does later in
“The Question Concerning Technology”—that this is an inherent and inte-
gral aspect of the post-industrial era: in committing to this course of action
humanity denudes the world of its Being: there are no longer thingswith in-
trinsic qualities and functions, but rather the world is understood to be filled
with objects—entities that can only be understood with respect to human-
ity as the “relational center” (Heidegger, 1977a: 128). The world becomes
an instrument, subject to our collective will: “[A] world picture, when un-
derstood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the world
conceived and grasped as picture” (Heidegger, 1977a: 129). This process
of conceiving of the world of a picture is of absolute and profound impor-
tance in understanding that constitution of the post-industrial era and our
place within it: “the fact that the world becomes picture at all is what dis-
tinguishes the essence of the modern age” (Heidegger, 1977a: 130).
Most significantly, in making the world a picture we ascend to the cen-
tral position, having strived for domination and mastery over what is via
our technology: “that the world becomes picture is one and the same event
with the event of man’s becoming subiectum in the midst of that which is”
(Heidegger, 1977a: 132). Humanity constructs the world as an image—an im-
age that is for us, rather than for itself—and the world therefore owes itself
to us; it owes us, because we are all that sustains it. Our “share of the gods”
as Stiegler writes, referring to Plato, becomes inflated; we now approach
the world as if we were gods ourselves (Stiegler, 1998: 195). Allen’s com-
ments, quoted in chapter 2, reflect such a sensibility: “The end of human
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life is the end of the world, beyond which is—nothing. Human existence
and activity make a world where otherwise there is—nothing. Kick a stone
if you like. Slap the table if it helps. That does not prove that in the ab-
sence of human beings such a thing as a stone or a star exists” (Allen, 2005:
30). Moreover, the more that the world becomes a mere representation,
the more it can be subject to our desires, becoming entirely a world of our
making, as Borgmann so astutely observes. In the age of the world picture,
without metaphysics, without morality and without gods, we have become
self-legislating; the law of the world finds itself shunted aside in favour of
the laws we provide. As Heidegger writes in “The Question Concerning
Technology”: “Man [. . . ] exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.
In this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters
exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise to one final
delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only
himself” (Heidegger, 1977b: 27).
We have already made mention of Weber, and how the development and
application of modern technology seems to invariably lead one into disen-
chantment. Heidegger is very much touching upon a similar sentiment here;
when Weber writes that “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that
come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by
calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted” (Weber, 1991: 139),
Heidegger appears to be making the same point: that with the world ren-
dered into data, there is no longer any place for making the inexplicable ex-
plicable. Poiesis—one of the processes that constitutes Dasein—no longer oc-
curs as there is no longer any Being to bring forth. Without distance, there
is no mystery; having abandoned both nature and the gods, we also aban-
don the transformative potential of art, with art “moving into the purview
of aesthetics” (Heidegger, 1977a: 116). Even art becomes subject to the inter-
rogative gaze of scientific ontotheology, wherein scientific data is privileged
and subsequently used to explicate all other entities; artworks are no longer
understood to be things to be experienced, but objects to be dissected, spe-
ciated, judged. With the world made plastic, the quality and colour of our
experiences ignored, our “god-like” experience of the world becomes a tor-
rent of data without ontological or metaphysical content.
All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches
overnight, by plane, places which formerly took weeks and
months of travel. He now receives instant information, by ra-
dio, of events which he formerly learned about only years later,
if at all. The germination and growth of plans, which remained
hidden throughout the seasons, is now exhibited publicly in a
minute, on film. Distant sites of the most ancient cultures are
shown on film as if they stood this very moment amidst today’s
street traffic. Moreover, the film attests to which it shows by
presenting also the camera and its operators at work. The peak
of this abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached
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by television, which will soon pervade and dominate the whole
machinery of communication. (Heidegger, 1971: 165)
It is this that is the ontological aspect of the Heideggerian suspicion of
technology. If the political aspect is a fear that our technology operates in
such a fashion as to render us incapable of genuine political agency, it is it-
self premised upon the fear that, in knowing everything about the world, we
have lost touch with the sense of our own mortality; the sense of our Being
in the world. That is to say: if, as Allen argues, our technology is itself an ar-
ticulation of our knowledge, being the physical proof of that knowledge, it is
no surprise that it is via the ubiquity of technology (viz.:, the world picture)
that we find the world epistemically satisfying. The world is reduced to a
field of data that is readily parseable and transmittable by our technological
prostheses and apparatuses; a field of data that allows us to make predic-
tions about future phenomena, as well as allowing us to more ably describe
the physical qualities of the objects that surround us. However, despite
being epistemically satisfying, the world is rendered ontologically problem-
atic: with the world understood as raw physical data, there is no longer
the potential for mystery, nor for world-changing revelations or epiphanies.
We feel that the world is “dehumanised”, per the Jung quote with which we
commenced this chapter. Although we have a plethora of data and are flush
with facts, our place within that world is now uncertain. We experience a
case of phenomenological unease that the world is meaningless; we suffer
even more keenly our ontological lack (Stiegler, 1998: 190).
Curiously, this body of philosophy argues that the more we know about
the world, we less we feel that we belong to it; as Stiegler observes, the
more that we technologise our environment to alleviate the pain of our
mortality, the more we become aware that we are, in fact, merely mortal.
Our responses are those that we have articulated in this chapter: confusion,
unease, scepticism. We may know everything there is to know about the
things-in-themselves, but—given that we have lost a sense of their Being,
and concomitantly lost the sense of our own—it is unclear that we still be-
lieve in them. Allen may be correct in arguing that such an approach is an
error-laden exercise in magical thinking, but the sentiment is impossible to
ignore: there is a clear sense that this is the danger inherent to technology;
that it engenders a kind of inescapable phenomenological nihilism as we
confront a world without meaning.
4 OPEN ING THE MECHAN ICAL T URK
To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It
means putting oneself into a certain relation to the world that
feels like knowledge—and, therefore, like power. A now notori-
ous first fall into alienation, habituating people to abstract the
world into printed words, is supposed to have engendered that
surplus of Faustian energy and psychic damage needed to build
modern, inorganic societies. But print seems a less treacherous
form of leaching out the world [. . . ] than photographic images,
which now provide most of the knowledge people have about
the look of the past and the reach of the present. What is writ-
ten about a person or an event is frankly an interpretation, as
are handmade visual statements, like paintings and drawings.
Photographed images do not seem to be statements about the
world so much as pieces of it, miniatures of reality that anyone
can make or acquire. (Sontag, 2008: 4)
4.1 Dark Chambers & Chess Players
In the autumn years of the 18th century, a German-speaking Hungarian in-
ventor by the unlikely name of Johann Wolfgang Ritter von Kempelen de
Pázmánd presented his latest creation to Maria Theresa of Austria, last Em-
press of the Hapsburg dominions. The article itself was a curious thing: a
large, cumbersome object that Kempelen called the Schachtürke, or “chess
Turk”. The bulk of the artefacts consisted of a large wooden cabinet approx-
imately 110 cm long, 60 cm wide and 75 cm high, in the front of which was
set three doors, a drawer, and an opening through which one could see an in-
timidating arrangement of cogs and gears. Behind this cabinet sat a rather
tacky life-sized model of the head and torso of a swarthy, bearded, grey-
eyed male dressed in furred robes and a large turban, armed with a long
Turkish smoking pipe: the “traditional costume of an oriental sorcerer”—
an aesthetic that was at that time fashionable with the Viennese glitterati
(Standage, 2002: 22-23). In addition, and most importantly, on top of this
cabinet, rendered in ivory, was a large 50 cm x 50 cm chessboard on which
could be placed a red and ivory chess set, obtained from the drawer set into
the front.
Making its debut at Schönbrunn Palace in 1770, Kempelen began his show
by demonstrating the interior of the machine. Opening up each of the three
doors set into the front, Kempelen would allow the audience to inspect the
machine and admire the ornate network of clockwork that filled the cabinet.
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In doing so he would also open up panels set into the back of the machine, in
order that the audience be able to see through the apparatus, and thus allay
any suspicions of foul play from cynical observers. All of this was an effort
on Kempelen’s part to convince the audience that the machine in front of
them was a true automaton: no mere puppet, but a reasoning agglomerate
of cogs, chains and gears. This display having been conducted, Kempe-
len then announced that the machine was ready for a challenger (Standage,
2002: 24-27). The first person to play the Turk was the Austrian diplomat
Count Ludwig von Cobenzl, who was quickly defeated by the aggressively
playing Turk—the first of a number of other challengers that day (Standage,
2002: 30).
These victories proved the beginning of an highly successful chess career
for the mysterious automaton, though Kempelen himself only begrudgingly
maintained the apparatus due to his interest in other projects; indeed, he
was wont to refer to his invention as a “mere bagatelle”, and dismantled it
following a match with Scottish diplomat Sir Robert Murray Keith in 1780
(Standage, 2002: 36-38). However this was to be short-lived: in 1781, Kem-
pelen was ordered by Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor and son of Maria
Therese of Austria, to reassemble the device and present it at his court in
Vienna. Reluctantly agreeing to the terms, Kempelen was dismayed when
Joseph II advised him to take the Turk upon a tour of the Continent—a
recommendation he clearly did not feel in his best interests to ignore. So be-
gan a tour of Europe that lasted over a decade: Versailles, Paris (where the
Turk defeated Benjamin Franklin), London, Leipzig, Dresden, Amsterdam,
Potsdam (maybe), before finally the automaton was retired to the Schön-
brunn Palace until Kempelen’s death in 1804—whereupon it was sold off, de-
feated Napoleon Bonaparte and shipped to America and expiring in a fire at
Philadelphia’s Chinese Museum in July 1854. According to the then-owner,
Dr John Kearsley Mitchell, present at the fire, he heard “through the strug-
gling flames [. . . ] the last words of our departed friend, the sternly whis-
pered, oft repeated syllables, ‘echec! echec!!”’—French for “check, check!”
(quoted in Levitt, 2000).
A fine trick, and an even finer story—one can easily imagine the haunting
last moments of the automaton, jerked into sentience at last, bemoaning its
lack of agency as it is finally and utterly consumed by flames. Except, of
course, that the automaton was in fact no automaton at all, but rather an
elaborate puppet manned by a series of diminutive chess prodigies—known
in the literature on the device as its “operators”. Thanks to a magnetic board,
a sliding seat and a particularly cunning series of pistons and levers, the op-
erator was able not only to control the movements of the Turk’s arm, but
also keep out of sight in the event that Kempelen or any of the Turk’s sub-
sequent owners wished to show off the interior of the machine. Although
the artefact appeared to be both intelligent and intelligible—“[one] old lady,
in particular, who had not forgotten the tales she had been told in her youth
[. . . ] went and hid herself in a window seat, as distant as she could from the
evil spirit, which she firmly believed possessed the machine” (Karl Gottlieb
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von Windisch, quoted in Levitt, 2000)—its purported agency was in reality
nothing but a masquerade, an illusion promulgated by the Turk’s owner and
the small gentlemen who took up residence in its belly.
So what of the photographic image, one might reasonably ask, and what
has that to do with a racially insensitive chess-playing automaton? What
has this to do with the intuitions of which I spoke in the first chapter—the
idea that photographs have some kind of epistemic weight (either truth-
or world-bearing) by virtue of the closeness with which they cleave to the
world? As I noted, it seems natural to make these sorts of claims: when
we see events unfold on CCTV, we want to say that we know that they
occurred by virtue of the fact that they were captured. When a private eye
shows a cuckolded husband photographic evidence of his wife’s infidelity, it
seems natural to say that we now know that infidelity has taken place. This
is a powerful intuition, and seems to make a certain sort of sense given our
implicit assumptions about the indexical relationship between photographs
and the world. However, the intuition also seems prima facie incompati-
ble with Allen’s performative epistemology for which I argued in chapter
2; unlike the making of a table—an action which requires a kind of spe-
cialised, intentional performance—the taking of a photograph requires no
such specialised knowledge. The taking of a photograph need not require
any technical ability or coherent understanding of the relevant parts on the
part of the photographer. Unless one is a specialist or a technician, the
camera is a kind of black box: although we provide the inputs (framing the
image, pressing the button) and can predict the outputs (an image of that
which has been framed), using an operationally simple camera in the right
way requires no special abilities or powerful insight; it is an easy example
of what Allen would call “mere habit”. However, it occurs to me that at least
in some respects the camera is rather like the Mechanical Turk. This might
seem an odd observation to make, but I do not believe the differences to be
superficial. The camera, like the Turk, is a device for which its power seems
contingent upon the degree to which it is independent of human agency:
the Turk is amazing because it appears to think under its own power; the
camera appears to do the same when it captures the world. However, I ar-
gue, appearances are misleading in both cases: just as the Turk is in fact
inhabited by a diminutive chess prodigy, so too is the creation of the pho-
tographic image far more contingent upon intention and circumstance than
much current scholarship in analytic philosophy of film and photography
appears to suggest.
So: it seems true that we afford a certain kind of epistemic privilege to
the photographic image; we automatically expect the contents of the im-
age to be in some sense the case. This is a well-documented phenomenon;
psychologists have long been aware of the collective propensity to privilege
images over text, a bias dubbed the “picture superiority effect”. Although
the exact mechanisms of this bias are uncertain, it is “well known that pic-
tures are typically remembered better than words”; human beings are more
inclined to experientially remember events or individual objects if said they
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Figure 10: “The Turk,” engraving in Ueber den schachspieler des herrn von Kempe-
len und dessen nachbildung, Racknitz, 1789
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are presented pictorially instead of verbally (Curran and Doyle, 2011). We
might legitimately argue that the particular power that photographs wield
is a radicalisation of this bias, premised upon their ostensive closeness with
the world.1
For his part, Ihde has proposed that, whatever cognitive biases are at play,
it is the development of what he calls “visualism” within scientific prac-
tice that has served to bolster the assumptions of propositional accounts of
knowledge. As he notes in 2002’s Bodies in Technology, there has been a
collapse of scientific knowledge into the domain of the visual; a “cultural
habit [that] has been accelerated in late modernity through the sophisti-
cated development of imaging technologies, which now transforms ranges
of phenomena that include, but also exceed, all human perceptual capacities
and translate these phenomena into visual form” (Ihde, 2002: 37).2 Ihde iden-
tifies a clear cultural bias privileging images over information contained in
other kinds of sense data; although this bias is less evident in “softer” sci-
ences (palaeontology, for instance), in physics and astronomy—the sciences
that are “favoured” (Ihde, 2002: 57) by virtue of the fact that they have taken
“dominant place in the interests of philosophers of science” (Ihde, 2002: 54)—
the visual has been prioritised because imaging technologies easily afford
us access to information which would otherwise be beyond our grasp (as in
the cases of telescopy, spectrography, infrared technology, microscopy, false
colour rendering, etcetera). Whereas earlier scientific praxis gave greater
emphasis to what he calls the “plenary gestalt” of sense data: “descriptive
anatomy at the time [c. 1500] was often in tactile and olfactory terms that
referred to how an organ felt (hard, soft, pliant, etc.) or smelled (putrid,
metallic, etc.)” (Ihde, 2002: 41-42), it was, Ihde claims, with the telescopes of
Galileo and Leonardo da Vinci’s anatomical drawings that scientific knowl-
edge began to take upon its contemporary visualist character.3
Ihde is, as you might expect, critical of this kind of thoughtless visual-
ism, identifying this perceptual bias with what Husserl in “Origin of Geom-
etry” called the forgetfulness of science—a kind of dispositional tendency
against the whole-body perception of the plenary gestalt; this forgetfulness
led Husserl to claim that “the primary and plenary perception of the life-
world was far from the abstractness of science” (Ihde, 2002: 54). However,
Ihde claims, this “abstractness” was not solely relegated to the realm of sci-
entific inquiry during the Renaissance, but was rather a product of a broader
1 For further information, please see Nelson, Reed, and Walling, 1976; Paivio, 1986; McBride
and Dosher, 2002; Hamilton and Geraci, 2006; Mintzer and Snodgrass, 1999. Please note that
this is but a small selection of the literature on the subject, but it may be of use.
2 Cf.: the image of the steam train made by infrared camera in chapter 2.
3 “Long before Vesalius developed his explicit anatomy, da Vinci had already taken the task
of analytically and descriptively showing interiors of the human body in visual form. His
exploded diagram drawings of a fetus, musculature and internal organs, etc., all anticipated
later scientific anatomies. Leonardo’s engineering vision of the three-dimensional exploded
diagram, still strikingly modern, was a universal vision for human and applied equally to
corpses and machines. His imaginative (and usually unworkable) technologies of pumps,
flying machines, and war machines were, like the fetuses and muscles, stylistically the same
as analytical-Euclidian exploded diagrams” (Ihde, 2002: 55).
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Figure 11: Diagram of a camera obscura
“Renaissance celebration of the visual” (Ihde, 2002: 54)—a celebration not re-
stricted to the sciences of physics and astronomy, but also being very much
present in the magisteria of art and philosophy, as exemplified in the tech-
nology of the camera obscura.
When the images of illuminated bodies pass through a small
round hole into a very dark room, if you receive them on a piece
of white paper placed vertically in the room at some distance
from the aperture, you will see on the paper on those bodies
in their natural shapes and colors, but they will appear upside
down and smaller. [. . . The] same happens inside the pupil of
the eye. (Leonardo da Vinci, quoted in Ihde, 2002: 72)
The camera obscura proved a powerful epistemic metaphor for artists,
philosophers and scientists during the Renaissance, with received wisdom
suggesting that the artefacts readily struck early thinkers with the unmis-
takable similarities between the camera obscura and the human eye, and
that both medieval Islamic and Christian philosophers and natural scien-
tists came to similar conclusions on the subject (Wade and Finger, 2001:
1159, Ihde, 2000: 21, Ihde, 2002: 71-75 and Ihde and Selinger, 2004: 365).4
“Rediscovered” by Leon Battista Alberti in 1450 to produce “wonderful pic-
tures of great verisimilitude” (cited in Ihde, 2002: 71), the camera obscura,
unlike the practice of, say, painting from a live model, means that one of the
“two matrices for subjectivity” (Ihde, 2002: 43) has been surpassed. Whereas
accurate depictions of a subject—say, da Vinci’s anatomical drawings—were
4 Of course, the camera obscura massively predates the development of scientific visualism,
with the earliest surviving mention of pinhole cameras being in the work of the 5th century
bce Chinese philosopher Mozi (Oullette, 2005: 52), as well as textual evidence that the Greeks
were in possession of the technology by the 4th century bce (Campbell, 2005: 114), per the
Problemata of Pseudo-Aristotle.
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previously contingent upon not only a kind of skilled reproduction (the act
of drawing, painting, sculpting, whatever), but also a kind of skilled seeing,
the ability to see objects as they are in order to reproduce them (a p+, or
superlative artifactual performance, in the Allenian sense). However, arte-
facts like the camera obscura—and I include technologies like telescopes
and microscopes in this category—being an hermeneutic technology per
the Ihdean schematic outlined in chapter 3.3, removed this requirement
for skilled seeing. Instead, we discover a kind of seeing that reduces the
viewed object to an isomorphic and fixed image that can be more readily
recorded; the world projected on tracing paper. Accordingly, in the camera
obscura we find the birth of a kind of visualist automatism; a kind of image
creation not subject—or at least less subject—to the performative vagaries
of human action.
It is for this reason that Ihde claims that the camera obscura had what
he calls a “paradigmatic role” in early modernity (Ihde, 2002: 71), particu-
larly as it served to inform the epistemic positions of two of early modern
philosophy’s leading lights: René Descartes and John Locke. Descartes, in
La Dioptrique (and echoing da Vinci), writes that the camera obscura is in
fact a perfect analogue for the human eye, with “the room [representing]
the eye, the hole the pupil; the lens, the crystalline humor—or rather, all the
refracting parts of the eye; and the cloth, the lining membrane, composed
of the optic nerve-endings” (Descartes in Ihde, 2002: 72). This, as Lee Bailey
points out, is the beginning of a specific epistemic disposition, characteristic
of early modern epistemology, that assumes that the camera/eye is the point
of contact between the res cogitans (“mental substance”) that constitutes in-
ternal processes and the res extensa (“corporeal substance”) that constitutes
the material world: “The camera obscura began as an experimental model
for the eye and became a ruling metaphor for the mind. [. . . The] image of
skull’s darkroom shifted from a suggestive experimental analogy to a con-
cealed methodological paradigm” (Bailey, 1989: 64, emphasis mine). It is in
this shift to what Daniel Dennett derisively called the “Cartesian Theater”
(Dennett, 1991: 107), replete with the dualist distinction between observing
subject and bodily vessel, that we find the origins of an epistemic model that
allows for no direct access to the world, but rather only a representational
access by way of the images delivered via the seeing apparatus. Thus the
beginnings of the Cartesian program: in claiming that our understanding of
the world outside of our senses is only ever via the hollow and unreliable
impressions of our sense data, he comes to the unpalatable conclusion that
engenders his position of maximal doubt.
In Locke this epistemic disposition is if anything even more explicit, ar-
guing that our eyes and perceptual faculties are meaningfully like “the win-
dows by which light is let into this dark room: for methinks the understand-
ing is not much unlike a closet shut from light, with only some little open-
ing left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without
[. . . these] resemble the understanding of a man, in refer to all the objects
of sight and the ideas of them” (Locke, 1976 in Ihde and Selinger, 2004: 365).
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Our minds—the tabulae rasae—are meaningfully like the white sheet of the
camera obscura: a white screen upon which representations of the world
are cast. Meanwhile, the modern subject, like a person trapped inside a cin-
ema, can only be aware of the external world by virtue of the images cast
upon the white screen by the camera obscura of our senses: “Herein lies the
‘invention’ of the modern subject or cogito” (Ihde, 2002: 73). Direct access
to the world is a mere conceit; all we can ever know is the image.
Here we have the birth of early modern epistemology: “reality”
is “external”, knowledge is “represented” and “internal”, and
“objective truth” has to be a “correspondence” between the ob-
ject and its representation. But with this model of knowledge
comes the problem of the inner homunculus or “subject”, the
self trapped inside the camera, and the need for an ideal ob-
server who sees both what goes on inside and outside at the
same time and is thus able to tell whether the object and its rep-
resentation correspond. Such is the epistemology produced by
the engine of the camera obscura. (Ihde, 2000: 21)
These assumptions, Ihde argues, have indelibly shaped the form of West-
ern epistemology by virtue of the fact that the camera obscura is the superla-
tive example of something that he calls an “epistemology engine”—that is,
a technology that provides a model for knowledge creation. That is to say,
Ihde argues that the camera obscura provides a measure by which we can
talk about the creation of knowledge in a general sense: as the camera ob-
scura is analogous with the eye (per da Vinci, Descartes, Locke), so too is
the process by which the image is rendered understood as a kind of ana-
logue of the subjective ego. Moreover, although one could argue that all
technological artefacts are epistemology engines of a kind in that certain
kinds of scientific knowledge would not become clear without the aid of a
concomitant artefact (in the case of the steam engine, it was entropy and
the second law of thermodynamics),5 artefacts such as the steam engine are
but imperfect or incomplete epistemology engines, for they only have epis-
temic ramifications within a given set of quite narrow boundary conditions.
Meanwhile, the camera obscura serves as the epistemology engine par ex-
cellence, because unlike those other examples it provides fodder for more
comprehensive and general epistemic models.
As the epistemology engine of choice, the camera obscura appeals to us
because of its purported accuracy. It, like the human eye, can capture some-
thing of the world in an important way, but it does so without the risk
of distorting any informational content due to the presence of a prevail-
ing ego: unlike a human being, the camera obscura cannot get upset; it
cannot miss things out of tiredness or carelessness; it cannot suffer per-
ceptual impairment due to drugs or alcohol. If the eye is assumed to the
5 “[T]he genesis of conceptual ideas from praxis [. . . ]. [Praxis], far from being inherently
antithetical to theory, is capable of inspiring the shape that theoretical concepts will come
to assume” (Ihde and Selinger, 2004: 363)
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knowledge-producing because it captures the world, then the camera ob-
scura is maximally knowledge-producing, by virtue of providing us with
ostensibly impersonal, accurate raw data from which we are able to render
knowledge claims—data, moreover, that need not be filtered through our
unreliable perceptual and cognitive apparatuses. It is supposedly not only
capable of seeing, but a kind of ideal seeing—a seeing that, mutely and with-
out judgement, accurately captures the facts.
The sensitive photographic film is the true retina of the scien-
tist [. . . ] for it possesses all the properties which Science could
want: it faithfully preserves the images which depict them-
selves upon it, and it reproduces and multiplies them indefi-
nitely upon request; in the radiative spectrum it covers a range
more than double that which the eye can perceive and soon per-
haps will cover it all finally, it takes advantage of that admirable
property which allows the accumulation of events, and whereas
our retina erase all impressions more than a tenth of a second
old, the photographic retina preserves them and accumulates
them over a practically limitless time. (P. J. C. Janssen, 1888, in
Ihde, 2002: 44)
However, is it appropriate for us to accept these claims uncritically? Cer-
tainly, Ihde is dubious of these sentiments, though his rejoinder strikes me
as a touch glib: he would like to know where this epistemic subject, this
cogito, makes its home. Finding no suitable candidate, he simply appeals to
his Merleau-Pontian intuitions: “Truth does not ‘inhabit the inner man,’ or,
more accurately, there is no inner man, man is in the world, and only in
the world does he know himself” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, in Ihde, 2002: 74).
However, despite his suspicions, he does not actively interrogate the extent
to which photographs are or are not truth- or world-bearing; although it
may be appropriate to reject a “camera obscura epistemology” for whatever
reasons, it is not appropriate to accept the “truth-bearingness” or “world-
bearingness” of photographs. Although I too have sympathies in a Merleau-
Pontian direction, I do not think Ihde’s invocation of Merleau-Ponty is a
sufficient disavowal of this position; as I will demonstrate in the follow-
ing sections, not only should we reject the assumption that photographs
are knowledge-producing or naïvely world-bearing on phenomenological
grounds, we should also do so on epistemic and ontological grounds. As we
established in chapter 2.4, assuming too much of the relationship between
our artefacts and the world is extremely problematic: rather than being log-
ically supervenient upon the world they are in fact naturally supervenient;
being trapped in an asymmetrical relationship, the forms of our artefacts
are not dictated by the base conditions, but instead require some additional
facts to account for them being the case—in this instance, meaningful, in-
tentional human agency.
So how to begin interrogating these visualist assumptions of photographic
technology? It seems prudent to begin at the beginning, at least insofar as
4.2 looking through a glass, darkly 106
these sentiments made themselves known in analytic philosophy of pho-
tography. Although I have clear reservations about the accuracy of these
position, it nonetheless behoves us to examine them in order to see not only
where the error lies, but also to ascertain what content may be repurposed.
4.2 Looking Through a Glass, Darkly
The sentiment that photographs are representative of or otherwise exam-
ples of a kind of automated, more true, seeing percolated, via Cavell’s 1971
TheWorld Viewed, into the earliest pieces of literature within analytic philos-
ophy of photography: “We might say: A painting is a world; a photograph
is of the world” (Cavell, 1979: 24). Immediately apparent, even in this first,
gentle attempt to usher photography and cinema into the purview of ana-
lytic philosophy, we find an obvious concern with the presumed relation-
ship between a photograph and its subject: “So far as photography satisfied
a wish, it satisfied [. . . ] the human wish, intensifying since the Reformation,
to escape subjectivity and metaphysical isolation—a wish for the power to
reach this world, having for so long tried, at last hopelessly, to manifest fi-
delity to another” (Cavell, 1979: 21). As Joel Snyder and Neil Walsh Allen,
quoting Arnheim, note: photographs suffer from the “same deficiencies that
‘physical reality’ or ‘the world’ itself does”, in that photographs—like the
world—lack the “‘formal precision’ and ‘expressive freedom’ which the ‘pri-
vate visions’ of the painter possess” (Snyder and Allen, 1975: 147). The pho-
tograph is deficient because it is tied to the world in a way that paintings
are not; the content of a photograph is contingent upon the world being a
certain way, having been captured by a process that is beyond our direct
mediation.
The intuition seems clear: that, due to the means by which photographic
images are produced, the photographic image is far closer to the world than
the products of other arts; by virtue of the automatism inherent in pho-
tographic production, we are ostensibly able to remove “the human agent
from the act of reproduction” (Cavell, 1979: 23). The photograph is seem-
ingly understood as an ahistorical artefact that somehow captures an aspect
of the world; it has “an authenticity from which painting is barred from
birth”, allowing us to take “a vacation from artifice” (Arnheim, 1974: 154,
157).6 Although this may seem a naïve view—indeed, though the facts of
the matter are likely otherwise—this question of automatism and produc-
tion has framed much of the subsequent literature in analytic philosophy of
photography. Accordingly, this section is my attempt to explore some of the
6 Thus Bazin’s statement to the effect in “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”: “No
matter how skillful the painter, his work was always in fee to an inescapable subjectivity.
The fact that a human hand intervened cast a shadow of doubt over the image. Again,
the essential factor in the transition from the baroque to photography is not the perfecting
of a physical process [. . . ]; rather does it lie in a psychological fact, to wit, in completely
satisfying our appetite for illusion by a mechanical reproduction in the making of which
man plays no part” (Bazin and Gray, 1960: 7).
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intuitions that photographs, per Bazin, have a privileged relationship with
the world:
The aesthetic properties of photography are to be sought in its
power to lay bare the realities. [. . . ] Only the impassive lens,
stripping its object of all those ways of seeing it, those piled-
up preconceptions, that spiritual dust and grime with which
my eyes have covered it, are able to present it in all its virginal
purity to my attention and consequently to my love. (Bazin and
Gray, 1960: 8)
Roger Scruton, in his “Photography and Representation”, makes his an-
tipathy to photography quite clear from the outset. Although one might
imagine that this argument stems from a sense of moral outrage—perhaps
an assumption that photography, being something of a parvenu compared
to more traditional visual media such painting, sculpture or theatre, has
no business positioning itself amongst the creative canon—Scruton’s argu-
ment is less axiological than it is categorical: due to the conditions under
which photographs are made, he argues that they are inherently precluded
from consideration as examples of an art form. Although this might sound
perverse—after all, it is common practice to refer to photography as being
capable of consideration as “fine art”, just as photography finds itself no
longer confined to the purgatory of specialist galleries (Costello and Iver-
son, 2012: 679)—his argument rests upon an analysis of representation and
intention in photography contra the more traditional arts.
It seems natural to say that a painting is an intentional product—referring
back to chapter 2.1, regardless of whether the activity of painting is under-
taken in the spirit of the workmanship of certainty or the workmanship of
risk, there is a clear intentional relationship between the person holding
the brush and the canvas sitting on the easel; an embodiment relation with
the enigma position planted between the person and the brush which, per
Ihde’s schema in chapter 3.3, may be rendered:
(I-brush)→ painting
It also seems natural to claim that there is a second intentional relationship
in which the first relation is nested, describing the relationship between the
ego, the painting and the subject of the painting, in that the subject of the
painting bears relevantly upon its contents in some capacity:
(I-painting)→ subject
The first mediated relationship, you will notice, has been collapsed into the
enigma position in my second formulation, thus describing more broadly
the opaque relationship between self and artwork in art practice. You will
also notice that this broader description poses a new embodiment relation
between the “I-painting” (that is to say, the representation), and the “subject”
(that which is being represented). Although a painting is a representation in
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that it is of something, “it does not follow that the subject exists nor, if it
does exist, that the painting represents the subject as it is” (Scruton, 1981:
579). There is a clear intentional relationship between the “I-painting” and
the subject in that the “I-painting” unit chooses the means of representa-
tion; in order to accurately describe or characterise the relation between a
painting and its subject, Scruton argues that a clear picture of artistic inten-
tion is necessary in order to do so accurately. Furthermore, the realisation
of said intention is contingent upon the painting being the product of the
right kind of artefactual performance (per Allen in chapter 2) in that it has,
at the very least, satisfied the relevant success conditions (kp): “successful
realization of [. . . ] intention lies in the creation of an appearance, an ap-
pearance which in some way leads the spectator to recognize the subject”
(Scruton, 1981: 579). Accordingly, we may unpack the nested relationship:
[(I-brush)→ painting]→ subject
However, so Scruton argues, this intentional relationship does not hold
in the case of photography: “The ideal photograph also stands in a certain
relation to a subject: a photograph is of something. But the relationship is
here causal and not intentional” (Scruton, 1981: 579). That is to say, whereas
a painting is of a subject, that subject (say, a unicorn) need not exist—or,
conversely, even if the subject does exist, it may represent it in a manner
that fulfils few veridicality requirements—the contents of a photograph are
entirely more restricted. If someone takes a photograph, x, of me, just by
looking at the photograph one is able to say that there exists a particular
man, Ryan Wittingslow, of whom x is the photograph. Although there is,
at least in most cases, an intentional relationship between a person and a
photograph—at least in the sense that a person is casually responsible for
its creation, per the embodiment relationship denoted below—there is no
such intentional relationship between the contents of the photograph and
its subject; instead, the relationship between the two, Scruton argues, is
purely causal.
(I-camera)→ photograph
Not being intentional, it is not a representation of the subject in that the
outcome is not reliant upon the “(I-camera) → photograph” embodiment
relation adequately observing the success criteria; indeed, the fact that the
relationship is purportedly causal rather than intentional seems to preclude
the possibility of “photograph—subject” being considered an embodiment
relationship at all. In other words, although the actual act of taking a photo-
graph is an embodiment relation—”(I-camera)→ photograph”—the relation-
ship between photograph and subject is better described as an hermeneutic
relation with the photograph, like the infrared camera mentioned in chap-
ter 2, reading the world via an automatic process and then providing an
ostensibly maximally veridical translation of the data.
I→ (photograph-subject)
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Moreover, if we are to expand this assessment to include the embodiment
relation, we notice that there are two enigma positions instead of one. Due
to the the eerily close relationship between photograph and the subject it
captures, we cannot nest the first relation within the second, as in the case
of painting. Rather, the two enigma positions emerge simultaneously, each
at either end of the technological relation:
(I-camera)→ (photograph-subject)
Imagine that you are in possession of two images of a very close friend,
one a photograph and the other a painting. It is due to the differing inten-
tional relations that hold between painting and photograph production that
Scruton believes it natural for me to say of the painting that you “see what
it represents”, but that you “do not take it for what it represents” (Scruton,
1981: 580). You might observe that the painting is a rather good one, and
that it captures your friend’s likeness in some important way: their smile,
or their knock-kneed stature, or perhaps something more ineffable entirely.
Or conversely, if the painting is a poor likeness, you might instead find your-
self mistaking it for someone or something else entirely: your father, a small
dog, a bag of cornstarch. In either case, Scruton argues, when you parse the
contents of a painting, there are three objects of interest worth observing:
1. The intentional object: what you perceive the painting to represent,
whether friend, father or cornstarch;
2. The represented object: your friend, as broadly dictated by artistic
intention;
3. The material object: the painting itself.
However, Scruton argues, one does not undergo the same process when
looking at the photograph of your friend. The photograph, being, as Ihde
would describe, the product of some kind of hermeneutic relation, is not ref-
erenced in the same way. One does not say of a photograph that it is a “good
representation” for it is not a representation at all. Instead, if someone were
to come to you and inquire about the photograph in your possession, you
would not say “This is a photograph of my friend”; instead, you would likely
say something like, “This is my friend”. Unlike in the case of the painting,
the process of production and the kind of relationship photographs are pre-
sumed to have with the world introduces a kind of terminological slippage.
In comparison with your reaction to the painting, you actually (correctly or
not) take the photograph for what it represents. The photo is, Scruton argues,
what is the case: “It is recognized at once for what it is—not as an interpre-
tation of reality but as a presentation of how something looked. In some
sense looking at a photograph is a substitute for looking at the thing itself”
(Scruton, 1981: 588).
The photograph for Scruton is then rendered, in some important and mys-
terious respect, a transparent technology. Despite our protestations to the
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contrary, Scruton argues that photographs are precluded from the possibil-
ity of having an inherent content of their own, for they are entirely consti-
tuted by the image captured by automatism. He writes: “Of course I may
take a photograph of a draped nude and call it Venus, but insofar as this
can be understood as an exercise in fiction, it should not be thought of as
a photographic representation of Venus but rather as the photograph of a
representation of Venus” (Scruton, 1981: 588). The photograph is not inten-
tional and can have no intentional content, even though the same is not
true of that which is being photographed. A photograph x of a painting y
in a certain aspect z is only important insofar as the image contains y, with
y entirely constituting not only the intentional content, but also the degree
to which a photograph is beautiful or ugly: “if one finds a photograph beau-
tiful, it is because one finds something beautiful in its subject. A painting
may be beautiful, on the other hand, even when it represents an ugly thing”
(Scruton, 1981: 590). A film is no different, in Scruton’s eyes: the value of
a film is only that inherent in the performances of the actors; a film is lit-
tle more than a play filmed and projected in light (Scruton, 1981: 599). To
exhibit aesthetic interest in a photograph, he argues, is to exhibit interest
in its contents; our interest in a photograph or a film is entirely contingent
upon what is presented to us.
Although his position on the art-status and aesthetics of photographs and
films are well beyond the purview of this analysis, the ontological and epis-
temic ramifications of these claims are nonetheless of clear interest. Namely,
if Scruton is correct in claiming that photography is a transparent technol-
ogy without a clear concept of content, then it also seems natural to say
that photographs are ontologically distinct from the world only in the sense
that a photograph can only capture the world at a certain time, in a cer-
tain place; otherwise, the photograph is defined by its sense of absence due
to its keen receptivity to the facts of the matter—i.e.: what is occurring in
front of the camera lens. This intuition certainly seems to be what Cavell
is invoking when, in The World Viewed, he writes that “photography is of
the world”—unlike the richly textured Alice universes of painting and sculp-
ture, a photograph is something like a very small window pointing to spe-
cific spatio-temporal coordinates somewhere on the broad map of existence;
a “mirror with a memory” (Oliver Wendell Holmes in Scruton, 1981: 596).
Moreover, in making this assumption that the photograph is transparent to
that small window to the universe, we might also reasonably expect that,
in having no content of its own, the photograph is of primarily epistemic
value: being ostensibly true to the facts of the matter, photography allows
us in some sense to see the world as it is, untainted by our perceptual con-
tingencies.
This assumption, however, is incorrect. Despite the fact that Scruton
appears ready to endorse some kind of thesis that photography is in a
sense “truthful”, the fact that we are so easily fooled by the contents of
photographs or films ostensibly precludes the possibility of that being the
case. Paintings, sculptures, literature and the other representative arts are
4.2 looking through a glass, darkly 111
of pedagogical or epistemic value by virtue of the fact that they do not
merely gratify our venal fantasies; in order to understand them properly,
we are forced into having the right kind of engagement lest our analyses of
the aesthetic truths contained therein be compromised. Furthermore, Scru-
ton argues that, even if we were able to ward off the seductive aspects of
the indexical image, the photograph is itself an imperfect truth detector;
although it may artlessly capture the world, it does so in a way wherein
the output is necessarily distorted by virtue of the fact it is incomplete; it
“remains inescapably wedded to the creation of illusions, to the creation of
lifelike semblances of things in the world” (Scruton, 1981: 602). However,
even though they are imperfect truth detectors, their presumed indexical-
ity with the world—the fact that photographs and films present themselves
as real—means that we consume them as if the illusions contained therein
are indeed the fact of the matter; according to Scruton, we lack sufficient
intellectual distance to judge photographs for what they are: inert and id-
iotic aspects of the real, containing only the merest illusion of substantive
content.
[We] are lulled into an acceptance of their reality and persuaded
to overlook all that is banal, grotesque and vulgar in the situa-
tions that they represent. The cinema has proved too persua-
sive at the level of mere realization and so has little motive
to explore the seriousness of its subject. It is entirely beguil-
ing in its immediacy, so that even serious critics of literature
can be duped into thinking that a film like Sunset Boulevard ex-
presses an aesthetic idea, instead of simply preying upon the
stereotyped fantasies of its audience. [. . . Photography] there-
fore gratifies the fantasy of desire long before it has succeeded
in understanding or expressing the fact of it. The medium of
photography, one might say, is inherently pornographic. (Scru-
ton, 1981: 602-603).
Uncharitable though this sentiment is, Scruton’s analysis is helpful be-
cause it prefigures much of the subsequent analytic literature regarding the
ontology of the photographic image. It certainly seems to have been in-
strumental for Kendall Walton in his 1984 paper “Transparent Pictures”—
Walton clearly inherits from Scruton the intuition that photographs exhibit
a kind of transparency to the world. He begins his paper with André Bazin’s
famous and much-misunderstood quote from “The Ontology of the Pho-
tographic Image”: “The photographic image is the thing in itself” (Bazin,
quoted in Walton, 1984: 246). Although Walton clearly does not take Bazin
at face value on this point—it would be absurd, he rightly claims, to think
that a photograph of a thing is literally the thing being photographed—that
a photograph of x is itself x (Walton, 1984: 249), he does endorse a related
position. He claims that photographs are best understood as aids to vision in
the same way that a mirror or a telescope is an aid to vision: periscopic mir-
rors can allow us to see things outside our embodied perceptual field, and
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telescopes allow us to see things very far away. In this vein, photographs
too allow for different ways of seeing; just as the technical apparatuses that
constitute telescopes, microscopes and periscopes work in such a way as to
allow us to exceed our physical limitations, cameras—by virtue of the mech-
anistic means by which they inscribe visual data—grant us a different kind
of ability: a form of seeing through time. “With the assistance of the cam-
era, we can see not only around corners and what is distant or small; we
can also see into the past. We see long deceased ancestors when we look
at dusty snapshots of them. [. . . ] Photographs are transparent. We can see
the world through them” (Walton, 1984: 251). It is worth quoting Walton at
length on this point:
I must warn against watering down this suggestion, against tak-
ing it to be a colorful, or exaggerated, or not quite literal way
of making a relatively mundane point. I am not saying that the
person looking at the dusty photographs has the impression of
seeing his ancestors—in fact, he doesn’t have the impression of
seeing them “in the flesh,” with the unaided eye. I am not saying
that photography supplements vision by helping us to discover
things that we can’t discover by seeing. Painted portraits and
linguistic reports also supplement vision in this way. Nor is my
point that what we see—photographs—are duplicates or doubles
or reproductions of objects, or substitutes or surrogates for them.
My claim is that we see, quite literally, our dead relatives them-
selves when we look at photographs of them.
Does this constitute an extension of the ordinary English sense
of the word “see”? I don’t know; the evidence is mixed. But if
it is an extension, it is a very natural one. Our theory needs, in
any case, a term which applies both to my “seeing” my great-
grandfather when I look at his snapshot and to my seeing my
father when he is in front of me. What is important is that we
recognize a fundamental commonality between the two cases,
a single natural kind to which both belong. We could say that I
perceive my great-grandfather but do not see him, recognizing
a mode of perception (“seeing-through-photographs”) distinct
from vision—if the idea that I do perceive my great-grandfather
is taken seriously. Or one might make the point in some other
way. I prefer the bold formulation: the viewer of a photograph
sees, literally, the scene that was photographed. (Walton, 1984:
251-252)
This has clear links with both Scruton’s and Bazin’s formulations of the
photographic image. Although he wants to avoid collapsing the photograph
with the thing of which it is an image, Walton seems quite happy to claim,
like Scruton, that the contents of the photograph have an identity with the
thing photographed. Although the photograph of your dead grandfather—
that is, the physical object on which the image is inscribed—is not liter-
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ally your grandfather, per Bazin’s rather bizarre identity claim, you do lit-
erally see your grandfather when you examine the photograph qua image,
as opposed to qua object. Indeed, in a nice reflection upon some of the
(post-)Heideggerian material we covered in prior chapters, his argument in
favour of this characterisation has a distinctly phenomenological flavour:
just as we would probably not dispute that we literally see the objects in
experience even when we are viewing them through spectacles, mirrors or
a closed-circuit television, Walton thinks it is nonsensical to pose a category
distinction simply because the photographic image has been inscribed upon
a piece of paper or a silver screen: “To think of the camera as another tool
of vision is to de-emphasise its role in producing pictures. Photographs are
pictures, to be sure, but not ordinary ones. They are pictures through which
we see the world” (Walton, 1984: 252). Of course, the mode of seeing may
be mediated or indirect, but so too is it mediated or indirect when we look
at live CCTV footage or through the lens of a periscope; it is still, Walton
would have us believe, a kind of seeing (Walton, 1984: 253). In short, he repli-
cates Scruton’s assumptions about the phenomenological and technological
relations that exist between the constituent parts:
(I-camera)→ (photograph-subject)
However, Walton’s analysis differs from Scruton’s in one important re-
spect: although he generally endorses Scruton’s transparency thesis, he
does not endorse the corollaries that Scruton argues emerge from that posi-
tion, particularly those regarding the impossibility of photographic content.
Whereas Scruton seems content to think that saying “That is a photograph
of Venus” in response to a photograph of someone providing a represen-
tation of Venus is the product of some kind of cognitive error or a victim
of terminological slippage, Walton attempts to draw a substantive distinc-
tion between what he calls “really seeing” versus “fictionally seeing”. In the
case of the photograph of the representation of Venus, Walton would de-
scribe the statement “That is a photograph of Venus” as being symptomatic
of the fictional kind of seeing—the same kind of seeing that allows you to,
upon seeing a photo of your friend x, say “That is x”. What you really see,
of course, is (as Scruton argues) the representation of Venus through the
transparent technology of the photograph: “We have now uncovered a ma-
jor source of the confusion which infects writings about photography and
film: failure to recognize and distinguish clearly between the special kind of
seeing which only fictionally takes place [. . . ]. A vague awareness of both,
stirred together in a witches’ cauldron, could conceivably tempt one toward
the absurdity that the viewer is really in the presence of the object” (Walton,
1984: 254).
Perhaps the best articulation of Walton’s position is his analysis of Chuck
Close’s 1968 Self-Portrait (figure 12). Here Walton makes the observation
that if the power of photographs relied upon how they looked—that is to say,
upon how well they observe and subsequently cleave to given veridicality
requirements—then we would probably want to say that because a photo-
realistic painting like Self-Portrait is equally as veridical as a photograph it
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Figure 12: Chuck Close, Self-Portrait, acrylic on canvas, 1968
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is also without content; a mere formal container for the thing that is being
shown (in this case, Chuck Close). I believe Walton is correct here when he
says that this is a clear misunderstanding of the state of affairs; rather than
simply being more accurate things that are nonetheless of the same type
as paintings, Walton argues that photographs are actually categorically dis-
tinct entities. Consider: cases like Self-Portrait discomfort and unsettle us
because we at first presume that the image is a photograph, and it is not un-
til we read the wall-text—”acrylic on canvas”—do we realise that it is not in
fact the case. Although we may admire Close’s artfulness, the uncanniness
of the image presents a kind of ontological dissonance—like mistaking a
stranger for a close friend, or stumbling into a department store mannequin
and apologising for stepping on its toes. Walton writes: “The discovery jolts
us. Our experience of the picture and our attitude toward it undergo a pro-
found transformation, one which is much deeper and more significant than
the change which occurs when we discover that what we first took to be an
etching, for example, is actually a pen-and-ink drawing” (Walton, 1984: 255).
The implication seems to be that a discovery of this type is an different kind
of experience because the object itself is far more the image produced by a
microscope than it is a painting. So, a problem emerges: photographic tech-
nologies need not produce veridically maximal images, yet they are to be
considered of a kind with technologies that we traditionally consider to be
veridically maximal: telescopes, microscopes, whatever. This seems prima
facie problematic; it seems fair to think that a form of seeing should have
a less inscrutable relationship with the world. It is uncertain how Scruton
would respond to these claims, but Walton is unfazed: “But why should this
matter? We can be deceived when we see things directly. If cameras can
lie, so can our eyes. To see something through a distorting mirror is still to
see it, even if we are misled about it. [. . . ] The ‘distortions’ or ‘inaccuracies’
of photographs are no reason to deny that we see through them” (Walton,
1984: 258).
It is this point about the “inaccuracies” of photographs that should most
attract our attention, for they force us to take note of a subtle but nonethe-
less important distinction for Walton: even though photographs, according
to Walton, are transparent to the world, they do not necessarily provide ac-
curate information about the world. They help us see the world in a certain
way, but knowledge of the world is not concomitant with that seeing; it does
not come along for free. The camera, while being a window to the world,
can lie about the world in the same way that a funhouse mirror can lie about
your height or fatness or grossly distorted features. Although counterfac-
tually dependent upon the world in a way that paintings are not (viz.: the
contents of a painting are contingent upon the beliefs and dispositions of
the painter; photograph are not similarly contingent upon the beliefs and
dispositions of the photographer [Walton, 1984; 264]), photographs are not
truth-bearing artefacts. Walton writes: “If a person looks into a mirror and
forms beliefs, on the basis of what he sees, about the things reflected in it
and if those beliefs happen to the true, perhaps his beliefs do not constitute
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knowledge. But this does not mean that he does not see the reflected things”
(Walton, 1984: 259). That is to say: although you might derive a belief
on the basis of having seen something via an imaging technology such as
a photograph, any correct information that you can extrapolate—anything
you might want to call “knowledge”—is only incidentally accurate, because
the accuracy of the image itself can only be improperly ascertained.
Following the cues of H. P. Grice, Walton then argues that photographs
express a form of natural, versus nonnatural meaning. Although the differ-
ence might seem initially unclear, Walton uses the distinction in order to
better clarify the causal relationships that exist between things that mean
p and things that are p. In the case of natural meaning, when we say that
something naturally means (meansN) p, we would say that it entails p: it is
necessarily connected with p in a way that is not contingent upon human
action or some other chicanery. Dropping a glass and watching it explode
into a thousand glittering shards meansN that something like gravity ex-
ists; my pot plant’s inability to flourish in my kitchen meansN that it is not
receiving enough sunlight. Conversely, if something nonnaturally means
(meansNN) p, it does not entail p; it is “connected instead with the notion
of someone’s meaning p by it” (Walton, 1984: 266). If natural meaning is
the world speaking to us, nonnatural meaning is only obtained by the cor-
rect reading of contingent symbolic intermediaries; unlike natural meaning,
nonnatural meaning need only have a formal relationship with the facts. As
Walton writes: “Spots meanN measles, he says, and the ringing of the bell
of a bus meansNN that the bus is full” (Walton, 1984: 265). Or, to situate the
distinction with regards to the problem at hand: a photograph, by virtue of
being transparent to the facts of the matter, meansN the facts of the matter;
a painting, by virtue of being opaque to the facts of the matter, meansNN the
facts of the matter.
For Walton, then, photographs are transparent but paintings
are not. Moreover, he argues, this difference makes an epis-
temic difference—for example, it explains why the appearance
of photographs, but not that of paintings, supports counterfac-
tuals about the appearance of the depictum. In addition, it ex-
plains why we often treat photographs as evidence (both formal
and informal), whereas we are resistant to treating paintings
and drawings as such. (Cohen and Meskin, 2004: 198)
If one wishes to subscribe to Walton’s position here, it seems that, refer-
ring to our work earlier in this chapter, we could cautiously claim that the
enigma position between photograph and subject—the Mechanical Turk—
has been cracked open. There is an uncanniness to the relationship be-
tween photograph and world because the photograph necessarily meansN
the world; the world being the way that it is meansN that the photograph
takes the form that it does. If we recall our Ihdean modelling of the tech-
nological relations that exist in the act of taking a photograph—(I-camera)
→ (photograph-subject)—we would probably say that the first enigma po-
sition, between self and camera, is straightforwardly Heideggerian, being a
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kind of embodied phenomenological Zuhandenheit relation; the apparatus
of the camera is subsumed into the phenomenology of the self by virtue
of the fact that the camera works appropriately and serves to facilitate our
ends. However, the enigma relation that holds between photograph and
subject is clearly not phenomenological, for although the creation of the
photograph itself is the product of human agency, the relationship it holds
with the world—assuming we endorse Scruton and Walton—is not contin-
gent upon our understanding of that relation. If it were contingent in this
way, the photograph would nonnaturally mean the world; however, as we
have established (or, at least, insofar as Walton understands it) the fact that
it holds without our understanding indicates that the photograph naturally
means the world. Accordingly, if we find ourselves willing to endorse Wal-
ton’s position, the enigma positions can be unpacked without substantial
fuss.
(I—[Zuhandenheit]—camera)→ (photograph—[meansN]—subject)
Furthermore, the act of looking at a photograph after the fact becomes even
less complicated. If we claim that looking at a photograph of Venus is the
same as looking at Venus by virtue of the fact that photographs meanN
the world, then we can depict the technological relation as unambiguously
embodied—like the glasses perched on my nose, I see through them in order
to look upon the world: (I-photograph)→ subject.
Although there are serious problems with these assumptions—problems
with which we will engage more robustly in the following chapter, it is
worth finishing on a positive note: although Scruton’s and Walton’s argu-
ments are really only of interest insofar as they have set the tenor of ana-
lytic philosophy of photography subsequent to 1981, a recent-ish paper by
philosopher Gregory Currie has injected some much-needed new ideas into
the debate—ideas, moreover, that will prove integral to isolating my position
in subsequent chapters. I will offer a brief précis here.
The photograph, Currie argues, is an example of one of the two different
kinds of representations: the trace, and that of the testimony. The distinction
between them should be reasonably apparent, particularly given our exege-
sis of Walton’s claims in the prior section: the trace is literally a “trace” of
the world, like a charcoal rubbing of a fossil, or the death mask of a French
revolutionary. A trace is independent of belief, is entirely nondoxastic—the
information the trace carries is independent of anyone’s belief that they
might hold to the contrary: “These are traces left by things on the world.
Anything about the person’s appearance that the footprint or death mask
manages to record is belief independent in the way that the photograph is:
what is recorded depends on the morphology of the foot or face; not on
what someone thinks the morphology of the foot or face is” (Currie, 1999:
287). Conversely, Currie argues, a testimony is not a record of the facts of
the matter, but is rather a record of what someone thought were the facts of
the matter, much in the same way that Capote’s In Cold Blood is a record of
4.2 looking through a glass, darkly 118
Capote’s beliefs regarding the 1959 murder of Herbert Clutter, or that Soft
Construction with Boiled Beans is a record of Dalí’s feelings about the Span-
ish Civil War. A testimony, unlike the trace, is not automated or automatic;
the form of the testimony is mediated by the intentions of the author in a
way that the trace, Currie argues, clearly is not. Accordingly, so Currie ar-
gues, although they both carry kinds of information, they are not the same
kinds of information (Currie, 1999: 286).
Although Currie does not invoke Grice explicitly—at least, not in the liter-
ature that I cover here—it is tempting to assume that the information carried
by the trace has some kind of relationship with Grice’s concept of natural
meaning. What makes a photograph a trace of the world, for instance, might
be that the contents of the photograph entail that a certain state of affairs is
indeed the case. Additionally, it appears that we can also find a rough ana-
logue between testimony and non-natural meaning—i.e.: that Picasso’s por-
trait of Gertrude Stein only means Gertrude Stein because Picasso intended
to paint Stein: an intention that was in turn realised only because certain
things were the case (they occupied similar spatial coordinates, they had
the right kind of relationship, Picasso had a sufficient level of skill, etcetera).
However, as we shall see, it would be incautious to claim that they map onto
one another perfectly.
[. . . ] photographs somehow lie midway between the handmade
image and the reality itself. That photographs are more able to
affect us than handmade pictures is best explained in terms of
the photograph’s being a trace. Traces of things bear particu-
larly direct relations to those things: things leave their traces
on other things. Possessing a photograph, death mask, or foot-
print of someone seems to put me in a relation to that person
that a handmade image never can. (Currie, 1999: 289).
What exactly does this mean? Currie is unclear on the subject, but the
sentiment appears to bespeak a kind of quiet Platonism, as if photographs
are but one tier on the scale of representation: we somehow see the con-
tents of photographs, but perhaps not in the full plenary sense in which
we would experience the photographed scenes directly. His Waltonian in-
heritance seems particularly obvious at these times, when he appears to be
endorsing a kind of metaphysical or ontological difference between differ-
ent kinds of representations, by virtue of the degree(s) to which they are
transparent to the world. However, it is also here that we unearth his key
point of difference with Walton. Walton would say, for example, that the dif-
ferences between paintings, photographs and the world are apparent in the
kinds of work that goes into reading the content of the image; that paintings
and other testimonies non-naturally mean the world because we require ad-
ditional information or some kind of supplementary story to explain the
relationship between object and world, whereas neither photographs nor
direct experience require any additional information.
Currie, however, does not think that photographs are literally windows
to the world—he does not believe that they are modes and methods of see-
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ing, despite seeming very much like it—though he does think that they are
ontologically and epistemically distinct from products of the plastic arts,
such as paintings. Walton, if we recall, asserts that the reason that pho-
tographs have a greater affective capacity than paintings is because they
allows us to actually see what is being shot: “[Walton claims] we are more
offended or disturbed by photographs and films because when we see them
we are actually seeing the offensive or disturbing events themselves” (Cur-
rie, 1999: 289). Currie, however, disputes this fact. Although it is almost
certainly true that we experience more powerful affective reactions from
photographs than we do from paintings, per chapter 4.1,7 Currie claims
that the affective reaction we experience from photographs is nonetheless
less than the affective reaction we would experience were we there when the
photograph was taken—i.e.: experiencing the events directly. Instead, medi-
ated by the automatism of the camera, we experience a kind of intermediate
affective state, like neither the experiences of painting nor direct experience,
induced by the fact that traces, unlike testimonies, are “left on the world by
their subjects themselves” (Currie, 1999: 286). Moreover, he argues, the fact
that photography affects us in a way that is like neither painting nor di-
rect experience has quite distinct implications for the relationship between
the photograph and the things-in-themselves; the experience of the trace,
despite the trace having a nondoxastic and naturally meaning relationship
with the world, differs in some important respect from the experience of the
thing-in-itself. Accordingly:




currie: testimony trace —
These accounts all appear seemingly straightforward, but the straightfor-
wardness of these accounts is, I think, deceptive. Although there is much of
value I wish to address in this work—particularly Walton’s Gricean distinc-
tion between natural and nonnatural meaning, and Currie’s idea that traces
are (or at least appear to be) a category unto themselves—I think it would
be clarifying to look closer at the constituent parts of the photographic pro-
cess, most notably the different roles and relationships that hold between
photographer, camera, thing-in-itself, photograph and viewer. Accordingly,
in the following section, I will attempt to offer a solution by taking care to
speciate between the constitutive parts of the larger problem. In doing so,
I will be referencing Allen’s material that we have already covered, as well
as introducing some material briefly touched upon in the very first chap-
ter: namely, how philosophy of action can help us speak intelligibly about
the role that intention—and thus representational context—plays in the re-
7 Cf: prior discussion re the picture superiority effect.
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alisation and subsequent understanding of photographs and other kinds of
traces.
4.3 Carving Photography at its Joints, 1
How does one open this particular Mechanical Turk? We begin by isolating
the moving parts that are minimally required: photographer, camera, thing-
in-itself, photograph and viewer.8 These five parts may be identified and
defined as follows (figure 13):
1. The intentional agent, hitherto called the photographer. The photogra-
pher is the agent responsible for the trace in question. The intentions
of the photographer may be summarised thus: that they intend to
produce a photograph (item 4) of something that exists in the world—
a thing-in-itself (item 3). In attempting to realise this intention, they
act upon the camera, producing the photographic event—a concept I
borrow from Dawn Phillips.
2. The automatism which captures the trace, hitherto called the camera.
The camera is acted upon by the photographer (item 1), setting in
motion a series of physical reactions whereby a photosensitive sur-
face is exposed to light in such a way as to allow that surface to
carry information from the light; it is in some sense subjected to the
thing-in-itself, and is the locus of the photographic event.9 Phillips
writes: “Light reaching the [surface] may be reflected off objects, emit-
ted directly from light sources, or both. The light is usually directed
through an aperture and by a series of lenses and mirrors” (Phillips,
2009: 337). This, we should be clear, is not the same as producing
of a photograph (item 4); although the photograph may be “taken”,
it has yet to undergo the process to become a visual image. Rather,
the camera captures what Phillips calls a “light image”: “a changeable
visible array of light of different wavelengths. [. . . ] Properties of the
light image, such as brightness and sharpness, are determined by the
camera optics; a filter will allow only selected wavelengths to reach
the screen. The size, shape, and pattern of the array is determined by
optics according to whether a wide or narrow cone of light reaches
the screen, but also by the camera position in relation to the objects
8 Although there can certainly be more than five such parts when talking about the cre-
ation and reception of photographs—particularly when one considers the myriad of both
pre-production and post-production options available—I argue that only these five are both
necessary and sufficient. Of course, one can also argue in favour of fewer moving parts—in
the case of Dawn Phillips’ “Photography and Causation”, a paper that proved instrumental
in helping me develop my views, she only argues for the existence of four such parts—but
I am not convinced that a theory with any fewer constituents would be sufficiently finely
grained for our purposes.
9 Although the processes that occur during the taking of a digital photograph is somewhat
different, the causal relationship between camera and world nonetheless holds true.
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Figure 13: Photography’s moving parts
and light sources” (Phillips, 2009: 337). We will speak more about the
relationship between automatism and the intentional agent shortly.
3. The ordinary facts of the matter, hitherto called the thing-in-itself.
The light image rendered by the camera (item 2) is a product of the
thing-in-itself by virtue of the information captured.
4. The image captured, hitherto called the photograph. The photograph
is caused by the photographic event (item 2), being what is left of the
light image after the photographer (item 1) has ensured that the light
image has undergone the relevant processes to become a visual image
of the thing-in-itself (item 3); the form that the photograph takes is
in some sense contingent upon the facts of the matter. We will speak
more about this relationship in the pages following.
5. The agent tasked with understanding or reading the photograph, hith-
erto called the viewer. Although we will engage with the viewer’s
relationship with the photograph more completely in due time, at
this point it seems adequate to say that the viewer sustains relation-
ships with both the photograph (item 4) and the thing-in-itself (item
3), though the natures of these relationships are ostensibly ambigu-
ous.
These categories clarified, we should note that I have picked out the more
ambiguous relationships that hold between these five constituent parts; that
is, between intentional agent and automatism, between photograph and
world, and between agent and photograph. These relationships appear to
be the loci for the conceptual confusions surrounding photographic practice.
As I will make clear, although I believe that Walton and Currie, particularly,
have substantive things to say about photographs, the fact that they have
not sufficiently speciated the moving parts compromises the depth of their
insights. Accordingly, in atomising the photographic process thus, I hope
to demonstrate just where and how their positions fit in with photographic
practice, as well as allowing us to pose an answer to the question with which
we began this chapter: to what extent, if any, is the photograph truth- or
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world-bearing? We begin our analysis with the relationship between au-
tomatism and intentional agent.
It should be clear from the material that we have covered thus far that
the idea of the “photographic agent” is one that has traditionally been given
rather short thrift by philosophers of photography, particularly those of an
analytic bent. The position, as summarised by Dominic McIver Lopes, can
be rendered thus: “An item is a work of art only insofar as it is the product
of agency, so a photograph is not an art work insofar as it is not the product
of artistic agency” (Lopes, 2012: 855). Being the transparent product of an
automatic process, it is not immediately clear where there is room for an in-
tentional agent in the schema—which is why, at least according to Scruton’s
view, it is not possible to capture objects in such as way as to betray the pho-
tographer’s style. Just as the photograph is not a representation, nor does
the photographer intend the outcome of a photographic in any meaningful
way.
For one thing, we lack all except the grossest features of style in
photography; and yet it is style that persuades us that the ques-
tion, Why this and not that? admits such fruitful exploration
in the case of painting. Style enables us to answer that ques-
tion by referring solely to aspects of the painting rather than to
features which are aesthetically irrelevant, features which are
in no way manifest in what is seen. The search for meaning
in a photograph is therefore curtailed or thwarted: there is no
point in an interest in detail since there is nothing that detail
can show. Detail, like the photograph itself, is transparent to
its subject. If the photograph is interesting, it is only because
what it portrays is interesting and not because of the manner
in which the portrayal is effected. (Scruton, 1981: 593)
Except, of course, that this is clearly not the case. Without the ability
to discern between the works of different photographers, it would not be
possible for “aficionados of photography [to] readily recognise an Arbus, a
Weston, or a Levine” (Lopes, 2003: 436). When Susan Sontag writes that “Ar-
bus photographs people in various degrees of unconscious or unaware rela-
tion to their pain, their ugliness. [. . . She] specialized in slow-motion private
smashups, most of which had been going on since the subject’s birth” (Son-
tag, 2008: 36, see figure 14), she is not simply writing with no clear referent,
the criticism equivalent of candy floss and empty calories; instead, Sontag is
touching upon the unique properties that render Arbus’ photography so im-
mediately recognisable: her pearlescent dispassion, her distance, the sense
that she is tirelessly and unsuccessfully trying to mar her own innocence.
The fact that we can make these sorts of assessments and that, moreover,
they are meaningful, seems to clearly demonstrate—indeed, painfully and
obviously so—that photographs are, in one way or another, recognisably in-
tentional products.10 But what exactly does this mean? Although Scruton
10 “While a painting or a prose description can never be other than a narrowly selective in-
terpretation, a photograph can be treated as a narrowly selective transparency. But despite
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has committed a grave error, the reasons for the mistake seem quite under-
standable: the camera is an automated entity upon which, at least ostensibly,
intention has questionable bearing. We need unpack this problem further.
Now, it seems obviously true that photographs stand in some kind of
automated, causal relationship with the things-in-themselves: the camera
is activated, a series of events occur, a light image is produced, from which
a photograph is produced. It also seems that, as Dominic McIver Lopes
argues, that questions of photography, automatism and agency form what
he calls a “mutually inflected triad”: if one value is overrepresented, one or
two of the other values, as a corollary, will be underrepresented. That is
to say (and I paraphrase Lopes here): if what makes photography distinct
from the other arts is the fact that it is subject to automation, then taking
advantage of that automaticity—that is, submitting to that automaticity—
inherently curbs the influence of authorial agency. Agency is given up in
exchange for automation (Lopes, 2012: 856), and subsequently there is an
assumption that “photography, by its nature ([and] hence unlike painting),
cashiers artistic agency” (Lopes, 2012: 857). And in a sense, of course, this
is all true: the power of the photograph seems to lie in the fact that it has
a closer relationship to the world than the other arts due to the automatism
of the processes involved.
However, we must take stock of the fact that, when we speak of the in-
tentional relationships that partially constitute the photographic process,
there are actually two kinds of relations of which we must take account.
The first, of course, is the relationship that holds between the intentional
agent and the photograph: when I take a photo with, say, a vintage Polaroid
instant camera, I do so with the goal of producing a kind of intentioned out-
come: “I intend to create t”. However, there is also a second relationship—a
relationship that exists in conjunction with the one that exists between pho-
tographer and photograph, but is nonetheless quite distinct; a relationship
between photographer and world—”I intend to capture some state of affairs
s”. Thereafter, it seems reasonable to think that we could collapse both rela-
tions into a single intentional relationship—”I intend to create such a t that
photographically captures s”, “I wish to capture a certain s in the form of
t”—or some other similar formulation.
Donald Davidson, as Lopes notes, observed that “attributions of intention
are typically excuses and justification; attributions of agency are typically
accusations or assignments of responsibility” (Davidson, 1980: 48; also see
Davidson, 1963). This is a striking claim: that, despite the fact that we com-
monsensically conflate ideas of intention and agency, they in fact fulfil two
entirely different roles in the explication of human action. His most famous
articulation of this distinction involves the flipping of a light switch and
thus accidentally disturbing the “prowler” lurking in his room: although
Davidson intends to turn on the light switch to illuminate the room, he is
the presumption of veracity that gives all photographs authority, interest, seductiveness, the
work that photographs do is no generic exception to the usually shady commerce between
art and truth. Even when photographers are most concerned with mirroring reality, they
are still haunted by tacit imperatives of taste and conscience” (Sontag, 2008: 6).
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Figure 14: Diane Arbus, Transvestite at a Drag Ball, New York City, 1970
Figure 15: Henri Cartier-Bresson, The Visit of Cardinal Pacelli, 1938
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also the agent responsible for alerting the burglar, even though he in no
way intended to do so—indeed, necessarily could not have intended to do so,
given his ignorance of the state of affairs.11 There is a clear disconnect here:
although the agent responsible for disturbing the burglar, his only intention
was to turn on the light. Similarly: imagine, for a moment, that you are on
the beach with some friends. You ask them to assemble in a line, their backs
to the water, in order for you to take a photograph by which you’ll remem-
ber this sun-drenched holiday. The intentional attitude is readily parseable:
the facts of the matter being particularly pleasant, you wish to capture them
photographically, hoping to produce some kind of memento of your experi-
ence. Your friends line up, the sun setting behind them, and you momentar-
ily marvel at the way the sun’s dying, orange rays cause their hair to burst
into brilliant coronae. Everyone smiles, and you press the button. You hear
the camera shutter click . . . and, just as it does so, an incontinent seagull
passing overhead voids its bowels upon the idyll below. A scream, a cry of
outrage, and the Polaroid dispenses a small, black and white rectangle which
eventually resolves into the image of a gaggle of appalled holiday-makers,
all of whom are ignominiously covered in guano. It’s clear that, in a case
such as this, there is a clear disconnect between the intended outcome—that
is, the perfect keepsake of a memorable afternoon—and that which actually
occurred. In Davidsonian terms: although the intention was not realised,
there remains an agent responsible for the act. The photographer is still
responsible for the photograph—the photographer, after all, caused the pho-
tograph to happen—even if they failed entirely to realise their intentions.
Moreover, there is a deeper point hidden within these kinds of circum-
stances. Although we could certainly argue that the intentional story that
I have presented above could just as easily be true of more traditional arts
(we once again consider Beardsley’s hypothetical sculptor who intends to
make something smooth and blue, but instead makes something rough and
pink [Beardsley, 1958: 20])—and indeed, people like Carol Armstrong have
argued that the automaticity of photography says nothing more about au-
thorial agency than does a paintbrush for painting (Armstrong, 2012: 710)—
I am inclined to think otherwise. For there is something indeed special
about photography, particularly as it bears upon or reflects authorial agency:
unlike sculpture, painting or music, photography is unique in that it “im-
plicates change” (Lopes, 2012: 858); unlike the more traditional arts, cam-
eras can capture “unwilled facts, caught willy-nilly, automatically, and all
11 “I flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also
alert a prowler to the fact that I am home. Here I need not have done four things, but only
one, of which four descriptions have been given. I flipped the switch because I wanted to
turn on the light and by saying I wanted to turn on the light I explain (give my reason for,
rationalize) the flipping. But I do not, by giving this reason, rationalize my alerting of the
prowler nor my illuminating of the room. Since reasons may rationalize what someone does
when it is described in one way and not when it is described in another, we cannot treat
what was done simply as a term in sentences like ‘My reason for flipping the switch was
that I wanted to turn on the light’; otherwise we would be forced to conclude, from the fact
that flipping the switch was identical with alerting the prowler, that my reason for alerting
the prowler was that I wanted to turn on the light” (Davidson, 1963: 686-687).
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at once” (Armstrong, 2012: 706) at the moment of the photographic event.
Consider: if we hark back to the distinction that we drew between the work-
manship of certainty and the workmanship of risk in chapter 2.1, it is not
entirely clear whether photographic practice can be properly considered un-
der either label.12 Indeed, it seems to have certain qualities of both kinds of
workmanship: it shares with the workmanship of certainty the fact that we
find its “pure state in full automation”, but shares with the workmanship
of risk the fact that “the quality of the result is not predetermined” (Pye,
1968: 4). Moreover, it is not predetermined in a way rather different to the
way that making a painting by table by hand is not predetermined, for even
if one were a photographer to exhibit maximal “judgement, dexterity and
care”, the risk emerges because the photographic event is automated: there
comes a point when the decision is no longer in the photographer’s hands—
the possibility of non-intentioned formal outcomes emerge. And to be clear,
this is something quite distinct from a case such as Monroe’s sculptor: al-
though he or she might fail in realising their goal of roughness or pinkness,
there is no formal aspect of the sculpture that is non-intentioned. There is
no possibility for surprise guano here.
It is this property of photography (viz., the possibility of non-intentioned
content) that differentiates it from other arts, even if the products of those
arts are indiscernible from a photograph, as in the case of the paintings of
Chuck Close. Although an example of a more traditional art might elicit
unintended consequences—for instance, I might write a book that I intend
to be deeply serious, only to have my opus met with gales of appreciative
laughter—the formal qualities of the artwork in question (in this case, the
words printed upon the page) are themselves fully intended. The same is
true for Chuck Close’s self-portraits: despite having the appearance of a
photograph, every single piece of visual information is the product of an
intentional, minded act; a product of intentionally putting paintbrush to
canvas.13 Conversely, this is simply untrue for photography: it is the only
art where it is genuinely possible for the formal aspects of the work—say,
a shitting bird—to be non-intentioned. Indeed, if we are to find a means of
meaningfully discerning photographs from photo-real paintings that does
not rely upon a transparency thesis, then this seems like it could provide a
solution: that is, the inherent and live possibility of non-intentioned formal
content is a necessary condition for something to be properly considered a
photograph.
It is also worth observing that although philosophers may have been
somewhat slow on the uptake, photographic artists have long been aware
12 That is to say: with the workmanship of risk “the quality of the result is not predetermined,
but depends on the judgement, dexterity and care with the maker exercises as he works”
(Pye, 1968: 4), whereas in the workmanship of certainty “the quality of the result is exactly
predetermined before a single saleable thing is made” (Pye, 1968: 4-5).
13 Although one might, with some justification, argue that abstract expressionism compro-
mises this assessment, I am unconvinced. By example: Jackson Pollock, according to his own
testimony, claimed that he had “as much control as possible over the painting process”—a
claim that seems incompatible with the readings of wild performativity that generally ac-
company his work (Jackson Pollock, quoted in Janecke, 1995: 163, n. 212).
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of photography’s intentional uniqueness. If we return to the type-token dis-
tinction between those artefacts produced either with or without a clearly
pre-determined outcome, we can see that the happenstance nature of pho-
tography allows photographers to render visual artefacts that would be im-
possible to produce via more traditional means. That is to say, whereas
a holiday snapshot is an intentional act of the sort “I intend to create t”—
where t in this case is a photograph with a predetermined outcome—when
a photographer makes a statement of the sort “I intend to create T”—a pho-
tograph without a predetermined outcome—there are several ways in which
this could be the case. The first way that a photographer could choose to
create a T is in essence no different to the way that a carpenter might cre-
ate a T-table: just as a carpenter can experiment at the risk of jeopardising
the outcome of the activity, so too can a photographer—say, by adjusting or
otherwise acting upon the shutter speed, white balance, f-stop or the photo
stock directly—act in such a way as to make the final product uncertain.
However, although there is the real possibility that the products of their in-
tentional acts will turn out poorly, the formal products of acts of this kind
remain strictly intentioned.
However, there are other methods by which T can be made—methods
that are specific to the medium. An early and famous example of a pho-
tograph of this sort is Henri Cartier-Bresson’s famous The Visit of Cardi-
nal Pacelli (figure 15), which was notoriously taken by holding the camera
high over his head and shooting without any clear awareness of what was
in frame. Although we can certainly make the case that the contents of
Cartier-Bresson’s photograph is obviously going to be restricted by certain
brute facts—the fact that the photograph was taken on Earth and not Mars,
for instance, and that the lens was pointed broadly towards the centre of
the crowed amassing outside Sacré-Coeur—he had no knowledge of what
the photographic event would capture: the back of the Cardinal’s head, a
petitioner kissing his ring, a woman looking plaintively into the Cardinal’s
eyes. In a move that would be impossible for any artform without the de-
gree of automatism that photography offers, Cartier-Bresson captured an
image where not only almost all of the formal qualities of the work were
non-intentioned, but an image that was intentional yet non-intentioned. This
very obviously seems to be a very different kind of “I intend to create T”
statement; it is an intentional arrangement that would be impossible to re-
alise in non-photographic media, and it is the possibility to create works of
this kind that provides the most robust response to Scruton’s reductive al-
legations. In an Allenian sense, the novelty of taking a photograph—that is,
the possibility of superlative artefactual performance—lies in taking advan-
tage of the bizarre, contingent web that exists between mechanistic camera,
intentional photographer and haphazard world.
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It should already be clear that the intentional relationships that hold be-
tween the various parts during the taking of a photograph are in fact far
more complex than traditional analytic accounts describe. Given that fact,
it should prove unsurprising that the relationships that hold between pho-
tographs, viewers and things-in-themselves are equally complex, and have—
as I shall demonstrate—quite significant ramifications for how and if we
should properly judge photographs as being in some sense knowledge or
world-bearing. To begin, it seems unambiguous to claim that photographs
(item 4) are, per Walton and Currie, traces of the world. They naturally
mean the world in that the thing-in-itself (item 3) being the way that it is
meansN that the photograph takes the form that it does. However, I want to
be careful to clarify that this assumption does not carry more weight than
it should; I am not trying to argue (cf. Walton and Scruton) that photogra-
phy is a kind of seeing in the same way that looking through spectacles is
a kind of seeing, but more that photography is “simply the inevitable out-
come of a certain series of events” (Snyder and Allen, 1975: 157). Although
it seems true that, by definition, photographs have a causal relationship
with that which was photographed (Lopes, 2012: 438), the mere fact of that
relation does not have any greater significance for the relationship between
photograph and world. Despite the fact that the world meansN that the
photograph takes the form that it does, this is not the same as claiming
that the photograph has a kind of identity with the world—as if seeing the
photograph is the same as seeing the thing-in-itself.
This distinction—that although a photograph is a trace of the world, it
is nonetheless not properly considered a form of seeing—finds early artic-
ulation in Joel Snyder and Neil Walsh Allen’s14 1975 “Photography, Vision,
and Representation”. Though Scruton’s paper followed some six years after
Snyder & Allen’s article was published, it is interesting in that Snyder &
Allen’s account, perhaps anticipating the shape of photography scholarship
in the years to come, provides something in the way of a rebuttal against
the transparency theses of later decades. To this end, Snyder & Allen ask us
to consider a photograph of a horse galloping. Now, if the photograph were
taken with adequate exposure and a fast enough shutter speed, it would be
possible to capture the static image of a horse in mid-gallop: “we have no
reason to doubt that, at a certain moment, the horse ‘really’ assumed that
posture. Here we are simply extending and modifying the notion that the
camera is an eye” (Snyder and Allen, 1975: 157). However, if the photograph
were taken under even slightly different circumstances—say, if the shutter
were to remain open for slightly longer—we would not see a horse frozen in
mid-gallop, but would instead see the four legs of the photographed horse
rendered a colourful blur. Curiously though, we do not react to these pho-
tographs in the same way. In the instance of the first photograph, there is
a sense in which we believe that the horse did indeed adopt that particular
14 No relation to Barry Allen.
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pose at least once during the completion of its gait; in the instance of the
second, there is no genuine confusion about whether or not the horse really
became a blur: “[we] assume, instead, that the horse ‘really’ galloped and
that this galloping plus perhaps the movement of the camera and the pe-
culiarities of the film resulted in the horse being characterised as an equine
blur” (Snyder and Allen, 1975: 157). This is what Snyder & Allen mean when
they speak of photography as the “inevitable outcome of a certain series of
events.”
Snyder & Allen then ask us to consider “another equestrian example”:
that of the photofinish camera as they are employed in horse racing. Unlike
other kinds of cameras, photofinish cameras do not take photographs as
discrete images, whether digitally or to photostock. Instead, the photofinish
camera is fitted with a long piece of photographic film hooked to a motor,
and when the motor is switched on, the strip of film is passed in front of
a thin vertical slit—the aperture—which is trained upon the finish line of
the track: “[as] no shutter interrupts the light on the way to the film while
the camera is running, the final result will be a single still picture” (Snyder
and Allen, 1975: 158). Importantly, this means that the photograph can
capture the exact order of all of the horses as they cross the finish line—
something that would be impossible with more conventional photographic
means. However, with the photofinish camera “it’s all very easy: whatever
horse is seen to be to the right of another horse was recorded on the film
first and therefore reached the finish line before the other horse” (Snyder
and Allen, 1975: 158). This means that the finish line that we see on those
images (as in figure 16) is a later addition by the camera operator: a helpful
fiction to ascertain which horse came first, given that literally every point
along the photographic reel is the finish line.
What is particularly interesting about all of this, as Snyder & Allen rightly
point out, is that there is something rather upsetting about the realisation
that photofinish photographic images are not actually depictions of the
event as we perceived it; looking at such a photograph, we are inclined to
believe that we are seeing a picture of a certain number of horses that were
in different positions at the same time. However, in the case of a photofinish
photograph, we are actually not seeing this at all; instead, we are seeing a
certain number of horses that were in the same position at different times.
Photofinish photographs are, unlike what we would normally expect, less
measures of distance than they are measures of time: “[we] do not know
how far the winning horse was ahead of the place horse at the time of
the finish line—all we know is that it took a certain amount of time for the
place hours to cross the finish line after the winner” (Snyder and Allen, 1975:
159). Astoundingly, this means that although the photofinish image is very
much an accurate—indeed unimpeachable—depiction of the final positions
of horses in a race, and although the production of this image has every-
thing to do with certain processes being in place and certain physical laws
being the way that they are, our naïve interpretations of the photograph has
almost nothing to do with the actual processes by which the image was cre-
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Figure 16: First triple dead heat in harness racing, Freehold Raceway, 3rd October
1953
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ated. An image like this is clearly not transparent to the world in the way
that Scruton and Walton have argued, even though it very much seems like
it is. As Snyder & Allen write: “[the] mechanical relations which guarantee
the validity of the photograph as an index of a certain kind of truth have
been almost completely severed from the creation of visual likeness” (Sny-
der and Allen, 1975: 159). The photofinish image may naturally mean that
such-and-such horse ran the best time by virtue of the photo being a trace,
but that it by no means the same kind of thing as saying that the photograph
allowed us to see the race, or that the camera was in any way transparent to
the race.
However, although this seems a perfectly satisfying answer, it opens a
larger problem: if the relationship between photograph and world is that
of a mere trace, what exactly are the relationships that hold between the
viewer and the photograph, or the viewer and the thing-in-itself? It seems
clear that we can no longer innocently endorse the unambiguously embod-
ied relation posed by Walton: (I-photograph) → subject. We might want to
say instead that the relationship between viewer, photograph and subject
is hermeneutic, in perhaps the same way that the relationship that holds
between photographer, camera and subject is hermeneutic (if complicated,
per our discussion above). But is this correct? Can it be the case that, rather
than photographs allowing us to see the world through them, the world has
been read by the camera and translated into a photograph? To antagonise
this problem further, it is necessary to finally begin answering one of the
questions with which we began this enterprise: what does it mean to know
the contents of a photograph? Obviously, according to the work of Scru-
ton and Walton—perhaps even Currie—the problem is a total non-starter,
being no more epistemically problematic than the experience of the world
more broadly. By this reading, the examples with which we opened this
inquiry—the CCTV footage, or the gumshoe’s manila folder of incriminat-
ing photographs, as outlined all the way back in chapter 1—can be plainly
said to be both world-bearing and truth-bearing. A close enough relation-
ship between world and photograph guarantees that drawing conclusions
from photographic evidence of an event is broadly similar to drawing ev-
idence from direct experience of that same event. However, as we have
articulated, this account is quite clearly problematic: although we can say
the photograph is a trace of the world, that is obviously not the same as
saying that it is world-bearing in the sense that it necessarily aligns with
our experiences and expectations.
Helpfully, Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, in their “On the Epistemic
Value of Photographs” have provided us with with something of a roadmap
out of this problem. Acknowledging both that the Waltonian account is
unsatisfying, and yet also acknowledging that it has been “surprisingly dif-
ficult to say just what is wrong about the transparency thesis” (Cohen and
Meskin, 2004: 197), Cohen & Meskin endorse an account of the opacity of
photographs to the world, providing an account that argues that in order to
see something, we must have the right kind of egocentric, spatial relation-
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ship with that thing: we must have an awareness of how it relates to us
phenomenologically, between two bodies in space. Accordingly, developing
an idea introduced by a number of previous authors,15 Cohen & Meskin ar-
gue that in order to see something, we must encounter it in the right way;
the viewer must be in possession of the right kinds of information about
the subject—information that, moreover, is premised upon the object’s spa-
tial relationship with the perceiving ego. They quote both Currie and Noël
Carroll with some approval:
With originally seeing, we get information about the spatial
and temporal relations between the object seen and ourselves.
[. . . ] Photographs on the other hands do not convey egocen-
tric information; seeing a photograph does not tell me anything
much about where the object photographed is in relation to me.
(Currie, 1995: 66, in Cohen and Meskin, 2004: 197)
I submit that we do not speak literally of seeing objects unless
I can perspicuously relate myself spatially to them—i.e., unless
I know (roughly) where they are in the space I inhabit. (Carroll,
1996: 62, in Cohen and Meskin, 2004: 197)
Now, if we recall from the prior section, Currie argues that traces, con-
tra Walton and Scruton, occupy a third ontological category, separate from
either representations such as painting or the lived experience of the thing-
in-itself—and that, moreover, this category manages to maintain a nondox-
astic, naturally meaning relationship with the world. However—and this is
where it starts to get a little tricky—even though the relationship that holds
between photograph and world may be nondoxastic, at least insofar as the
contents of the trace are not subject to my beliefs on the subject, it is less
clear whether or not my relationship with a trace is equally nondoxastic.
As Cohen & Meskin write, possibly the most obvious way of parsing Cur-
rie’s or Carroll’s proposal is by arguing that in order for an agent to see
something, it must be in possession of the right kinds of beliefs about the
subject; for me to see the tree in the front yard of my house, I have to make
and then endorse some kind of judgement about its location with regards to
my embodied perception—a kind of egocentric spatial belief. Furthermore, it
seems quite clear that both Currie and Carroll endorse some kind of doxas-
tic idea of seeing, as Cohen & Meksin observe: “For example, Currie specif-
ically refers to the ‘kinds of judgments we make in cases of ordinary seeing
. . . which have no counterparts in the case of seeing photographs.’ Similarly,
Carroll speaks of ordinary seeing as requiring knowledge about spatial rela-
tions” (Cohen and Meskin, 2004: 198).
However, as Cohen & Meskin note, Walton in another paper argues con-
vincingly that a doxastic component to seeing is too heavy and cumber-
some a requirement to render proposals of that kind convincing. In order
15 Cohen & Meskin cite Carroll, 1995, Carroll, 1996, Currie, 1991, Currie, 1995 and Warburton,
1988 as being of particular significance.
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to demonstrate this point, he asks us to imagine what he considers two rele-
vantly similar situations: in the first, the viewer receives visual information
about a carnation through a long series of mirrors, though the viewer does
not know how many mirrors nor the carnation’s true location; in the sec-
ond, the viewer receives visual information from a carnation that is right
in front of him or her, but the many mirrors around confuse or otherwise
compromise the viewer’s beliefs on the subject—the viewer may develop the
mistaken belief that he or she is looking at a reflected carnation, for instance
(Walton, 1997: 70). As seems clear, in neither case is there a clear judgement
about the location of the carnation; there is no obvious knowledge claim
that can be made about the carnation’s location, and accordingly—if one is
to endorse a doxastic view of seeing—it seems that we should claim that
neither example should qualify as “seeing” in any real sense. Walton argues
that this claim is clearly undesirable; although we might be in possession of
incorrect information regarding the location of the second carnation, that
does not mean that we do not see it. Accordingly, he claims that the two
cases are functionally indistinguishable: one sees the carnation in the first
instance, albeit prosthetically, just as one sees the carnation in the second.
In neither case is a judgement or a knowledge claim required.
Although I am with Walton on the first point—that a doxastic component
to seeing is an unnecessarily burdensome requirement—I very obviously dif-
fer on the second point; indeed, were I also to endorse the claim that they
are like instances I would be forced to once again revisit the transparency
thesis. However, Cohen & Meskin, citing Fred Dretske’s Knowledge and the
Flow of Information, provide an alternative in the form of a model that is
both embodied and yet without a doxastic component. In this characterisa-
tion, seeing something relies upon the viewer having access to egocentric
spatial information, as opposed to holding an egocentric spatial belief; it is
more about the information-carrying nature of the world than it is about
the viewer’s beliefs about that information. That is to say, what Cohen
& Meskin mean by “information-carrying” is that there holds “a kind of
(objective) probabilistic, counterfactual-supporting connection between in-
dependent variables” (Cohen and Meskin, 2004: 200). For cases such as the
relationship between our Venus and the photograph, to reference a previous
example, this means that the photograph meansN Venus. The relationship
is observable first because the probability of the photograph of Venus being
conditional upon the actual form of Venus is much higher than the probabil-
ity of the photograph appearing to be Venus and the object being something
else entirely—a statue of Zeus, for example, or a small and rather yappy dog.
Moreover, the fact that the the relationship is meaningfully probabilistic is
made clear by the various counterfactuals that can be brought to play: that
is, if the statue of Venus were in some sense different, then the photograph
of Venus would also be different.
Accordingly, Cohen & Meskin’s thesis relies on the assumption that in
order to see something—say, the hamburger in your hand—that capacity is
premised upon having access to a specific kind of egocentric spatial infor-
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mation. Your access to that information is premised upon having the right
kind of relationship with the hamburger; a relationship that is perceptually
situated and embodied is “produced by a process that carries spatial infor-
mation about the object. That is, x sees y through a visual process z only
if z carries information about the egocentric location of y with respect to x”
(Cohen and Meskin, 2004: 201). That is to say: when I look at a photograph
of Venus, I am not actually seeing Venus, contra Walton’s claims: although I
have egocentric spatial information about my relationship with the object in
my field of vision (that is, the photograph), I have no such egocentric spatial
information about my relationship with the depictum (that is, Venus).
[Our] proposal provides a principled basis for rejecting photo-
graphic transparency. That is, it implies that photographs and
films do not allow us to see the objects they depict. For, as we
have maintained, visual processes involving photographs and
film fail to carry egocentric spatial information about their de-
picta (although they do carry some sort of information about
their depicta): there is no probabilistic relationship between the
photographic/film image, on the one hand, and the egocentric
location of the depictum, on the other. (Cohen and Meskin,
2004: 203)
Although I may know something about the photograph (the kind of card
stock on which it is printed, the camera used to capture the image, presence
and type of filters, the identity of the captured content) it is an error to think
that knowing about the photograph means that I know, in any serious sense,
about Venus. Recognising the photograph as being of a statue Venus is the
kind of modest perceptual judgement that can be made; saying that one can
directly see the statue of Venus from the photograph is quite another thing
entirely.
At this juncture, it seems helpful to summarise our findings thus far in
order that we are better able to isolate any remaining questions. To wit:
1. The intentional actor is responsible for the creation of the photo-
graphic trace, though the content of the trace is not dictated by the
intentional agent. Although the photographer is responsible for the
frame of the photograph and selecting the moment at which the pho-
tograph is taken, photographs invariably contain non-intentioned con-
tent which may exceed the limits of or otherwise compromise the
intentional attitude of the photographer. This possibility bespeaks a
Davidsonian distinction between the intention of the photographer—
that which the photographer intended to capture—and the responsi-
bility of the photographer for whatever image is actually captured.
2. Photographs naturally mean the world because we do not require ad-
ditional information or some kind of supplementary story to explain
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Figure 17: Hubble Space Telescope, The Pillars of Creation, 1995
the relationship between photograph and world; the form of the pho-
tograph and the form of the world are necessarily contingent, with
the photograph being “simply the inevitable outcome of a certain se-
ries of events” (Snyder and Allen, 1975: 157). So, in the case of the
photograph of the Pillars of Creation, that trace meansN the actual
Pillars of Creation.
3. Despite the fact that photographs meanN the world, we do not see
the world through the photograph. Although the form of the photo-
graph is contingent upon the form of the world, the relationship is
not so close as to guarantee that we see the world through the photo-
graph. Instead, due to both technological contingencies (per Snyder)
and the epistemic limitations of egocentric embodiment (per Cohen &
Meskin), we only have a nondoxastic, information-carrying relation-
ship with the perceived object—in this case, the photographic object
(say, The Pillars of Creation, [figure 17]), and notwith the scene, event,
person or place depicted by the object itself (the actual Pillars of Cre-
ation).
Accordingly, it seems clear we still require an account of the epistemic
relationship that holds between the viewer and the photograph. If pho-
tographs are not a form of seeing—if we are incapable of observing the
world through a photograph—then how is it possible for us to render judge-
ments about the world based upon photographic evidence? When we ob-
serve the famous false-colour photograph of the Pillars of Creation taken
by the Hubble Space Telescope, are we game enough to say that we do not
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in some sense see the stars being born? How is it possible to extract data
from a trace if we are not in any real sense seeing its contents? On this point,
we have already seen that Cohen & Meskin argue photographs are, in some
important sense, information-carrying; although we are not seeing the ob-
ject in the photograph, the photograph itself is some kind of evidence of a
substantive spatial, egocentric and information-carrying relationship that
occurs between the photographed object and the camera, even if the view-
ers of the photograph themselves do not have a similar relationship with the
photographed object. Acknowledging this relationship, Cohen & Meskin ar-
gue that photographs are “epistemically special” in a way that objects like
paintings are not; “they are information carrying whose conditions of em-
ployment are easier to satisfy than other information carriers” (Cohen and
Meskin, 2004: 204). But epistemically special in what way, exactly?
In their paper, Cohen & Meskin claim that in order for a person to see
something, they must have access to two things:
1. information about the visually accessible properties of the represen-
tational object, and
2. information about the egocentric location of the representational ob-
ject. (Cohen and Meskin, 2004: 204).
Now, it seems clear that, under normal circumstances, embodied sight
fulfils both requirements: when I look at a carnation in front of me, I am
not only able to access its visual properties (redness, smallness—type 1), but
also its spatial location based upon my egocentric position (type 2). The
same is also true in some cases of the use of visual prostheses: when I look
at someone else through a single mirror, although my access to the spatial
information is attenuated, I can still nonetheless parse that visual data in
the relevant spatial, egocentric way. However, looking at a trace of some-
thing is rather different: although it is obviously true that a photograph or
a charcoal rubbing of a carnation is able to afford me information (even if
incomplete) about the visual properties of an object, it entirely fails to give
me egocentric spatial information about the location of that carnation. In
this sense, looking at a photograph of the Pillars of Creation is no different
to looking at the Pillars through a telescope: in both cases has the phenom-
enal experience been denuded of egocentric content. Don Ihde echoes this
sentiment in a telling passage in Technology and the Lifeworld: “To see the
moon through a telescope is to see it close up but also to lose its position
in the sky. Lens technology transforms the very sense of space I experience
[. . . ]. It transforms it into a kind of irreal, flattened and narrowed ‘world”’
(Ihde, 1990: 50).
Given the limited epistemic ambit of photographs, the question then of
what it means to parse or otherwise understand photographic content be-
comes an interesting one. Although we do not see the object in the pho-
tograph, the photograph itself is a trace of an event wherein a camera had
access to the relevant egocentric information. Because of the automatic
quality of the camera’s internal operations—the fact that the photograph is
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the inevitable outcome of a certain series of events—this outcome is more
reliable than in the case of media such as paintings, where the outcomes
are entirely more subject to the vagaries of human agency. So, even if pho-
tographs are indeed “epistemically special”, it is only because they neces-
sarily capture type 1 information, whereas paintings only incidentally do
so: unlike photographs, the contents of paintings are not parasitic or other-
wise contingent upon the world but instead exist only in a kind of formal
relationship with the world.
In that case, then, in order to parse a photograph, we are required to read
it in some important sense; given that we do not see the things represented
(as we noted, any information it capture is merely incidentally accurate),
in order to understand the visual data captured by a photographic trace
we are required to provide some kind of account of how and why the im-
age is the way that it is. That is to say: even though the relationship that
holds between world and photograph is one of natural meaning—the form
of the world entails the form of the photograph, and vice versa—the same
cannot be said of the relationship between the photograph and the viewer.
Instead, the relationship is entirely non-natural: the photograph being the
way that it is does not necessarily entail that I will read it a certain way.
Indeed, Snyder & Allen make a very similar point in “Photography, Vision,
and Representation”: that, although we might see an image such as Den-
nis Stock’s photograph of James Dean at the grave of Cal Dean (figure 18),
there is nothing in the photograph that guarantees that we should accept
that particular narrative: that Dennis Stock took James Dean to the site of
Cal Dean’s grave, and captured a trace of him exhibiting “what Stock be-
lieved to be Dean’s attitude toward death” (Snyder and Allen, 1975: 167).
We should not only understand that this particular photo is the aggregate
product of potentially thousands of different contingencies—the selection of
location, the nature of the subject, the kind of camera, lens and film used,
the lighting, the possibility of unintended content, the fact that this pho-
tograph could be only one among thousands taken that day—but also that
there is nothing to tell us that this photo is even of James Dean, beyond the
fact that it looks like him. Snyder & Allen write:
One is tempted to say that it does, that it establishes certain
facts about James Dean—that, at the very least, he once stood
next to the grave of Cal Dean. But even this minimal statement
is not incorrigible. We might be challenged to prove that it
was indeed James Dean, not a look-alike, or that this is a real
grave, not a stage set, or that Cal and James Dean were related.
If we were to establish that everyone and everything is what
it seems from external evidence, what new facts does the pho-
tograph establish? It would seem then to establish the same
things about James Dean that would be established about the
subject of this picture even if he weren’t James Dean, or in fact
had never existed at all. Of course our knowledge about the real
James Dean—that he died young or that he played a character
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Figure 18: Dennis Stock, James Dean at the Grave of Cal Dean, 1955
named Cal in East of Eden—may add a good deal of poignancy
to this photograph. This sort of thing happens all the time, re-
gardless of medium and even regardless of “the facts.” (Snyder
and Allen, 1975: 168)
It seems clear: there are no “facts” in a photograph; without some kind of
intelligible narrative—some non-natural account—photographs say nothing
to us. They are information-carrying in the sense that they provide us with
visual data in a manner that is more reliable than painting, and they are
“epistemically special” for this fact. However, this visual data does not itself
comprise a fact or a field of facts; the data must be received, sorted, parsed
and then narrativised in order for us to make sense of it, denuded as the
image is of egocentric spatial information; what someone like Ihde might
call the “phenomenological plenary”.
However, that observed, it does seem fair to think that this visual data
more readily lends itself to the right kind of intelligible sorting and pars-
ing than other kinds of visual data, with that fact likely premised upon the
assumption that photographs are the product of an impersonal, automatic,
strictly physical reaction, which is why someone like P. J. C. Janssen, to
whom we referred at the start of this chapter, could make the claim that
photographic film is the “true retina of the scientist” (Ihde, 2002: 44). Al-
though this seems like a clear example of the picture superiority effect
in play, this bizarre web of epistemic relations and commitments that oc-
cupy centre stage in photographic practice nonetheless explains why it is so
easy—and so seductive—to carelessly assume that the camera is, according
to the Ihdean nomenclature, a true “epistemology engine”: even if cameras
do not truly allow us to see the world, the visual data captured by cameras
is sufficiently compelling, and sufficiently accurate, that we nonetheless as-
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sume that they do. Of course, as I have argued here, this is an error it would
do us well to avoid.
It is at this point that it is perhaps worth reconnecting this material with
the discussion on Allen in chapter 2 and Ihde in chapter 3. Now, observant
readers may be struck by the fact that the Gricean natural/nonnatural dis-
tinction looks a surprising amount like the distinction that we made in the
last chapter about different kinds of supervenience relations. That is to say: if
we take Walton at face value and accept that the relationship between pho-
tographs and world is characterised by natural meaning, then we can make
the assumption that they have natural meaning because photographs, like
other artefacts, have a logical supervenience upon the world. Although the
contents of a photograph may not be accurate, the purported transparency
of the technology means that the supervenient B-facts of the photograph
appear to be necessary products of the A-facts; it is ostensibly the case that
no additional facts need to be postulated in order to provide an account of
why a photograph looks the way it does. Moreover, being logically superve-
nient, it also seems plausible to claim that photographs are—per the second
chapter—also reducibly emergent phenomena; they are complex products
that are nonetheless straightforwardly deducible from low-level phenom-
ena (the reaction of light upon silver salts in analogue cameras; algorithmic
processing in digital cameras). Even if they are not truth-creating, they are
still somehow obliquely truth-bearing; due to the bilateral symmetry that
holds in cases of reducible emergence (just as if we have a sufficiently com-
plete picture of the A-facts then we can predict the emergent B-properties,
so too does it seem that with a sufficiently complete picture of the emergent
B-properties we could presumably successfully extrapolate the A-conditions
that gave rise to the B-properties), photographs seem like they are epistemi-
cally significant because of this logical supervenience relation.
Of course, this would be entirely well and good in the event that it was
even possible to speak of acquiring a sufficiently complete picture of the
emergent B-properties. As we have already clarified, photographs do not
contain anything in the way of facts, because they make no claims. Al-
though it seems plausible to think that the relationship between the photo-
graph and the world is both logically supervenient and reducibly emergent,
we cannot say the same of the relationship that exists between the viewer
and the world whenmediated by a photograph. The photograph, as we have
clarified, does not capture the world and cannot give it to us naïvely; we
require something to read it by. As Nelson Goodman points out: our ability
to read images in the right way—even ones with near-maximal veridicality—
requires us to have in our possession a kind of key that is relative to con-
ceptual schemata (Goodman, 1976: 10-19); and it is this key that means that
the photographically mediated relationship between world and viewer is in
fact naturally supervenient; we require additional facts to make sense of the
data. The information is not given to us freely; we must make sense of it,
narrativise it, in order for it to be of any help to us. Because they afford
us the illusion of showing us the world-as-given (thus rendering them an
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epistemology engine without peer), photographs subsequently seem to be
far more epistemically significant than they actually are.
Thus, to portray the technological relation in terms of an Ihdean schematic,
we see that viewing a photograph is to engage in two kinds of relations. In
the first place the viewing is an alterity relation, in the sense that the pho-
tograph is the object of our attention due to its “epistemic specialness”. Be-
cause of the relationship that is presumed to hold between the camera and
the world—it seems like another viewer, per Locke and Descartes’ view of
the camera obscura as analogous with the eye—it appears to us as a quasi-
other. Like a religious idol or an automatic teller machine, a photograph
is the kind of object that demands that we treat it as an other; they seem,
by virtue of having been made automatically, or at least with the presump-
tion of automatism, not contingent upon our interaction or continued in-
tervention. Instead, feeling like an other, it demands our attention because
it seems to be, in an important respect, relevantly like us; the photograph
itself becomes the object of our attention because we are compelled to take
it seriously.
I→ photograph-(-world)
However, what distinguishes the tenor of our relationship with photographs
from other alterity relations is that, appended parasitically onto the alterity
relation is an hermeneutic relation, which is the kind of relationship that
Ihde, in Technology and the Lifeworld, poses exists between human beings
and photographs. As noted in our discussion of Scruton and Walton, this
is the form that the technological relation would take in the event that pho-
tographs did in fact observe some kind of transparency thesis: the device
itself becomes a means by which it is possible to perceive the world in that
the camera reads the world and provides a kind of translation of that data
into a visually parseable form. However, as we have clarified, this cannot
be the case if we do not see the world through the photograph; if the pho-
tograph is merely the dumb product of a series of brute physical processes,
the photograph can make no claims.
[I→ photograph-(-world)]→ (camera-world)
Subsequently, the hermeneutic relation that exists between the photo-
graph and the camera-world is one denuded of semantic significance, and
is the locus of Gricean natural meaning (meansN). Conversely, it is the
alterity relationship between the I and the photograph which is the locus
of non-natural meaning (meansNN); like ascribing mental states and inten-
tions to human beings or non-human animals in order to parse their be-
haviour, we must ascribe narratives onto photographs in order to parse the
mute visual data available to us. In this respect, photographic images are
much like evidence for the detective. The scene of the crime, so to speak,
is readily available to our senses and intuitions: we see the chalk outline
around the dismembered corpse, the splatter of gore against the far wall,
the bloodied butcher knife, the stopped clock with the shattered face; like
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a detective, we are in possession of certain facts about the point of contact
between world and the image. Although we do not know who committed
the murder—whether it be a botched break-and-enter, a rancorous ex-lover,
a cheated business associate, or even Miss Scarlet in the kitchen with the
candlestick—we can extrapolate from the available evidence models with
which we try and account for the observable facts. It is what we might call
a scientistic view, this exercise in abductive reasoning: in order for the B-
facts to be true, we can surmise that certain A-facts might be true in order
for those B-facts to be a matter of course. Not being a deductive process,
the A-facts are sufficient but not necessary for the B-facts; the premises do
not guarantee the conclusion.16 Indeed, this lack of necessity is why we are
able to derive a number of models in order to account for the B-facts, and—
given that photographs cannot confess—it is clearly within our interest to
pick the most parsimonious response, all other things being equal. Like the
detective, there remains room to abductively generate models by which the
B-facts of photographic content can be accounted; we are clearly within our
rights to extrapolate models describing what might be the case in order for
the B-facts of the photograph to be what they are. However, we must at all
times be aware of the epistemic limits of these kinds of models; we should
not assume that photographs contain facts and let our naïve assumptions
carry us away.
Now, it seems plausible to think that these kinds of accounts are basi-
cally Allenian in that the success or failure of these performances—and it
seems unambiguous to think that accounts of this type are performances—
is premised upon a kind of superlativeness criterion, just like any other kind
of description. The best description (p+) of the visual properties of a given
photographic trace is the one that manages to be both parsimonious and
ably account for the available data (k). Whatever facts we have in this case
are mutable, plastic things, subject to change in the face of shifting data: a
photo of a large hairy biped running into the forest may shift from Bigfoot
into a large man in a suit once someone notices the silver zipper; the validity
of our knowledge claims about photographs is entirely premised upon our
ability to perform, with the data in mind, in the right way; a photographic
reading is an instance of knowledge (n) if and only if the exemplary perfor-
mance satisfies the success conditions: p+ is n iff p+ meets kp+. Much as
the creation of photographs allows for novel articulations of knowledge by
virtue of playing with the unusual intentional character of the camera, the
reading of photographs allows for similarly novel articulations. Although
photographs can be read in the same manner as paintings—they are both
not the case, in that they make no explicit claims to states of affairs in the
world—our commitment to photographs is greater. Even if our access to the
facts of the matter via photographic images is mediated and the image itself
makes no claims to the truth, it is still significant that it is the product of a
16 For more on this subject, please refer to the work of Charles Sanders Pearce; “On the Logic
of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, Especially from Testimonies”, is particularly
helpful (Peirce, 1999: 75-114.)
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certain kind of automatic process. This is why Cohen &Meskin refer to pho-
tographs as being “epistemically special”; although they are themselves not
the case, the fact that they are products, even tenuously, of the facts of the
matter means that they retain a certain epistemic and ontological gravitas.
Accordingly, I argue in my next and final chapter that photographs, due to
their afore-mentioned “epistemic specialness”, serve as a kind of temporary
solution to the existential and ontological anxieties posed by technology
that were discussed in chapter 3. In doing so, I will draw substantively upon
the scholarship of Gilles Deleuze and Stanley Cavell, particularly as read
through the lenses of philosophers Paola Marrati and Robert Sinnerbrink.
5 T RANSLAT ING RAYS IN TO FA I T H
[Scientific rays] were occult, supersensual, irrational; they were
a revelation of mysterious energy like that of the Cross [. . . ].
The historian was thus reduced to his last resources. Clearly if
he was bound to reduce all these forces to a common value, this
common value could have no measure but that of their attrac-
tion on his own mind. He must treat them as they had been
felt; as convertible, reversible, interchangeable attractions on
thought. He made up his mind to venture it; he would risk
translating rays into faith. (Adams, 2008: 320)
5.1 A Nihilism We Can Believe in
Though we have yet to robustly engage with much material within the field
of philosophy of film, it is unsurprising that its conceptual concerns over-
lap with those of philosophy of photography. Despite the fact that cinema
has its own axes to grind with regards to the composition and assemblage
of motion pictures, the epistemic and ontological concerns are the same:
the fact that the photographic image is still in one instance and moving in
another seems largely irrelevant to the problem of the nature of their rela-
tionship with the world. Accordingly, we will begin the final chapter with
a discussion of the work of Gilles Deleuze, inarguably the most influential
philosopher of cinema at present: just as Heidegger is an unavoidable ob-
stacle in philosophy of technology, so too is Gilles Deleuze in his particular
domain. We begin this chapter with an extremely brief rendition of the
key concepts in Deleuze’ work on cinema—namely the movement-image
and the time-image—before examining, via Paola Marrati and Robert Sin-
nerbrink, the extent to which Deleuze can speak to us about the ontological
anxieties introduced by technology.
One should understand that the aim of the first volume of Deleuze’s Cin-
ema is primarily to define the cinematic movement-image with respect to
the irreducible positions that constitute the illusion of movement in the real
world—the generic temporal instants that Deleuze calls the “any-instants-
whatever” (Deleuze, 2005a: 3-4).1 As Robert Sinnerbrink, in New Philoso-
phies of Film, writes: “cinema is a mechanical system of animating images
that enable the reproduction of movement ‘as a function of the any-instant-
1 “[Movement] will always occur in the interval between the two [positions], in other words
behind your back. On the other hand, however much you divide and subdivide time, move-
ment will always occur in a concrete duration; thus each movement will have its own qual-
itative duration. Hence we oppose two irreducible formulas: ‘real movement—concrete du-
ration’, and ‘immobile sections + abstract time”’ (Deleuze, 2005a: 1).
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whatever’ [. . . ], which are selected and combined in order to ‘create the
impression of continuity’ (Deleuze, 2005a: 5). [. . . It is the] subordination
of time to movement” (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 94).2 Subsequently, Deleuze spe-
ciates the movement-image into three distinct categories, which correlate
broadly to long shots, medium shots and close-ups, respectively. There is,
moreover, a distinct semiotic rigidity to the movement-image, with Deleuze
equating the affection-image and action-image with the Peircean semeio-
logical concepts of the First and the Second, as he discusses in his 1888 “A
Guess at the Riddle”. To wit:
1. The affection-image occupies the gap between the perception-image
and the action-image. Affect occupies the difference between the
world as it presents itself to the camera (the perception-image) and
the world as the cinematic actants believe that it ought to be, thus
yielding the motive for the action-image: “Affection is what occupies
the interval, what occupies it without filling it in or filling it up. It
surges in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the subject
[. . . ]. It is a coincidence of subject and object, or the way in which
a subject perceives itself [. . . ] ‘from the inside”’ (Deleuze, 2005a: 67).
Although we are most familiar with affection-images in the form of
facial close-ups, they can also be of affectively charged objects, as in
the case of the blue box in David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive, or the
snow globe and sled in Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane. Subsequently, it
correlates with the Peircean First by virtue of the fact that it is strictly
monadic; the image is not in relation to anything else. Peirce writes
of the First: “The First is that whose being is simply in itself, not
referring to anything nor lying behind anything. [. . . It] must be en-
tirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else
[. . . ]. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation: it has no unity
and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has
already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies
a denial of something else” (Peirce, 1992: 248). The correlation with
the affection-image seems clear; as Deleuze writes: “Firstness is thus
a category of the Possible: it gives a proper consistency to the possi-
bly, it expresses the possible without actualising it, whilst making it a
complete mode. Now, this is exactly what the affection-image is: it is
quality or power, it is potentiality considered for itself as expressed”
(Deleuze, 2005a: 100-101).
2 A note on nomenclature: Deleuze’s use of the term “image” is somewhat misleading, par-
ticularly in light of the way that we have thus far employed the word. Although my usage
hitherto reflects commonsense usage (or, at least, so I hope)—that is, an artefact that has
recorded or otherwise depicts perceptual information—Deleuze’s “image” is borrowed di-
rectly from Bergson, in that for him perceptions are images. Viz.: although I am presumably
interfacing with a real computer as I write this, the perceptual data that I am receiving
from the computer—appearance, tactility, whatever—themselves are the plenary that consti-
tute the phenomenological image of the computer. Although confusing, I will nonetheless
observe Deleuze’s nomenclature, for I suspect changing it to reflect my use of the word “im-
age” would only be more confusing. Deleuze is hard enough without my own classificatory
quirks obscuring the material further.
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2. The action-image is the image that focuses upon the duration of ac-
tion, particularly as it relates to the relationships that exist between
constituent subjects, such as characters. Deleuze writes of the action-
image: “The operation under consideration is no longer elimination,
selection or framing, but the incurving of the universe, which simulta-
neously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible ac-
tion on things. [. . . ] And, just as perception relates movement to ‘bod-
ies’ (nouns), that is to rigid objects which will serve as moving bodies
or as things moved, action relates movement to ‘acts’ (verbs) which
will be the design for an assumed end or result” (Deleuze, 2005a: 67).
As in the case of the perception-image, the action-image is subject to
further speciation, falling into one of two categories: the large form
or small form, where, in the case of the former, either the situation
discloses the action, subsequently changing the situation (SAS1) or,
in the case of the latter, the initial action discloses a situation which
subsequently catalyses more action (ASA1).
3 Regardless of its form,
the fact that the action-image speaks of the domain of action, of the
dyadic interplay between parts, is why Deleuze correlates it with the
Peircean Second, which is not the domain of raw qualities (as in the
case of the First), but is rather the domain of individuation: “[The Sec-
ond] meets us in such facts as Another, Relation, Compulsion, Effect,
Dependence, Independence, Negation, Occurrence, Reality, Result. A
thing cannot be other, negative, or independent, without a first to or
of which it shall be other, negative, or independent” (Peirce, 1992: 248).
Accordingly, per Deleuze: “Everything which only exists by being op-
posed, by and in a duel, therefore belongs to secondness [. . . ]. It is
the category of the Real, the actual, of the individuated. And the first
figure of secondness is that in which power-qualities become ‘forces’,
that is to say are actualised in particular states of things [. . . ]. It is
here that the action-image is born and developed” (Deleuze, 2005a:
100).
3. The perception-image is the image that purely relates to the percep-
tion of sight, whether as if by a human agent (what Deleuze calls
solid perception), the ambiguous elision of images (liquid perception),
or as if seen by a non-human agent; as if the world could see itself
(gaseous perception): “But the cinema is not simply the camera: it
is montage. And if from the point of view of the human eye, mon-
tage is undoubtedly a construction, from the point of view of another
eye, it ceases to be one; it is the pure vision of a non-human eye, of
an eye which would be in things” (Deleuze, 2005a: 83). Unlike the
affection-image and the action-image, which are both kinds of signs,
the perception-image is in some sense the Zeroth to the First and Sec-
ond of the affection-image and action-image; it sorts and sets limits
to the facts of the matter—it sets them into Bergsonian “images”—
allowing us to parse them in the first place. Paola Marrati writes:
3 We will not speak of this more, here; see Deleuze, 2005a: 145-181 for additional details.
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“But the perception-image is not limited to sorting; it incurves the
universe around itself and gives a horizon to the world. [. . . ] Per-
ception shows us the usable face of things, whereas action teaches us
how to use them. Perception is thus always essentially sensorimotor
and pragmatic, always oriented by and toward the needs and interests
of life [. . . ]. The belief that perception’s sole aim is pure knowledge,
all too common in philosophy, is not merely an isolated error but
also the origin of all sorts of false conceptions in metaphysics” (Mar-
rati, 2003: 34). It is curious: although Deleuze is extremely equivocal
about the nature of the perception-image—at least in the sense that he
is far less specific about the nature of the perception-image than he is
about affection- or action-images—it is also the image that seems to
offer the most insight with regards to his metaphysical commitments.
We will return to this point shortly.
Finally, we should understand that the triad of the movement-image is
resolved in the relation-image, which is the first avatar of the domain of
thought—the means by which we can speak of the camera encompassing
thinking, or exhibiting a kind of mindedness by virtue of the affection-image
and the action-image containing something in the way of mental content:
“pure consciousness” in the first instance; implied in the “end of action (con-
ception), in the choice of means (judgement), in the set of implications (rea-
soning)” in the second (Deleuze, 2005a: 202). It is the affection-image and
the action-image that constitute cinematic characters, and it is these fig-
ures that “introduced the mental into the image” (Deleuze, 2005a: 202). Ac-
cordingly, the relation-image is the synthesis of perception-image, affection-
image and action-image, or Zeroth, First and Second, thus introducing the
Peircean Third: the “Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the
absolute first and last, and brings them into relationship” (Peirce, 1992: 249);
it “finds its most adequate representation in relation; for relation is always
third, being necessarily external to its terms” (Deleuze, 2005a: 202). The
Third is the domain of relations, of the possibility of intelligible accounts
that can subsume all of the constituent parts. It—and the movement-image—
is rational, muscular and positivistic, in that the Third is able to be reduced
to and subsequently parsed as set of atomic constituents and relations. Paola
Marrati writes: “[In the movement-image, the] relations of humans to each
other and to the milieu, world or universe were organized around action.
These actions were not necessarily happy, and were sometimes even tragic,
but they were nonetheless always inscribed within a horizon of possible
meaning” (Marrati, 2003: 79).
This material has been covered at both great length and depth by other
authors, so we shan’t explore the movement-image further here. If nothing
else, we should appreciate that the Deleuzian movement-image privileges
movement over time; time is only indirectly articulated via the assemblage
of movement-images that constitute works of cinema. However, there are
problems lurking below the positivist motions of the movement-image; this
“sensory-motor scheme”, or “perception-affection-action circuit”, as Deleuze
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calls the set of relations that constitute the movement-image, suffers a kind
of existential internal ruction after the Second World War—an event that
he describes as the “crisis of the action-image” (Deleuze, 2005a: 201-219 and
Deleuze, 2005b: 1-23). It is the nature of this crisis that will be the object of
the rest of our discussion of Deleuze.
When Deleuze speaks of the crisis of the action-image, he is speaking
of the decay of narrative forms, of the impossibility that narratives them-
selves are entirely parseable. With time subordinate to movement, cinema
is rational and explicitly causal; the relationships between parts are clear
and unequivocal, reflecting a general belief in an ordered and logical uni-
verse. Even in the case of the frenetic chaos of a Charlie Chaplin comedy,
we admire it because the relationships between objects are deterministic;
as Cavell writes in The World Viewed, although we cannot predict the out-
come of the mayhem, each event is explicitly and transparently caused by
the event before it, permitting “his Proustian or Jamesian relationships with
Murphy beds and flights of stairs and with vases on runners on tables on
rollers: the heroism of momentary survival, Nietzsche’s man as a tightrope
across an abyss” (Cavell, 1979: 37). We might even say that the action
in the action-image is reducibly emergent, in that complex outcomes are
nonetheless entirely reducible to simple basal phenomena; the only thing
preventing us from correctly anticipating the outcomes of Chaplin’s cine-
matic actions are our own intellectual limitations. Nonetheless, the crisis of
the action-image is catalysed by our slightly gormless faith in a determinis-
tic, predictable universe having been shaken by the horrors of the Second
World War: “the crisis which has shaken the action-image has depended
on many factors which only had their full effect after the war, some of
which were social, economic, political, moral and others more internal to
art, to literature and to the cinema in particular” (Deleuze, 2005a: 210). It
is a move that echoes the writings of figures such as Arendt, Marcuse, Fou-
cault, Adorno and Horkheimer: that the rationalistic positivism inherited
from the Enlightenment—instantiated in the movement-image—leads one
necessarily and inexorably to the violent and decadent excesses of National
Socialism, Soviet communism and/or gratuitous consumerism (Sinnerbrink,
2011: 97).4
We hardly believe any longer that a global situation can give
rise to an action which is capable of modifying it—no more
than we believe that an action can force a situation to disclose
itself, even partially. The most ‘healthy’ illusions fall. The
first things to be compromised everywhere are the linkages of
situation-action, action-reaction, excitation-response, in short,
the sensory-motor links which produced the action-image. Re-
alism, despite all its violence—or rather with all its violence
4 As Horkheimer and Adorno write: “Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes
dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities. For the Enlighten-
ment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion;
modern positivism consigns it to poetry” (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002: 4).
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which remains sensory-motor—is oblivious to this new state of
things where the synsigns disperse and the indices become con-
fused. We need new signs. (Deleuze, 2005a: 211, emphasis mine)
Accordingly, this crisis of the action-image catalyses the necessity for the
developments of an entirely new kind of image: one in which plot is loos-
ened; an image wherein archetypes and clichés become self-aware, celebrat-
ing amongst themselves; when space and the causal order are disrupted and
dispersed. This is what Deleuze called the time-image—an image in which,
rather than time being subordinate to movement, movement becomes subor-
dinate to time. As Sinnerbrink writes: “Such images are no longer sensory-
motor in orientation but reveal instead ‘pure optical and sound situations’
[. . . ]. These are pure audiovisual descriptions that are no longer extended
into action, that expresses a new way of depicting the world, opening up the
intensive dimensions of time, affect and thought” (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 96).
With movement subordinate to time, so too in this vein does Deleuze write
that the time-image “is a cinema of the seer and not of the agent” (Deleuze,
2005b: 2); even the characters inhabiting the cinematic worlds of the time-
image are watching each other and themselves, quietly aware of their own
circumstances: “The characters are multiple, with weak interferences and
become principal or revert to being secondary. It is nevertheless not a se-
ries of sketches, a succession of short stories, since they are all caught in the
same reality which disperse them” (Deleuze, 2005a: 211). However, even this
“same reality” is contingent, fissile; human being are only weakly moored
to an indifferent cinematic universe where causation can no longer be relied
upon to tie together events; where instead the action is punctured by mean-
ingless chaos or maddening stillness. “[The] line or the fibre of the universe
[. . . ] has broken. [. . . Reality] is lacunary as much as dispersive” (Deleuze,
2005a: 211).
It is one of the curious qualities of Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 that it is oc-
casionally ambiguous as to what extent Deleuze is actually talking about
film at all. Although his examples and nomenclature are explicitly cine-
matic, I am often uncertain as to whether Deleuze is actually speaking of
cinema, or is describing a metaphysical program whereby reality is cin-
ema. We have already noted his curious ambivalence regarding the true
nature of the perception-image, particularly as it relates to the Real—what
Deleuze, in a Spinozan turn, calls the “plane of immanence”; he writes of
the perception-image as seeming to provide an horizon to experience in
much the same way that the Husserlian transcendental ego, the Heidegge-
rian Dasein or the Merleau-Pontian corps propre sets the experiential and
conceptual limits of lived experience. This seems to lead him inevitably to-
wards endorsing a kind of Bergsonian cinematic metaphysics, inspired at
least in part by his earlier scholarship in Difference and Repetition—but it is
also a metaphysics that contains within it the seeds of the disintegration of
the movement-image.
The plane of immanence is the movement (the facet of move-
ment) which is established between the parts of each system
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and between one system and another, which crosses them all,
stirs them all up together and subjects them all to the condition
which prevents them from being absolutely closed. It is there-
fore a section; but, despite some terminological ambiguities in
Bergson, it is not an immobile and instantaneous section, it is
a mobile section, a temporal section or perspective. It is a bloc
of space-time, since the time of the movement which is at work
within it is part of it every time. There is even an infinite series
of such blocs or mobile sections which will be, as it were, so
many presentations of the plane, corresponding to the succes-
sion of movements in the universe. And the plane is not distinct
from this presentation of planes. This is not mechanism, it is
machinism. The material universe, the plane of immanence, is
the machine assemblage of movement-images. Here Bergson is
startlingly ahead of his time: it is the universe as cinema in
itself, a metacinema. (Deleuze, 2005a: 59)
This paragraph serves as an early signpost for the crisis of the action-
image that arises later in Cinema 1. That is, if Deleuze is discreetly arguing
in favour of a plane of immanence constituted by the machine assemblage
of movement-images—certainly, as least insofar as we are able to perceive
it—then it seems to preclude the possibility of all actions being “inscribed
within a horizon of possible meaning” (Marrati, 2003: 79). For, despite the
universe being constituted by an infinite series of space-time “blocs”, they
are fundamentally expressions of a kind of metaphysical monism, being of
the same substance—that is, of immanence without opposition. He writes,
with Félix Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus: “Here, there are no longer any
forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation
of subjects. There is no structure, any more than there is genesis. [. . . ]
Nothing develops, but things arrive late or early, and form this or that as-
semblage depending on their compositions of speed.” (Deleuze and Guattari,
2004: 266). So, despite the perception-image serving to partially constitute
the movement-image, the provided horizon of experience is fundamentally
a misleading one, for the plane of immanence itself is a realm in which
positivistic or teleological explanations must inherently falter; with no real
division between parts, there is no possibility of progress or of meaningful
change. The crisis of the action-image seems not only an artistic or aesthetic
crisis, but rather an ontological or existential crisis.
Suddenly, the crisis of the action-image is one of lived experience; not
only are cinematic worlds rendered fissile and inexplicable, but so too is our
own. With the twisted wreckage of positivism washing up upon our shores,
we (to paraphrase Sartre) were forced, without traditions, with the means
available, to render our stupor and forlornness in the midst of incompre-
hensible events. Moreover, I am not alone in having made this observation;
Marrati, in her Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy argues that Deleuze’s
cinematic works are most correctly understood as, among other things, a
paean to the expired possibility of revolutionary politics (Marrati, 2003: 5).
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As traditional narratives have disintegrated, it is no longer coherent to as-
pire to new forms of political and social life, let alone to rely upon inexorable
sociocultural teloi as in the case of antebellum, pre-Frankfurt School Marx-
ism: “Dialectical or teleological modes [. . . ] give a direction and a sense to
the events that punctuate history. The idea of revolution is a typical exam-
ple of this: the new world to come regulates human actions and gives them
a real significance. [. . . ] The thought of immanence implies the rejection of
any historicism and of the subordination of time to the oriented path that
historicism [. . . ] necessarily implies” (Marrati, 2003: 81). Accordingly, Mar-
rati argues that Deleuze’s description of the crisis of the action-image is no
more an analysis of a shift in cinematic aesthetics than it is an analysis of
the crisis of historical grand narratives more generally; a grim antecedent to
the gormless optimism of Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History?”.5 More-
ove, Deleuze is not alone in making this point: as Robert Sinnerbrink notes,
Cavell expresses a similar sentiment, diagnosing our suspicion of truths and
grand narratives in lived experience as being symptomatic of a kind of exis-
tential dissatisfaction with the contemporary era due to the lasting effects of
the SecondWorldWar: “We no longer grant, or take it for granted, that men
doing the work of the world together are working for the world’s good, or
that if they are working for the world’s harm they can be stopped. [. . . The]
stain of the atomic blood will not wash and that its fallout is nauseating us
beyond medicine, aging us very rapidly” (Cavell, 1979: 62-63). Accordingly,
and as a result of this existential doubt, Marrati writes: “What is broken
with History is our link to the world, and the power of time in person will
lead us nowhere if this link is not reestablished. Our skepticism is ethical
[. . . ]” (Marrati, 2003: 87).
What does this mean, this “ethical” scepticism? We have already seen that
it is at least partially constituted by uncertainty surrounding the possibility
of revolutionary change—a charge that would put Deleuze in agreement
with Marcuse, if not Habermas and Feenberg. Moreover, it seems that this
ethical scepticism is a symptom of a kind of existential scepticism ushered in
by the tacit acknowledgement of a kind of Bergsonian monism. Having lost
faith in our narratives, Deleuze argues—echoing Cavell’s claim that we can
“no longer naturally establish conviction in our presentness to the world”
5 “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a par-
ticular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government. [. . . ] The Battle of Jena marked the end of history
because it was at that point that the vanguard of humanity (a term quite familiar to Marx-
ists) actualized the principles of the French Revolution. While there was considerable work
to be done after 1806—abolishing slavery and the slave trade, extending the franchise to
workers, women, blacks, and other racial minorities, etc.—the basic principles of the liberal
democratic state could not be improved upon. The two world wars in this century and their
attendant revolutions and upheavals simply had the effect of extending those principles spa-
tially, such that the various provinces of human civilization were brought up to the level of
its most advanced outposts, and of forcing those societies in Europe and North America at
the vanguard of civilization to implement their liberalism more fully” (Fukuyama, 1989).
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(Cavell, 1979: 60)—that we have, as a corollary, lost faith in the things-in-
themselves:
The link between man and the world is broken. Henceforth,
this link must become an object of belief: it is the impossible
which can only be restored within a faith. Belief is no longer
addressed to a different or transformed world. Man is in the
world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction
of which man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by
belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what he
sees and hears. The cinema must film, not the world, but belief
in this world, our only link. The nature of the cinematographic
illusion has often been considered. Restoring our belief in the
world—this is the power of modern cinema (when it stops being
bad). Whether we are Christians or atheists, in our universal
schizophrenia, we need reasons to believe in this world. (Deleuze,
2005b: 166)
It is not that Deleuze thinks that the world is literally “gone”; he does not
believe that it has died, effaced by our own collective sceptical disposition.
Rather, our loss of the world acknowledges that the world is still there, but
that we may no longer be possible to make sense of it sufficiently in order to
begin life anew (Marrati, 2003: 89). As Deleuze and Guattari write in What
is Philosophy?: “[It] is possible that the problem now concerns the one who
believes in the world, [. . . ] so as once again to give birth to new modes of
existence [. . . ]. It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes
our most difficult task [. . . ]” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1996: 74-75). The crisis
of the action image is a crisis not only of scepticism—an acknowledgment
of our fundamental inability to render narratives about the inevitability of
human progress—but also introduces a modern problem of nihilism: that
our uncertainties about the usefulness or relevance of lived narratives has
engendered a kind of ontological crisis; a fear that the world is without
meaning. Understood this way, it is interesting—and I think appropriate—
that Marrati’s Deleuze starts to sound extremely Heideggerian with regards
to the anxieties that are being articulated. In both cases there is a kind of
suspicion or despair that the world has been denuded of meaning, of the ca-
pacity for mystery and epiphany. The unease we feel is both phenomenolog-
ical and existential; no longer capable of poiesis, Dasein—our very Being—is
endangered.
Not even the praxical knowledge offered by Allen’s artefactual epistemol-
ogy offers a way out of this morass, for neither knowledge nor truth—at
least according to Allen’s strictly anti-metaphysical pragmatism—are par-
ticularly special or impressive properties. If “truth”, as he argues, is nothing
more than the right kind of superlative performance, it simply cannot sus-
tain Being; indeed, it is unclear what kind of relationship exists between
truth and Being except in the sense that they are both anchored to things in
the world, viz.: the Heideggerian comparison between Vorhandenheit and
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Zuhandenheit, and how both properties are instantiated in the same object.
“Truth” and “knowledge” are not intrinsically valuable or powerful, accord-
ing to an Allenian schema; insofar as they help us to live, it is only by
providing palliation to make our lives easier. Indeed, even well before Allen
published Knowledge and Civilization, this remained a common sentiment
in his work; the closing lines of his early Truth in Philosophy read: “truth
has no value apart from whatever is built, destroyed, sustained or impeded
with what passes for true. Truth has no power of its own, no utopian poten-
tial, no affinity for good, and will not make us free” (Allen, 1993: 182). This
is an important observation: the mere fact that something is epistemically
satisfying does not tell us how we are to live, nor does it help us take the
world seriously if we are the only concrete point of reference. To re-quote
Heidegger: “Man [. . . ] exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In
this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters
exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise to one final
delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only
himself” (Heidegger, 1977b: 27).
Marrati and I do differ on one point, however. Although I am inclined to
endorse her reading of Deleuze as articulating a kind of existential anxiety—
even if it does rely rather heavily on those few passages where Deleuze
refers explicitly to politics and lived experience (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 101-
102)—I am not convinced of the emphasis that she places upon this exis-
tential despair being premised upon the (im)possibility of revolutionary po-
litical action. It is not that I think she is incorrect, per se; rather I believe
that her analysis is incomplete by virtue of the fact that she seems unaware
of the tangible effect that technology has had upon the development of this
collective dispositional pessimism. We have already seen the deeply contin-
gent relationship that holds between technics and contemporary political
structures: not only does socio-politics influence the kinds of technology
utilised (cf.: Feenberg’s discussion of the technological ramifications of ren-
dering slavery illegal), but so too do technologies themselves bear relevantly
upon the forms that these socio-political structures take.
Consequently, I argue that the crisis of the action-image—the “break” with
the world that Deleuze poses—is just as much a product of post-Heideggerian
technological concerns as it is a product of Frankfurt School political pes-
simism. Moreover, given the mutually contingent nature of socio-politics
and technology, this relationship should not be unsurprising, for they are in
some important respect complementary symptoms of the same fundamental
ontological disorder: per our analysis that concluded chapter 3, it is a fear
that we have been unmoored from the things-in-themselves, that we have
lost our sense of Being, and that our sense of agency and self-determination
is under threat from social and epistemic sources of our own making. The
crisis of the action-image is not only a crisis that ushers in a kind of “ethical”
scepticism, per Marrati, but also a kind of ontological nihilism as the world
is collapsed into an instrumental (and fundamentally Allenian) image.
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5.2 Renewing our Vows to the World
If the Heideggerians are to be believed, our technology and its discontents
have left us adrift in a universe without meaning. Sceptical of forms of
knowing and convinced that the world has been eviscerated of our Being,
our lived experience has become featureless, distanceless, das Abstandlose.
We are confronted with the inescapable challenge of a Heideggerian world
picture, which “does not mean a picture of the world but the world con-
ceived and grasped as picture” (Heidegger, 1977a: 129). Despite the various
proposals to help us address this anxiety as we discussed in chapter 3, the
overwhelming and catastrophic effects of the crisis of the action-image are
felt too deeply. The world has been too effectively dehumanised and too ef-
fectively disenchanted as our technology occludes our sense of Being. With
the things-in-themselves turned into an image—a instrumental set of raw
physical data—we are no longer capable of experiencing genuine mystery
or epiphany; particularly according to Heidegger and Borgmann, we cannot
feel as if we are communing with the divine. Furthermore, although it is an
error to feel this way (Allen is, I think, entirely correct in his assessment
of the world-constituting nature of technological progress), our suspicion is
defensible and justifiable; we are rightly anxious about being disappointed
by our own narratives and our own belief in the world, particularly when
our account of the world seems so complete and so replete with facts. But
what other option do we have? Sceptics we might be, but we cannot afford
to stop being part of the world; we must somehow deal with the problem of
our own scepticism and reconcile ourselves, if only occasionally or momen-
tarily, with living in a universe denuded of Being. We must adopt a certain
sceptical disposition; a kind of ironic disbelief where it is possible to exist in
the world without necessarily committing to it. Thomas Nagel on this topic,
in his seminal essay “The Absurd”, writes:
Philosophical skepticism does not cause us to abandon our ordi-
nary beliefs, but it lends them a peculiar flavor. After acknowl-
edging that their truth is incompatible with possibilities that we
have no ground for believing do not obtain—apart from grounds
in those very beliefs which we have called into question—we
return to our familiar convictions with a certain sense of irony
and resignation. Unable to abandon the natural responses on
which they depend, we take them back, like a spouse who has
run off with someone else and then decided to return. (Nagel,
1971: 724)
So how is it possible for us to return to the world, to recommit to that
inconstant spouse? As articulated in chapter 3, we have remarkably little
in the way of answers. Although all of those philosophers we discussed
are happy to provide diagnoses of these existential problems, few actually
commit to providing answers that exceed the bromidic or overly idealistic—
if indeed an answer is provided at all. Beyond Heidegger’s exhortations to
rediscover Being, or Marcuse’s utopian optimism in a Marxian revolution,
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or Feenberg’s cautious hopefulness about the power of human agency to
materially affect technological outcomes, it is really only Borgmann who
attempts to provide a muscular account of how we are best to live in a post-
industrial and technologised era. Although there are deep problems with
his account, we begin our concluding analysis with his work.
If we recall from chapter 3.3, Albert Borgmann argues—in his specific
spin on the problem of Heideggerian world-loss—that this ontological anx-
iety stems from the fact that we have lost or otherwise forgotten our true
mode of being. We have been entirely subsumed within the device paradigm:
a form of living not only characterised by the fact that those technologies
that help constitute our forms of life have become invisible to us, but also
characterised by the fact that opting out is not considered a desirable or co-
herent option: “[A] decision against technology or, more accurately, against
technologically specified democracy is one against freedom simply and for
prejudice, paternalism or totalitarianism” (Borgmann, 1984: 103). However,
rather than pinning his hopes on the possibility of a Marcusian New Tech-
nology, Borgmann believes that we have lost—and must reattain—the right
kinds of activities or focal practices. Although we are now able to extract
clean, clear water from a spigot, thus more easily meeting our physical
needs, we have lost the focal dimension of drawing water from a well: as I
noted previously, Borgmann points out that Abraham’s servant discovered
the future wife of Isaac at a well, and a well was the location of the first
kiss between Jacob and Rachel. When we interact with the world strictly
instrumentally, we lose something of its significance and its character, as
well as the fully plenary experience that would otherwise be available to us:
“These features of physical engagement and of family relations are only first
indications of the full dimensions of a thing’s world. Physical engagement
is not simply physical contact but the experience of the world through the
manifold sensibility of the body” (Borgmann, 1984: 42).
Borgmann, unlike many of his post-Heideggerian colleagues, offers a de-
ceptively simple answer to this perceived problem: given that we cannot
return to the, in some senses, more desirable form of life that was available
to us prior to the Industrial Revolution, it behoves us instead to forge and
reliably observe new focal practices. Although Borgmann nominates reli-
gious observance as the focal practice par excellence, there is nonetheless
something worshipful about all of the focal practices he nominates, even
something as banal as a neighbourhood game of baseball: “A thoughtful
and graceful ballpark tunes people to the same harmonies. It inspires com-
mon pride and pleasure, a shared sense of season and place, a joint antic-
ipation of drama. [. . . ] When reality and community conspire this way,
divinity descends on the game, divinity of an impersonal yet potent kind”
(Borgmann, 1992: 135). It is this idea of sharing: of sharing space, goals,
victories, defeats; of feeling the spark of the divine—even of a secular kind—
in the wonder of shared experience. It is worth re-quoting what is easily
Borgmann’s most beauteous passage on the subject:
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Amidst the complication of conditions, of the Bedingungen, we
must uncover the simplicity of things, of the Dinge. A jug, an
earthen vessel from which we pour wine, is such a thing. It
teaches us what it is to hold, to offer, to pour and to give. In its
clay, it gathers for us the earth as it does in containing the wine
that has grown from the soil. It gathers the sky whose rain and
sun are present in the wine. It refreshes and animates us in our
mortality. And in the libation it acknowledges and calls on the
divinities. (Borgmann, 2003: 294-295)
However, Borgmann claims, not all shared experiences are created equal.
Although he thinks there is a kind of ontological honesty to playing base-
ball, going on a long hike, making a meal from scratch, or paying defer-
ence to your god of choice, the fabric of contemporary life is compromised
by a myriad of dishonest or “hyperreal” experiences: “This middle region
of physical reality is divided today by the line between the real and the
hyperreal. On the one side are things of commanding presence, contin-
uous with the world; on the other, disposable and discontinuous experi-
ences” (Borgmann, 1992:118). It is in this vein that, in Crossing the Post-
modern Divide, Borgmann refers to “the cancerous growth of video culture”
(Borgmann, 1992: 10)—a growth that is, as we observed earlier, due to the
loss of “authentic” practices, and has engendered an era of hyperactivity, hy-
perintelligence and hyperrealism that he believes is synonymous with the
postmodern age. Accordingly, Borgmann poses us a choice: we must decide
“whether to proceed on the endless and joyless plain of hypermodernism or
to cross over to another more real world” (Borgmann, 1992: 126).
General criticisms of this position have, of course, been made—such as in
the case of Douglas Kellner’s essay on the subject6—criticisms that I will not
repeat here. Rather, my dispute with Borgmann is rather specific: not that
technically mediated experiences are or can be just as “authentic” (whatever
that means) as non-mediated experiences, but rather that Borgmann en-
tirely misunderstands the existential ramifications and effects of the “video
culture” that he so aggressively denigrates. Of course he is, as I have ar-
gued in chapter 4, correct in thinking that photographs, whether moving
or still, are not world- or truth-bearing in any significant way: although
a photographic image might have natural meaning with the world, the in-
tentional complexity of photographs, as well as the fact that any kind of
meaning or narrative we can derive from photographs is a kind of entirely
non-natural testimony, means that the photograph cannot serve as a source
of egocentric spatial information. However, he completely misses the fact
that photographs are nonetheless epistemically special; the fact that they are
6 “[. . . ] new technological modes of experience and interaction are just as real and life enhanc-
ing as conversation, gardening, taking a hike in the wilds, or caring for animals—examples
positively valorized by Borgmann. I believe that Borgmann’s distinction between the real
and hyperreal and his denigration of hyperreality are problematic, that we need to decon-
struct such oppositions, and should see how new technologies make possible the sort of
focal, life-enhancing experiences and activities that Borgmann himself calls for” (Kellner,
2000: 242-243).
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ostensibly “simply the inevitable outcome of a certain series of events” (Sny-
der and Allen, 1975: 157) means that they seem to us as epistemically more
reliable than forms of representation such as painting. Although a photo-
graph might well confuse us by virtue of tracing the world in a misleading
way, it is only our testimony of the trace that misleads; the trace itself makes
no claims at all.
Of course, the curious thing is that we are misled—and willingly—by pho-
tographs all the time. When I watch a film in good faith, I am watching it
with a certain kind of approach, armed with a certain disposition. I am as-
suming, within the boundary conditions set by my level of investment and
subsequent enjoyment, that the events transpiring on the screen are in fact
the case: this is what people mean when they say that they “suspend their
disbelief”. It is because photographs are epistemically special by virtue of
their automatically-rendered verisimilitude that we are happier to believe
in them, even if what they are showing us is impossible—or, at the very
least, highly improbable; whether it is due to conditioning or a genuine
difference in ontological status, we are disposed to think of photographic
images as traces, even in the event that they are testimonies (as in cases
of post-production rotoscoping or CGI, for example). It is for this reason
that, contra Borgmann’s claims, although we remain adrift in an entirely
empty, senseless universe, the power of photography and cinema lies in the
fact that it serves as an existential response to the epistemic scepticism and
the ontological nihilism ushered in by our deeply strange relationship with
our artefacts. Having lost our narratives and our myths to the crisis of the
action-image, it is with the bizarre properties instantiated in photographs
that we find ourselves once again able to renew our vows and to have faith
in the world—and in new forms of living—once again: “We need an ethic
or a faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a need to believe in something
else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are a part.” (Deleuze,
2005b: 167).
And so it is the case that Deleuze and Marrati claim that cinema (and,
I would also argue, photography more broadly), is fundamentally Catholic,
despite the acknowledged “strangeness” of the comparison (Marrati, 2003:
80). It should be noted: his is not only a kind of phenomenal comparison
between the feeling of entering a cinema theatre and entering a cathedral,
although there are undeniable parallels—a place of quiet and solitude, where
stories are told, where popcorn or communion wafers serve as hosts to be
consumed—but rather a comparison that appeals to the fact that both cin-
ema and Catholicism aspire towards universality, toward “a becoming-world,
that current processes of capitalism do not exhaust”; like Catholicism, cin-
ema preserves the sense that “the link between humans and the world is al-
ways at stake” (Marrati, 2003: 80): “For the cinematographic image, in con-
trast to the theatre, showed us the link between the man and the world.
Hence it developed either in the direction of a transformation of the world
by man, or in the discovery of an internal and higher world that man him-
self was . . . ” (Deleuze, 2005b: 165-166). Being arts “of the masses”, cinema
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and photography bespeak a catholic (in both senses of the word) attempt
to write new myths and new stories in a lived universe that is fundamen-
tally hostile to both; a way to make sense of the senseless (Marrati, 2003:
80). Deleuze writes that “belief replaces knowledge only when it becomes
belief in this world, as it is” (Deleuze, 2005b: 166); faced with an Allenian
epistemic universe denuded of metaphysics, we are only sustained by belief
when we once again find it within ourselves to believe in the world: we are
only tethered to the things-in-themselves by the possibility of hope. More-
over, because of the unique properties of the photographic image, it is only
in cinema and photography that these hopes are satisfyingly instantiated:
these artefacts have become an expression of a kind of faith, and is “faith
alone” that allows us to “forge the link anew and give us the world once
again” (Marrati, 2003: 87).
Faith is no longer concerned with a heavenly sphere beyond life,
but neither is it concerned with the project of a better world to
come. The object of faith is not in a temporal beyond to be
attained; belief no longer fills the wait with hope, thus making
it acceptable. The new faith invests the world as it is, not to
justify what is intolerable, but to make us believe that although
the organic form of the link that attached us to the world is
broken, the link itself is not broken, and other forms of it can
still be invented. (Marrati, 2003: 86)
This is a key point: that, with the link to the world broken, we have to
have the tools and the faith available to render new kinds of narratives, and
it is the photographic image that affords us these tools. This is the point
that both Deleuze and Cavell make in their books about cinema: that there
is something inherently mythic about the technology that allows us to ex-
plore and express, perhaps, a new kind of faith in the world; they express
the “idea and wish for the world recreated in its own image” (Cavell, 1979:
39). Marrati writes that this is the dimension of greatness to cinema af-
ter the crisis of the action image: the “capability to create other links.” She
writes further: “Italian neorealism marks the appearance of pure optical and
sound situations in cinema and of characters who are no longer ‘actors’ but
seers, witness of a world that has become unthinkable because it has become
intolerable—as intolerable in its immense injustices as in its daily banality”
(Marrati, 2003: 85). Although the photographic or cinematographic image
is very clearly not real, very obviously not the case—as I argued in chapter
4—the fact that they are epistemically special, in that they feel like the case,
is what makes them such remarkable vectors for our new myths; even when
they are testimonies, they nonetheless manage to feel like traces. As Cavell
writes, the “idea of and wish for the world recreated in its own image was
satisfied at last by cinema”; even though this attribution or assumption is
obviously and inherently false—it is what Bazin called the “myth of total
cinema” (Bazin, 1967: 23-27)—the ontologically parasitic nature of the pho-
tographic image makes us feel that the world has been reflected back at us
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by virtue of the automatism of the image (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 112). Cavell
writes:
What is cinema’s way of satisfying the myth? Automatically,
we said. But what does that mean—mean mythically, as it were?
It means satisfying it without my having to do anything, satis-
fying it by wishing. In a word, magically. I have found myself
asking: How could film be art, since all the major arts arise in
some way out of religion? Now I can answer: Because movies
arise out of magic; from below the world. (Cavell, 1979: 39)
The mythic quality of cinema and photographs is given to us as if by
magic; it is not an intellectual exercise of the application of knowledge and
belief, but a deeper, almost visceral response to the demands made of us by
the image. It is almost as if Cavell is describing something like the Barthe-
sian punctum: whereas the merely formal qualities of the image—place, plot,
characters, event; that is, the studium—nonetheless remain in service to the
punctum, that aspect of the image that “rises from the scene, shoots out of
it like an arrow, pierces me. [. . . ] A photograph’s punctum is that accident
which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)” (Barthes, 1981:
26-27). Although the comparison is imperfect, the metaphor nonetheless re-
mains apt: although we are required to give an account for the relationship
between the formal qualities—the testimonial or reading aspect of viewing—
there is something deeper, more raw, something below the world that grabs
our attention and forces us to take the image seriously.
I spoke in the very first chapter about how there is something in the
photographs of Miss Atomic Bomb (figure 19) that made those images feel
something like the truth. Moreover, although we could provide a multitude
of different accounts for why those images were taken, my argument is
these accounts are in a sense divorced from why the image is compelling
in the first place. Perhaps it was a grandiose gesture of American jingo-
ism; a exercise in the kind of blinkered, belligerent nationalism that freely
celebrates the deaths of opposing combatants. Or perhaps, although she
is undeniably adorned in an icon of death—she is, after all, an anthropo-
morphised mushroom cloud—Miss Atomic Bomb is less a fetishisation of
the Bomb’s destructive potential than she seems to be actively participat-
ing in that uniquely American optimism about the Atomic Age. However,
this is immaterial: if the photograph is an expression of the “idea of and
wish for the world recreated in its own image”, whatever justification one
would like to employ to account for her ghoulish semiotic baggage is sec-
ondary to the tacit, immediate andmistaken pre-theoretic belief or intuition
that Miss Atomic Bomb exists in our universe. As Walter Benjamin notes
in “A Small History of Photography”, there is something special or unique
about this sense of sharing a world; there is “something that cannot be si-
lenced, that fills you with an unruly desire to know what her name was,
the woman who was alive there, who even now is still real and will never
consent to be wholly absorbed in art” (Benjamin, 1979: 242-243). It is curi-
ous: although Benjamin wrote that comment in response to the image of an
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entirely different woman—a photograph taken by 19th century photography
David Octavius Hill—it seems fair to think that his comment could be about
any women in any photograph; photography’s aspiration to universality
seen in action.
So why do we have this bizarre intuition? What is it about the photo-
graphic image that forces us to once again have faith in the world, even if
we really have no good reason to do so? Cavell, for his part, argues that this
faith in the magically provided image is fundamentally a product of the fact
that photographic images, in their seeming to be transparent, presenting or
reflecting to us the word, convince us of our own invisibility. They are not
“literally presenting us with the world”, but permit us “to view the world
unseen”. Cavell writes that it is the same kind of power afforded to Gyges
in his eponymous myth: not a “power over creation [. . . ], but a wish not to
need power, not to have to bear its burdens” (Cavell, 1979: 40). The ontolog-
ical ramifications of a performative, artefactual epistemology have left us
uncertain of the world beyond our capacity to instrumentalise it; to again
quote Allen: “The end of human life is the end of the world, beyond which
is—nothing. Human existence and activity make a world where otherwise
there is—nothing. Kick a stone if you like. Slap the table if it helps. That does
not prove that in the absence of human beings such a thing as a stone or a
star exists” (Allen, 2005: 30). Although this certainly seems like the case, it
leaves us ontologically adrift; how are we able to access the world artlessly,
without mediation? Allen would claim that it is impossible, and I am in-
clined to agree even if it leaves us ontologically dissatisfied or unsettled, as
the Heideggerians claim. However, the photographic image lulls us into an
important—even beneficial—cognitive error: despite our inability to justify
the intuition, we feel as if we have been presented to the world as if unseen.
We feel as if we are invisible to the world just as the world is made visible
to us; we feel as if the experience is non-instrumentalised, unmediated and
honest.
[. . . ] the photographic exigency that interpellates us has noth-
ing aesthetic about it. It is, rather, a demand for redemption.
The photograph is always more than an image: it is the site of
a gap, a sublime breach between the sensible and the intelligi-
ble, between copy and reality, between a memory and a hope.
(Agamben, 2007: 26)
I believe it is for this reason that, as Agamben observes in his essay “Judg-
ment Day”, there is something of the Day of Wrath in the photograph; a
sense that “everything that happens” in a photograph—from the universally
significant to the mind-numbingly jejune—is “called forth, summoned to
appear on Judgement Day” (Agamben, 2007: 23). We should be forgiven
if Agamben’s intention is not entirely clear, but he presents an illustrative
example to help us. In 1838, Louis Dageurre, using his eponymous ma-
chine, captured an image of the Boulevard du Temple, one of the main thor-
oughfares in Paris, at a particularly busy moment in the middle of the day
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Figure 19: LeeMerlin as Miss Atomic Bomb, 1957. Source: Las Vegas News Bureau
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Figure 20: Louis Daguerre, Boulevard du Temple, 1838
(figure 20). Having been taken some decades before the advent of the au-
tomobile, one would reasonably expect to see the street bustling with foot
traffic and the street thick with horse-drawn carriages. Instead, the street
is entirely empty; it is as if the world has been washed clean of humanity.
That is, of course, with one exception: whereas, due to the extremely long
exposure time, all of the other human beings in the photograph evaporate
into a faint smear on the footpaths, there is in the bottom left corner, a
man with his foot resting on a stool, having his shoe shined—the very first
photograph of a human being.
Agamben writes that he “could not have invented” a more appropriate im-
age of the Last Judgement, because it is in appearing to capture this slightly
ridiculous gesture—the man’s foot pointing daintily, like a horse perform-
ing in dressage—that the significance of that moment becomes obvious. Al-
though it is the case that “photographs contain an unmistakable historical
index, an indelible date”, he highlights the fact that there is something else
in the photographed gesture; that this index “now refers to another time,
more actual and more urgent that any chronological time” (Agamben, 2007:
25). The photograph operates as a kind of supreme, almost Messianic mo-
ment; it is an instance wherein we feel the real world and the world of
our mediated perceptions to align in some important and vital sense. This
man’s silly, banal gesture (standing tall, leg cocked imperiously) “is now
charged with the weight of an entire life”; in that single photographic mo-
ment, like all photographic moments, is condensed “in itself the meaning of
an entire existence” (Agamben, 2007: 24). There is something of Stiegler’s
analysis here: although our relationships with our artefacts generally leave
us in a privative relationship with immortality (“[. . . ] the Immortals, al-
ways present in their distance, a proximity nevertheless forever withdrawn”
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[Stiegler, 1998: 190]), it is with the photographic image that we are offered
a god’s-eye view. Prior to the invention of the daguerrotype, our mortality
“appears through its relation to immortals for whom it erects temples and
fashions images” (Stiegler, 1998: 195); however, with the introduction of the
photographic image we are no longer required to fashion images, for we
can see the world as the gods would. Observing the world as if by magic,
removed from the normal state of affairs, we are find ourselves privileged
by virtue of being displaced from the facts of the matter: “Photography de-
mands that we remember all this, and photographs testify to all those lost
names, like a Book of Life that the new angel of the apocalypse—the angel
of photography—bolds in his hands at the end of all days, that is, every day”
(Agamben, 2007: 27). And so it is that Cavell writes:
In viewing films, the sense of invisibility is an expression of
modern privacy or anonymity. It is as though the world’s pro-
jection explains our forms of unknownness and of our inability
to know. The explanation is not so much that the world is pass-
ing us by, as that we are displaced from our natural habitation
within it, placed at a distance from it. The screen overcomes
our fixed distance; it makes displacement appear as our natural
condition. (Cavell, 1979: 40-41)
Photographs, therefore, are a kind of response to the crisis of belief that
follows the disintegration of the action-image—the instrumentalisation of
our lifeworlds. As Robert Sinnerbrink notes, this capacity for photographs
and cinema to project, to give us, the world “parallels, but also questions,
our modern sceptical orientation; our ‘inability to know’ ourselves, oth-
ers, or the world”. The photographic image displaces us from the world
by virtue of making us invisible, as if able to watch it and the things that
constitute it from a distance; it naturalises our “condition of existential dis-
placement from our environment, rendering itmeaningful, even pleasurable”
(Sinnerbrink, 2011: 112, emphasis mine). These images are pleasurable be-
cause they respond to, and momentarily address, our existential fear that
the world has been lost to us. It is for these reasons, returning to Borgmann,
that the viewing of photographic images does in fact constitute the exact
kind of focal practice that he valorises. Although Heidegger laments the
ushering in of the age of the world picture because he fears that our on-
totheological bias will render the world instrumental, disenchanted, as if
entirely for us, it is actually in the photograph and the film that Dasein re-
discovers the possibility of epiphany, of transformation. When we see a
photographic projection, it no longer “seems as though man everywhere
and always encounters only himself” (Heidegger, 1977b: 27); rather we see
a world for itself, to which we are invisible and unable to affect. The pho-
tograph shows us a world where the stuff of the world returns once again
to being things rather than mere objects; they are invested with significance
and power, subject to their own internal and essential qualities and func-
tions, thereby constituting a universe “in which human beings are not on-
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tologically favoured over the rest of nature, in which objects are not props
but natural allies (or enemies) of the human character” (Cavell, 1979: 37).
It is a curious thing: of all of the post-Heideggerian theorists we discussed,
it is perhaps Andrew Feenberg who is closest to the truth. For the photo-
graph is evidence of exactly the kind of process that he describes: when
he writes about how an analysis of games like Go rightly casts doubt upon
Habermas’ story of technological determinism and neutrality, it is because
Go is an example of a practice where “ambiguity has been removed from the
field of play”, as well as enforcing “the artificial equalisation of the players
who, in everyday life, are sure to be subtly differentiated in ways the game
ignores” (Feenberg, 1995: 112-113). Practices such as Go are constituted by
a set of behaviours which are strictly formal and not subject to contingent
facts; as I wrote in chapter 3.2, whether or not the Go board is on a cruise
ship, a sub-arctic island or a lava field will not bear relevantly upon the
means by which the game is played. However, in spite of these facts, the
game ends up being saddled with all manner of existential and aesthetic
baggage; how one plays the game is anything but incidental to the practice.
Now photography, per philosophers like Scruton, seems to be not dissimi-
lar in many important respects. It seems to us to be a merely mechanistic
image-producing process, denuded of intention and able to accurately cap-
ture the world because of that fact. However, in spite of the observation that
it seems to be like those Habermasian “characteristics of modern science and
technological rationality” (Achterhuis, 2001: 82 and Feenberg, 1995: 113), it
provides a necessary and significant service. The photograph, the “epistem-
ically special” object, has been integrated into our lifeworlds in a way that
is as important as it was unexpected; in an example of what Feenberg calls
“secondary instrumentation”, the the photographic image has been repur-
posed in such a way as to be existentially satisfying; whereas the loss of
myths and grand narratives guarantees that photographic image cannot tell
us how to live, it does nonetheless show us the possibility of having lives
worth living, that our actions can be “inscribed within a horizon of possible
meaning” (Marrati, 2003: 79).
Borgmann is suspicious of “video culture” because he fears that it is hy-
perreal, and in a sense he is correct. For the photographic universe is one
with which we feel that we have otherwise lost touch; as our old forms
of life recede from us inexorably, it is our only reminder that we once felt
things to be animated with spirit. He fails to realise—or perhaps fails to
appreciate—that the unique properties of the photographic image show to
us a world in which burning bushes speak to shepherds looking for lost
sheep; wherein herds of swine speak with the tongues of demons; where
men of rude countenance and humble origins can perform miracles and re-
veal themselves as the son of God. Moreover, the mythic properties of cin-
ema provide us with shared narratives in a world that has been atomised by
the instrumental, performative application of our technology. Error though
it is, experiencing photographic images allows us to once again feel as if the
world has substance; as if the Being that we feel has been stripped from it
5.2 renewing our vows to the world 164
has been reinstated and reinstantiated. Pushed away from with the world
by scepticism, we return to it with a very particular kind of faith, armed
with a very particular kind of artefact: the photograph. Although the gods
have been lost to us, never to return, photographic images—our machines
for living—provide us with the means to once again acknowledge and call
upon the divinities.
6 F INALE : R I BBONS OF DREAMS
What are we to do with our imaginations? Love them and
believe in them to the point of having to destroy and falsify
them (perhaps this is the meaning of Orson Welles’ films). But
when, in the end, they reveal themselves to be empty and unful-
filled, when they show the nullity of which they are made, only
then can we pay the price for their truth and understand that
Dulcinea—whom we have saved—cannot love us. (Agamben,
2007: 93-94)
We conclude this work with a summation of our findings this far, beginning
with the commencement of our analysis in chapter 2. I began with a de-
fence of a very specific kind of epistemic approach, as developed by Barry
Allen in his Knowledge and Civilization and, to a lesser extent, Artifice and
Design. Postulating that traditional sentential or propositional—that is to
say, linguistic—epistemological systems were inadequate to the task of ade-
quately explaining the internal processes of design, I argued that knowledge
was instead best characterised as a kind of intentional performance. More-
over, this intentional performance need not have a strict outcome in mind
for it to be an expression of knowledge; invoking David Pye and drawing
a type-token distinction between types of objects and individual instances
of objects, I claimed that one need not be in possession of the final form of
an artefact (understood loosely) for the performance to be knowledgeable—
a concept that seems prima facie incompatible with sentential or proposi-
tional theories of knowledge. Building upon that assumption, I then en-
gaged in an historical analysis of the evolution of tool use in hominins, first
pointing out that intentional, knowledgeable tool use in hominins predates
the development of language by over two million years. Subsequently I ar-
gued, via the work of Roy Rappaport and other anthropologists, that the
capacity for intentional tool use is a necessary precondition for the devel-
opment of language, before arguing, via Allen, that “knowledge” should
be best understood as a “superlative artefactual performance” rather than
being premised upon a linguistic faculty. After providing an extensive justi-
fication for this claim, I then proposed a method of parsing the relationship
that Allen’s artefacts hold with the world, arguing that they are a irreducibly
emergent property of the facts of the matter by virtue of the fact that they
are naturally supervenient effects that are contingent upon but not deducible
from lower-level phenomena. Consequently, Allen’s epistemology indicates
that we can only imperfectly access the world just as we are categorically
incapable of providing a complete account of the global A-facts even were
we in possession of a complete account of our B-facts—that is, our artefacts.
As a result, it seems obvious that the irreducibly emergent nature of our
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artefacts presents an excellent reason as to why it is impossible in Allen’s
view to attain any kind of complete or unambiguous picture of the world
beneath the artefacts—impossible, even, to make contact with the Real in
any significant, non-attenuated way.
Thereafter, in chapter 3 I argued that, despite this being the case—that is,
that our artefacts are world-constituting—we are nonetheless suspicious of
an overly technologised world; we find it existentially problematic. Tracing
a thread from Martin Heidegger, through Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Haber-
mas and Andrew Feenberg, and then onto Alfred Borgmann and Don Ihde,
I explored the various forms that this anxiety has adopted, as well as the pro-
posed means of addressing the problem. Consequently, I concluded chapter
3 with an analysis of Bernard Steigler and a reintroduction of Heidegger, ar-
guing that technology poses two nested concerns. The first, I claimed, is
that we fear that technology is denuding us of our agency; as the accel-
erating complexity of our world renders it opaque to us, we are forced to
consider the possibility of a future wherein we are stripped of the possibil-
ity of meaningful social or political action. The second fear, moreover, is
a kind of expansion upon the first: whereas the first fear is a response to
the changing character of lived experience, the second poses the idea that
technology has the potential to change the kinds of beings that we are. We
have become sceptical of the world’s authenticity as our experiences grow
more mediated, and this has subsequently introduced a kind of inescapable
ontological nihilism: we fear that we are losing our sense of ourselves as
we confront the possibility of a world without meaning.
It is in chapter 4 that I introduced the photographic image to the pic-
ture. Beginning with an overview of analytic philosophy of photography, I
demonstrated why certain prevailing theories—particularly what is known
as the “transparency thesis”—are premised upon a misunderstanding of the
relationship that photographs have with the world. Subsequently, I engaged
in a substantive analysis of the moving parts of the photographic image—
photographer, camera, thing-in-itself, photograph and viewer—explaining
the deeply contingent skein of intentional and automatic relations that hold
between parts. Then, building upon that analysis, I explained why looking
at a photograph of an object is not equivalent to looking at an object due
to the absence of egocentric spatial information; although we might reason-
ably say that a photograph naturally means the world, our account of that
data is entirely non-natural. Despite our sentiments and beliefs to the con-
trary, there are no “facts” in a photograph; without some kind of intelligible
narrative—some non-natural account—photographs say nothing to us. They
are information-carrying in the sense that they provide us with visual data
in a manner that is more reliable that painting, and they are “epistemically
special” for this fact. However, this visual data does not itself comprise a
fact or a field of facts; the data must be received, sorted, parsed and then
narrativised in order for us to make sense of it, denuded as the image is of
egocentric spatial information.
finale: ribbons of dreams 167
Finally, chapter 5 is the section in which I tied together these disparate
threads. Accordingly, I argued that it is the epistemic specialness of pho-
tographic images, both moving and still, that provides a means of bridging
both the unapologetic pragmatism of Allen’s analytic philosophy of tech-
nology and the existential anxiety of Heideggerian philosophy of technol-
ogy. Using the scholarship of Gilles Deleuze, Paola Marrati, Stanley Cavell
and Robert Sinnerbrink, and with specific reference to Deleuze’s crisis of
the action-image, I claimed that photographs, by virtue of their presumed
indexicality (and thus presumed veridicality) serve as a panacea to the ex-
istential doubts expressed by post-Heideggerian philosophers of technol-
ogy. Unlike other kinds of image—indeed, entirely unlike other kinds of
objects in general—photographic images, whether moving or still, force us
to recommit to the world in a serious and substantive way. The truth or
falsity of the contents of these images is irrelevant, because the power of
photographs is not contingent upon us believing that the contents of the
image are indeed the case; rather, because they seem to capture a glimpse
of the world, we are forced to take the world seriously by virtue of our pre-
theoretic intuitions about the relationship that holds between photographs
and the things-in-themselves. Finally, I argued, photographs in short are
machines for living—mere heuristic solutions to our epistemic scepticism
and ontological nihilism, but no less remarkable for the fact.
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